Benson Everett Legg
How Judge Legg rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Legg no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Legg decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Greenan, Legg treated an informal grievance alleging discrimination as protected opposition activity.
“To qualify as opposition activity, an employee need not engage in the formal process of adjudicating a discrimination claim.”
In PC Construction, he read contractual modifiers through ordinary grammar while allowing context and common sense to control.
“qualifying words or phrases are presumed to refer to the language immediately preceding the qualifier, unless context and common sense suggest otherwise.”
In the pre-indictment restraint matter, he required a remedy capable of preserving traceable property rather than relying on an ineffective prohibition alone.
“Only an order affirmatively directing Hailey to produce and deliver the traceable property in his possession to the custody of the court will accomplish that end.”
Procedural preferences
In LWRC International, Legg declined to reward an anticipatory filing prompted by stalled settlement discussions.
“the race will certainly not go to the litigant who sprinted for the Courthouse after tying his adversary’s shoelaces together.”
In Doe, he emphasized the practical discovery value of a confidentiality order.
“A protective order in a case such as this greatly facilitates discovery.”
In Western Maryland Wireless, he decided the motions on the papers because the disputes were confined to clear legal issues.
“No hearing is required because the issues are narrow, purely legal in nature, and indisputably clear.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion to vacate”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City’s Motion to Amend its Complaint (Docket No. 74).”
“GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Board’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 15)”
“GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No. 16)”
“The following property (hereinafter, collectively, the ‘Property’) is restrained in the manners described below.”
“Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Bank of America will freeze and restrain all funds”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate Order of even date, GRANT the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court will, by separate order, GRANT Sears’s Motion for Summary Judgment”
“deny the EEOC’s motion for summary judgment”
“grant Baltimore County’s motion for summary judgment”
“GRANT the County defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the sole federal count, Count 3 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), only”
“we shall GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss by separate Order.”
“GRANT the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment”
“DENIES Warren Poison’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment;”
“DENIES Nelson’s Motion to Dismiss for Excessive Pre-Indictment Delay;”
“DENIES Polston’s Motion to Compel Co-Conspirator Proffer Pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E);”
“DENIES Nelson’s Motion to Compel Co-Conspirator Proffer Pursuant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E);”
“DENIES Nelson’s Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence;”
“DENIES Nelson’s Motion for Discovery;”
“DENIES Nelson’s Motion for Disclosure of Relevant Witness Statements.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 282.5 days (N = 10).
A fixed sample of ten terminated historical cases included two employment civil-rights matters, two contract matters, and one each involving insurance, lease disputes, retirement benefits, motor-vehicle injury, prisoner civil rights, and a motion to vacate sentence. None retained a motion-entry timeline.
A historical record
Judge Legg no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.