Earl Ernest Veron

How Judge Veron rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Veron no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana
Position
District judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1977–1990
Appointed by
Jimmy Carter (Democratic)
Commissioned
August 5, 1977
Education
McNeese State University, B.A., 1957; Louisiana State University (Paul M. Hebert Law Center), J.D., 1959
Signed orders read
28

About Judge Veron

Earl Ernest Veron was a judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, Judge Veron received a commission on August 5, 1977. Judge Veron assumed senior status on February 13, 1990 and served until death on August 28, 1990.

How Judge Veron decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Hebert v. Kerr-McGee, Veron held that a neighboring state's anti-indemnity statute governed an Outer Continental Shelf contract dispute and that the federal Seckinger rule did not displace the statute.

“the Court therefore holds that the rule enunciated in Seckinger does not displace an adjacent state anti-indemnity statute on the Shelf.”

In Poole v. Marlin Drilling, Veron granted summary judgment on a Jones Act claim after finding that the platform worker's connection to a vessel was incidental to his drilling duties. Eating and sleeping aboard the boat for several days did not establish a permanent attachment.

“The fact that Poole slept and ate aboard the boat for a number of days does not establish a permanent attachment to the vessel.”

In Melchiorri v. United States, Veron dismissed an FTCA claim alleging that Army negligence led to a shooting. He held that the intentional-tort exception also barred claims alleging negligence that led to a battery.

“the intentional tort exception to the FTCA bars not only claims based on intentional torts but claims based on negligence leading to intentional torts as well.”

In Airline Car Rental v. Shreveport Airport Authority, Veron found that the Authority was not a participant in the rental-car market because it neither provided nor purchased rental-car services; its fee resolution was therefore subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny.

“The Authority has not entered the market for rental car services. The Authority neither provides nor purchases these services.”

Procedural preferences

In Airline Car Rental, Inc. v. Shreveport Airport Authority, Veron described Rule 12(b)(6) motions as disfavored and denied dismissal of several claims while dismissing others.

“The 12(b)(6) motion is not favored and should rarely be granted”

In Lonthier v. Northwest Insurance, Veron granted the plaintiffs’ motion to remand their Jones Act case. He held that the defendants had not shown the seaman-status allegation was a fraudulent attempt to evade removal, and he declined to pretry that factual issue on remand.

“the defendants must go further and prove that the allegation of Jones Act status is so baseless, colorable and false so as to constitute a fraudulent attempt to evade removal to federal court.”

In Geyen v. Marsh, Veron held that the six-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) barred the plaintiff's suit against the United States and that administrative review did not toll it.

“Failure to bring an action within the time specified is a jurisdictional bar to the claim.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Ecodyne Corp.
441 F. Supp. 787 · 1977-12-05
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“we grant American's motion for summary judgment and order that Ecodyne's third party complaint be dismissed.”

Johansson v. Nunez
473 F. Supp. 1270 · 1979-07-27
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For these reasons we GRANT the motion to dismiss filed by Reliance Insurance Company.”

McCain v. Commercial Union Insurance
592 F. Supp. 1 · 1983-02-07
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.”

Counts v. Lafayette Crewboats, Inc.
622 F. Supp. 299 · 1983-11-08

Maritime personal-injury bench trial. A platform worker was hurt boarding a crewboat in choppy seas. Veron found no negligence by the vessel or platform owner and attributed the fall to the plaintiff's own failure to time his step or use the swing rope, entering judgment for the defendants.

Geyen v. Marsh
587 F. Supp. 539 · 1984-07-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.”

Howard v. Transworld Drilling Co.
592 F. Supp. 1305 · 1984-09-25
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“we hold that section 1441(c) prevails over section 1445(a) and DENY the Howards' Motion to Remand in all respects.”

Schultheiss v. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc.
592 F. Supp. 628 · 1984-09-10
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, the motion of the defendant, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., for summary judgment in its favor is GRANTED and the claim of plaintiff, Arthur L. Schultheiss will be DISMISSED.”

Poole v. Marlin Drilling Co., Inc.
592 F. Supp. 60 · 1984-09-11
Motions to strike (defendant) Denied

“Accordingly, the motion to strike the memorandum and the affidavit is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“the motion by Marlin Drilling Co., Inc. for summary judgment is GRANTED to the extent that David W. Poole cannot maintain a Jones Act claim against the defendant. A sufficient evidentiary basis does not exist at this time, however, to hold that the plaintiff does not have a claim under general maritime tort law against the defendant Marlin Drilling Co., Inc. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED to the extent that the defendant seeks dismissal of the plaintiff's general maritime tort claims.”

Stelly v. United States
598 F. Supp. 344 · 1984-12-05
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“We grant the motion to dismiss the Army and its Corps of Engineers as defendants because the United States is the only proper party defendant in FTCA suits.”

Lunday-Thagard Co. v. United States Department of the Interior
620 F. Supp. 3 · 1984-12-06
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, we GRANT the DOI's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.”

Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Denied

“Accordingly, we DENY Lunday-Tha-gard's Motion for Reconsideration.”

Lonthier v. Northwest Insurance
599 F. Supp. 963 · 1985-01-04
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“Accordingly, the motion to remand is GRANTED.”

Cormie v. Bailor
599 F. Supp. 834 · 1984-12-20

Title VII sex-discrimination bench trial over a Postal Service promotion. Applying the McDonnell Douglas / Burdine framework, Veron found the plaintiff established a prima facie case but that the Postal Service selected a more experienced male candidate for legitimate, non-pretextual reasons, and entered judgment for the defendants.

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 73 days (N = 20).

  • As a district judge in the Lake Charles Division (1977-1990), Veron carried a general civil and criminal docket.
  • The retained enumeration is a slice of 1983-1989 cases: by their captions a mix of oil-and-gas and oilfield-service disputes, maritime and admiralty matters, banking and insurance cases, and prisoner and civil-rights suits typical of southwest Louisiana (e.g. Sample v. Amoco Production, Pirkey v. Despot Exploration, Holt Cargo Systems v. M/V River Oshun, European American Bank v. Broadhurst Sikes, Craig v. Beauregard Parish Jail).
  • Nature-of-suit codes are not retained, so the mix is described chiefly from the captions.
  • The referral magistrate on much of this docket was James Travis Trimble, Jr.

A historical record

Judge Veron no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.