Thomas E. Stagg Jr.
Judge Stagg no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Stagg decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In employment cases the court grants summary judgment where the plaintiff cannot establish a required element, treating a long gap between protected activity and an adverse action as fatal to causation and requiring evidence of pretext.
“Cleco’s second motion for summary judgment (Record Document 122) is GRANTED.”
The court reads contracts and deeds as a whole and declines to rewrite them: obligations are personal rather than running with the land unless the parties' own drafting choices show they intended otherwise.
“If the parties intended all of the obligations to be predial in nature, they could have easily applied the successors and assigns language to the entire sentence. They did not.”
Procedural preferences
Sitting in diversity, the court applies Louisiana substantive law and makes an 'Erie guess' where the state courts have not spoken, resolving insurance-coverage and contract disputes on the plain meaning of the policy or deed.
“the resulting damage did not manifest until well after the expiration of the Clarendon policy period”
The court polices its own subject-matter jurisdiction, dismissing sua sponte under Rule 12(h)(3) where a claim styled in contract actually arises under a federal scheme that requires exhaustion of administrative remedies first.
“this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the above stated reasons, NorAm’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
“the plaintiffs’ motion to remand is hereby DENIED”
“his motion to remand (Record Document 3) is hereby DENIED”
“Cleco’s second motion for summary judgment (Record Document 122) is GRANTED.”
“Clarendon’s first motion for summary judgment (Record Document 9) is GRANTED.”
“Clarendon’s second motion for summary judgment (Record Document 33) is MOOT.”
“AVIC’s motion for summary judgment is (Record Document 28) is GRANTED.”
“Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. See Record Document 23. All claims by Franks against Union Pacific are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“the defendants’ motions to dismiss (Record Documents 19 and 20) are GRANTED. All of the Bernofskys claims against the LRA and the OCD are dismissed without prejudice.”
“All of the federal claims asserted against ICF are dismissed with prejudice.”
“The defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).”
“Cleco’s second motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”
“Cleco’s second motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”
“both of the motions for summary judgment are GRANTED.”
“the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED to the extent that it requests the court to issue a finding regarding the liability of the defendants. However, the plaintiffs’ request for a declaration that Capital’s liability is not capped by the FTC Holder Rule is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 194 days (N = 13).
Sampled from the judge's senior-era civil cohort (filed 2005-2013). As a senior judge the mix skews heavily toward prisoner habeas, Section 2255 vacate-sentence, and other petitions against the United States, with a smaller number of diversity real-property and personal-injury suits — a reduced docket consistent with senior status.
A historical record
Judge Stagg no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.