J. Frederick Motz

How Judge Motz rules, drawn from 20 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Motz no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
Position
district
Status
Deceased
Served
1985–2023
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
1985-07-12
Education
Wesleyan University, A.B. (1964); University of Virginia School of Law, LL.B. (1967)
Signed orders read
20

How Judge Motz decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Glynn, Motz treated documented workplace toxicity as a legitimate reason for termination independent of protected activity.

“It is perfectly legitimate for an employer to terminate an employee who *419 proves toxic to a work environment.”

In Libonati, he enforced the federal court’s obligation to exercise jurisdiction where the parallel probate proceeding could not resolve title to the disputed assets.

“Ultimately, there are no factors that outweigh this Court’s obligation to exercise jurisdiction.”

In Scott, Motz treated the derivative contract and consumer claims as dependent on the plaintiffs first establishing the claimed credit-statute violation.

“Because Plaintiffs cannot prevail on their CLEC claim for the reasons discussed above, these remaining claims necessarily fail as well.”

Procedural preferences

In Equal Rights Center, Motz rejected an unusually exacting pleading demand for associational standing.

“even general allegations of harm are sufficient to enable an organization asserting representative standing to survive a motion to dismiss.”

In Kircher, he found that prolonged affirmative participation in federal proceedings waived a procedural removal objection.

“It is equally well-established a plaintiff who ‘engages in affirmative activity in federal court typically waives the right to seek remand.’”

In Hawkins, Motz distinguished a legally insufficient complaint from sanctionable advocacy.

“However, mere failure to survive a motion to dismiss does not necessarily support sanctions.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Mayo v. Board of Educ. of Prince George's County
· 2011-07-14
Motions to remand (plaintiffs) Denied

“plaintiffs motion to remand (document 13) is denied.”

Motions to dismiss (school-board defendants) Granted

“Defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted.”

Motions to dismiss (union defendant) Granted
Coutinho & Ferrostaal Inc. v. M/V Federal Rhine
· 2011-07-29
Motion for declaratory judgment (terminal operator) Granted

“Defendant Rukert Terminals Corporation’s Second Motion for Declaratory Judgment (document 85) is granted;”

Boyd v. Bell
· 2011-05-24
Summary judgment (defendant plan) Granted

“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted”

Scott v. Nuvell Financial Services LLC
· 2011-06-07
Summary judgment (defendants in Scott) Granted

“That Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (document 79) is granted;”

Summary judgment (defendant in Gardner) Granted

“That Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (document 51) is granted;”

Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
· 2011-07-05
Motion to intervene (environmental organizations) Granted

“The motion to intervene filed by Chesapeake Bay Foundation, et al. is granted;”

Petition for review (steel company) Granted in part

“The petition filed by Severstal Sparrows Point LLC is granted to the extent that it requests that I resolve a dispute over the effect of the April 23, 2003 Bankruptcy Sale Order entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York;”

Kensington Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. v. Montgomery County
· 2011-05-31
Motions to dismiss (county defendant) Granted

“defendant Montgomery County’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint (document 17) is granted.”

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC
· 2011-07-05
Motions to dismiss (ArcelorMittal) Granted in part

“ArcelorMittal’s Motion to Dismiss (document 17) is granted in part and denied in part;”

Motions to dismiss (Severstal) Granted in part

“Severstal’s Motion to Dismiss (document 19) is granted in part and denied in part.”

Glynn v. IMPACT SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, INC.
· 2011-08-25
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“I therefore deny Glynn's Motion for Summary Judgment as to retaliation and grant IST's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Glynn's FCA Retaliation claim (Count I).”

Summary judgment (employer defendant) Granted
T-Mobile Northeast LLC v. Frederick County Board of Appeals
· 2010-12-30
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (document 14) granted.”

Equal Rights Center v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
· 2011-01-31
Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff organization) Granted

“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 51) is granted;”

Ross v. Early
· 2011-02-25
Motion for qualified immunity and reconsideration (defendants) Granted in part

“Defendants’ Motion for Qualified Immunity and for Reconsideration (no. 48) is granted in part and denied in part;”

LIBONATI v. Ransom
· 2009-10-22
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“I deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and deny Defendant’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings of this Court.”

Motions to stay (defendants) Denied

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 809 days (N = 10).

A fixed-seed sample of ten terminated historical cases included three product-liability matters, two cases without a retained nature-of-suit label, and one each involving other civil rights, personal-property damage, prisoner civil rights, insurance, and employment civil rights. None retained a motion-entry timeline.

A historical record

Judge Motz no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.