Charles Stanley Blair

How Judge Blair rules, drawn from 19 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Blair no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
Position
district
Status
Deceased
Served
1971–1980
Appointed by
Richard Nixon (Republican)
Commissioned
1971-07-29
Education
University of Maryland, B.S. (1951); University of Maryland School of Law, LL.B. (1953)
Signed orders read
19

How Judge Blair decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In the Board of Education case, Blair permitted a jurisdictional amendment where the existing pleading already made the parties’ diverse citizenship apparent.

“These authorities suggest, and common sense dictates, that the amendment ought to be permitted in the instant case.”

In Sharp, Blair treated differently worded excess-benefit agreements according to their shared practical obligation.

“Although the language differs, all convey the same substantive rights and impose similar obligations on the parties.”

In Byers, Blair required a statutory-negligence plaintiff to fall within the protected class and to allege the kind of harm the statute was designed to prevent.

“To use a statutory duty as a foundation for a negligence claim, the plaintiff must show that it was within the class of persons the legislation was intended to protect and that the alleged injury was of the type of harm which the statute was intended to prevent.”

Procedural preferences

In Nelson, Blair followed the district’s usual sequencing of a party deposition before production of that party’s prior statement.

“Thus, it would appear that in the usual situation in this district the practice is to require the production of the plaintiff’s statement after the plaintiff has been deposed.”

In Fathers United, Blair abstained where a state-court interpretation of a new constitutional amendment could avoid or narrow the federal question.

“this court holds that it should abstain from ruling on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.”

In Swearingen Aviation, Blair maintained narrowly drawn secrecy orders after examining evidence about the grand jury investigation.

“the court finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that it is essential that these orders remain in effect to preserve the legitimate functions of the grand jury and the integrity of the judicial process itself.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Williams v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Insurance
· 1980-03-13
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.”

Board of Education v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
· 1980-03-05
Motion to amend (defendant) Granted

“That the defendant’s amendment to the petition for removal be, and the same hereby is, permitted;”

Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“That the plaintiff’s motion to remand be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.”

United States v. Articles of Drug Panapar VK
· 1978-10-02
Motion to withdraw claim (claimant) Moot / procedural

“That Copanos’ motion to withdraw its claim, except as provided above, is moot.”

Nelson v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc.
· 1976-11-29
Motion for protective order (defendant) Granted

“ORDERED that the plaintiff submit to deposition prior to the production by the defendant of the plaintiff’s statement and that, at the close of the deposition, the defendant immediately furnish to the plaintiff a copy of all statements which the' plaintiff may have given to the defendant.”

Motions to compel (plaintiff) Granted in part
Shacter v. Shacter
· 1979-03-16
Bankruptcy appeal (appellant) Denied

“ORDERED that the orders of the bankruptcy court be, and hereby are, AFFIRMED.”

Cilento v. BT Credit Co., Inc.
· 1977-01-05
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“That defendant’s motion to dismiss the prayer for punitive damages in this cause be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; That defendant’s motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED in all other respects.”

Fathers United for Equal Rights v. Circuit Court for Baltimore County
· 1973-08-06
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Therefore, we conclude that the sounder choice is to dismiss the suit without prejudice.”

Lanham v. Amoco Oil Co.
· 1979-11-26
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“That defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“That plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.”

In re Swearingen Aviation Corp.
· 1979-07-30
Motion to vacate (Swearingen Aviation Corporation and Fairchild Industries, Inc.) Denied

“That the motion of Swearingen Aviation Corporation and Fairchild Industries, Inc. to vacate be, and hereby is, DENIED;”

Lenox v. S. A. Healy Co.
· 1978-11-16
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to remand this case to the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland be, and hereby is, GRANTED.”

United States v. Robinson
· 1974-09-12
Motion to withdraw guilty plea (defendant) Denied

“For the aforementioned reasons, the defendant Robinson’s motion for leave to withdraw his guilty plea is, this 12th day of September, 1974, denied.”

Sharp v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
· 1978-12-26
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“That plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment be, and hereby is, GRANTED;”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“That defendant’s motion for summary judgment be, and hereby is, DENIED;”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

No assigned historical dockets were returned, so no sampled case-mix description is available.

A historical record

Judge Blair no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.