Frederic N. Smalkin

How Judge Smalkin rules, drawn from 21 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Smalkin no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
Position
district
Status
No longer serving
Appointed by
Ronald Reagan (Republican)
Commissioned
1986-09-26
Education
Johns Hopkins University, B.A. (1968); University of Maryland School of Law, J.D. (1971)
Signed orders read
21

How Judge Smalkin decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Henderson, Smalkin treated an unreasonable and prejudicial delay as a viable Title VII laches defense.

“Laches is a defense that can be raised in a Title VII case where there has been an unreasonable delay on the part of a private plaintiff and its undue prejudice to the defendant.”

In Wiedenhoeft, he gave substantial weight to the public interest in protecting highly classified information when assessing emergency relief.

“the intense public interest in safeguarding such information usually far outweighs an individual’s right to access to it, even when that access is critical to the individual’s employment.”

In Dunn, he remanded supplemental state claims after the sole federal claim was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

“state-law based claims supplemental thereto must be remanded, rather than dismissed, after an Eleventh Amendment dismissal of the only ‘federal’ claim in suit.”

Procedural preferences

In Canavan, Smalkin found a bill of particulars unnecessary when the indictment and ordinary criminal discovery gave adequate notice.

“the indictment adequately apprises the defendant of the charges against him so that he can prepare a defense”

In Larson, he declined to revisit a state arbitration panel chair’s supported good-cause determination.

“This Court will not second-guess the panel chairman’s determination of good cause.”

In Miller, he enforced bankruptcy-estate standing before reaching class certification.

“the trustee alone has standing to bring that claim.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Dunn v. Baltimore County Board of Education
· 2000-02-09
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“dismissing plaintiffs ADEA claim, and remanding his remaining claims to the Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore County.”

Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted
United States v. Recinos-Gallegos
· 2001-07-03
Postconviction petition (defendant) Denied

“That the section 2255 motion of the defendant, construed as such and also construed as a petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. section 2241 BE, and it hereby IS, summarily DENIED and DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases;”

United States v. Canavan
· 2001-08-10
Motion for bill of particulars (defendant) Denied

“The Motion for Bill of Particulars is summarily denied,”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“The Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is also summarily denied.”

Townsend v. United States
· 1999-03-15
Postconviction petition (petitioner) Denied

“That the petition for writ of audita querela filed herein BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED;”

Brashear v. Simms
· 2001-04-12
Screening dismissal (court) Granted

“That this case BE, and it hereby IS, SUMMARILY DISMISSED, as legally frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l);”

Henderson v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education
· 1998-10-14
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted in part

“the defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted as to Count I of the amended complaint, all defendants, except Anne Arundel County Board of Education, are dismissed, and all claims for punitive damages are also dismissed.”

Ceesay v. Immigration & Naturalization Service
· 1997-10-01
Motions to transfer (court) Granted

“this case BE, and the same hereby IS, TRANSFERRED to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631;”

Shiver v. United States
· 1999-02-04
Motions to dismiss (United States) Granted

“the defendant United States’ motion to dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and the complaint is dismissed as against it and against Attorney General Janet Reno for lack of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).”

Maryland Electrical Industry Health Fund v. Levitt
· 2001-08-08
Cross motions for summary judgment (both parties) Moot / procedural

“That the cross-motions filed by the parties for summary judgment BE, and they hereby ARE, MOOTED;”

Buckingham v. United States
· 2000-01-03
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, denying the plaintiffs cross-motion, and denying the plaintiffs motion to certify a question of law to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied
Motion to certify question (plaintiff) Denied
Larson v. Peninsula Regional Medical Center
· 1998-02-17
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“the defendant’s motion to dismiss is hereby denied”

Tsalafaos v. Tsalafaos
· 1999-02-02
Petition for warrant (petitioner) Denied

“this Court hereby denies the Petition for Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habe-as Corpus.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 365.5 days (N = 10).

A fixed-seed sample of ten terminated historical cases included four without a retained nature-of-suit label and one each involving motor-vehicle personal injury, other personal liability, disability-benefits review, other contract, securities, and labor-management relations. None retained a motion-entry timeline.

A historical record

Judge Smalkin no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.