Thomas W. Lawless
How Judge Lawless rules, drawn from 18 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Lawless no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Lawless decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
The court treated the bank's failure to investigate its collateral as distinct from intentional deception by the debtor.
“The debtor’s alleged failure to inform the Bank of the boat’s documented status at most constitutes negligence, and does not establish a basis for declaring the debt involved nondischargeable in the contemplation of bankruptcy law.”
Procedural preferences
Venue transfer required a clear, substantial balance in favor of the proposed forum, not a simple shift of inconvenience.
“Where a transfer would merely shift the inconvenience from one party to the other or where after balancing all the factors, the equities lean but slightly in favor of the movant, the ... choice of forum should not be disturbed.”
Cautions
Equitable considerations did not permit revival of an already terminated lease.
“Courts will not revive a terminated lease simply because of the lease’s importance to the reorganization efforts.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Bank has failed to establish a case under either § 523(a)(2)(A) or § 523(a)(6). Accordingly, the debt here involved may be discharged.”
“In accordance with the above, the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
“the landlord is entitled to payment through the date of this memorandum (May 29, 1985) in the amount of $30,100.”
“The landlord’s claim for interest is allowed in the amount of $1899.”
“I have determined that a reasonable fee for the services rendered is $3500.”
“The request for $100 fee for word processing is denied as this constitutes overhead of the attorneys office. The request for reimbursement for ‘xerox, telephone, mise.’ is denied as it is merely an estimated charge, and no detail is provided. Expenses are allowed in the amount of $205.”
“In accordance with the above, the relief requested in the defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.”
“Accordingly, Sullivan & Worcester’s request for an upward adjustment of these attorneys’ hourly rates is denied.”
“Accordingly, final fees are awarded to the firm of Goldstein & Manello in the amount of $519,800.83”
“Accordingly, this applicant is awarded a final fee of $345,606.63”
“No objection was timely filed to the final accounts submitted by the trustees and receivers and they are allowed.”
“all pending adversary proceedings and contested matters are dismissed with prejudice except only the pending dispute between the debtor Rosewood Gardens Health Related and New York State”
“Accordingly, counsel’s request for an upward adjustment is denied.”
“John D. Hanify and the law firm of Hanify & King are awarded a final fee of $62,128”
“this applicant is allowed final reimbursement of expenses of $1,559.12”
“this applicant is awarded a final fee of $16,500”
“M.G. Sherman & Co., accountants, is awarded a final fee of $3,400”
“Accordingly, an order shall enter denying both Motions.”
“the defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is allowed.”
“I order that periodic payments be paid to the Commonwealth as adequate protection of its secured interest in the Debtor’s equipment at the rate of $823.00 per week, commencing Monday, December 5, 1983, in lieu of the interim order of $500.00 per week.”
“In accordance with the above, the relief requested in the debtor’s motion for authority to assume executory contract is DENIED.”
“The plaintiff-debtor’s complaint to avoid a judicial lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1) is accordingly denied and the complaint is DISMISSED.”
“the Debtor’s motion to strike appearance, proof of claim and motion of Anthony R. Martin-Trigona is allowed.”
A historical record
Judge Lawless no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.