Christopher K. Barry-Smith
How Judge Barry-Smith decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On statutory standing, he looks past a bare notice or disclosure violation and asks whether the plaintiff can point to any concrete, non-speculative consequence that actually flowed from it -- a technical violation with no real-world impact does not make someone a 'person aggrieved.'
“It caused no appreciable harm -- on plaintiffs, their employment applications, their decision-making, or their lives. The deprivation indeed infringed plaintiffs' legal right -- in receiving a required disclosure -- but any harm was de minimis, purely technical, not an appreciable harm.”
In separating opinion from actionable defamation, he draws the line at whether a statement asserts something a jury could verify as objectively true or false, regardless of how emotionally loaded the language is -- accusing someone of a specific crime crosses the line even amid florid rhetoric, while statements of felt experience do not.
“statements reasonably could be understood to state as a matter of provable truth or falsity that based on Knouse's personal knowledge of Sabatini and their relationship, he committed some level of sexual crime against her (rape and/or assault), and has a history of sexually harassing the subordinate women in his lab.”
On an attorney's ethical duty when a drafting mistake favors their own client, he holds that recognizing but staying silent about an opposing counsel's error -- even while building a defensible rationalization for why it might not really be a mistake -- is not enough to defeat reformation once the silence is proven.
“They may not remain silent and take advantage of the mistake, even in pursuit of their client's interest. This rule governs even if an attorney, after recognizing a mistake, also formulates a credible explanation for why the mistake, after all, might not be a mistake.”
Procedural preferences
Facing genuinely unresolved contract-identification problems at the pleading stage (which of two competing, disputed contracts governs), he prefers a guided leave-to-amend over an outright dismissal, laying out in the order itself what the amended pleading needs to fix and setting a concrete schedule for a renewed motion.
“this order responds to the defendants' motions to dismiss by granting Calvary leave to amend its complaint in order to address the infirmities discussed below. I anticipate that defendants will meet such an amended complaint with renewed motions to dismiss, so my order below establishes a schedule to have any such renewed motions to dismiss heard before the end of 2026.”
Interpreting two contracts executed close in time by overlapping but not identical parties, he gives controlling weight to the later, more specific, on-point clause (a lease's own non-arbitration provision) over a broader arbitration clause in an earlier, related agreement -- rather than assuming the earlier document's terms simply carry over.
“Where the parties' disputes predominately arise from the Sublease's terms, and they have not mutually agreed to arbitration, the Non-Arbitration Clause controls.”
Reviewing a special litigation/demand-review committee's rejection of a shareholder derivative demand, he defers to a detailed, well-documented investigative report and puts the burden squarely on plaintiffs to rebut its good faith with particularized facts, not just the existence of a large adverse verdict elsewhere that was later vacated.
“the DRC's demand refusals were reasonable and supported, and fell within the discretion afforded to it under the business judgment rule.”
On third-party discovery he disfavors deposing opposing litigation counsel directly, requiring the requesting party to show both that the information is crucial and that it cannot be obtained any other way (such as from the other participants themselves) before allowing such a deposition to proceed.
“MIAA has not shown that the information it seeks to gain by deposing the Town's lawyers is crucial to MIAA's preparation of the case. Nor has MIAA shown that no other means exists to obtain the information.”
Cautions
An LLC member cannot use the implied covenant of good faith to manufacture rights the operating agreement itself does not provide -- if the agreement expressly authorizes a majority-approved sale and disclaims fiduciary duties among members, a minority member's dissatisfaction with the outcome does not survive a motion to dismiss.
“Packnett proposes to use the implied covenant not to obtain the benefits of the contract she signed, but to provide new rights, contrary to the terms of the Operating Agreement.”
A receiver appointed by a state court to wind down a multistate business cannot expect a blanket nationwide litigation stay -- he will confine a state-court receivership's protective reach to the receiver's own localized operations and assets, leaving out-of-state creditors and landlords free to pursue their own claims.
“That stretches too far the appropriate reach of a state court receivership.”
A party seeking to justify a corporate deadlock remedy (a custodian or a receiver) must show an actual or imminent injury to the company itself, not merely point to the deadlock's existence or to unflattering conduct like a Fifth Amendment invocation in discovery -- a company that is still operating and roughly breaking even will not get a court-appointed outsider just because the principals cannot agree.
“Despite a deadlock 'in the management of corporate affairs' and that 'the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock,' the parties have not shown an actual or threatened injury to Gebsco.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Takeda's motion to dismiss is allowed as to the following claims: ... In all other respects, the motion to dismiss is denied.”
“WADG's motion for summary judgment is allowed. WADG's primary insurance has been exhausted because its primary carrier is insolvent and will not be paying on any covered claims, and Federal is obligated to 'step down' and provide coverage under its policy.”
“Winslow's motion to dismiss is allowed as to Count IX alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, but is otherwise denied. ... Wasabi's motion to dismiss is allowed as to Count XI alleging fraudulent misrepresentation, but is otherwise denied.”
“Brookfield's motion to dismiss is allowed with respect to Rumble's claims for breach of the Lease ... and is otherwise denied. The Landlord's ... motion to dismiss is denied.”
“Landlord's allegations, accepted as true, state a plausible claim that Landlord may be entitled to pierce the corporate veil of Tenant and reach the Tenant affiliates.”
“The review of the entirety of Overjet's complaint demonstrates that Overjet has identified the business information that it alleges is confidential and qualifies for protection as trade secrets.”
“the Commonwealth's motion for a preliminary injunction is allowed. Kalshi's motion to dismiss is denied. The Commonwealth is entitled to a preliminary injunction prohibiting Kalshi from offering sports-related event contracts in the absence of the required license under the Sports Wagering Law.”
“Because Kalshi's motion to dismiss is predicated entirely on its preemption argument, which fails for the reasons outlined above, that motion also fails. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied.”
“QS/Ross by full, clear and decisive proof, have shown they are entitled to reformation of the Settlement Agreement, to include a release of claims by Cahoon/Mis in favor of QS/Ross that is equivalent to the release of claims running from QS/Ross to Cahoon/Mis.”
“Because plaintiffs cannot show that they suffered a harm from defendants' violation of the notice provision that is more than minimal or slightly appreciable, or a harm that is more than speculative, they do not qualify as 'persons aggrieved' ... The complaints therefore will be dismissed for lack of standing.”
“AMTAX's motion for summary judgment on Count 1 is allowed, limited to the entry of a declaratory judgment that a binding and enforceable contract exists between the parties for the sale of the Property under the ROR, and that the exit taxes component of the purchase price is to be paid directly to AMTAX. The claim is otherwise denied.”
“the motion by Knouse is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part”
“the motion by Whitehead and Lehmann is ALLOWED”
“MIAA has not shown that the information it seeks to gain by deposing the Town's lawyers is crucial to MIAA's preparation of the case. Nor has MIAA shown that no other means exists to obtain the information ... For these reasons, the Town's motion to quash the subpoenas ... is allowed.”
Put Judge Barry-Smith's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Barry-Smith actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Barry-Smith's own signed orders and cites them.