Earl Ernest Veron
Judge Veron no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Veron decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Outer Continental Shelf oilfield litigation he enforces the adjacent state's anti-indemnity statutes, holding that OCSLA adopts state law (not federal common law) as surrogate federal law and that federal contract-indemnity rules do not displace those statutes on the Shelf.
“the Court therefore holds that the rule enunciated in Seckinger does not displace an adjacent state anti-indemnity statute on the Shelf.”
In Jones Act cases he will grant summary judgment against seaman status where the worker's tie to a vessel is only incidental to platform or drilling duties, applying the Fifth Circuit's Longmire analysis rather than sending every marginal claim to a jury.
“The fact that Poole slept and ate aboard the boat for a number of days does not establish a permanent attachment to the vessel.”
He construes waivers of federal sovereign immunity narrowly: the Federal Tort Claims Act's intentional-tort exception bars even negligence claims that lead to an assault or battery, and statutory limitations periods against the United States operate as jurisdictional bars.
“the intentional tort exception to the FTCA bars not only claims based on intentional torts but claims based on negligence leading to intentional torts as well.”
On Commerce Clause challenges to public entities he distinguishes market participants from market regulators, refusing to extend the market-participant shield beyond the specific market the government actually enters.
“The Authority has not entered the market for rental car services. The Authority neither provides nor purchases these services.”
Procedural preferences
He treats Rule 12(b)(6) as testing only the formal sufficiency of the pleading, refusing to dismiss on affirmative defenses unless they appear on the face of the complaint and directing merits arguments to summary judgment or trial.
“The 12(b)(6) motion is not favored and should rarely be granted”
On removal he protects a plaintiff's Jones Act choice of a state forum, holding that a defendant must prove the seaman-status allegation fraudulent before the court will pre-try that issue on a motion to remand.
“the defendants must go further and prove that the allegation of Jones Act status is so baseless, colorable and false so as to constitute a fraudulent attempt to evade removal to federal court.”
He enforces statutes of limitations against the United States strictly, treating the six-year period of 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) as a jurisdictional bar that exhausting administrative remedies does not toll.
“Failure to bring an action within the time specified is a jurisdictional bar to the claim.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“we grant American's motion for summary judgment and order that Ecodyne's third party complaint be dismissed.”
“For these reasons we GRANT the motion to dismiss filed by Reliance Insurance Company.”
“Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.”
Maritime personal-injury bench trial. A platform worker was hurt boarding a crewboat in choppy seas. Veron found no negligence by the vessel or platform owner and attributed the fall to the plaintiff's own failure to time his step or use the swing rope, entering judgment for the defendants.
“For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED.”
“we hold that section 1441(c) prevails over section 1445(a) and DENY the Howards' Motion to Remand in all respects.”
“Accordingly, the motion of the defendant, Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., for summary judgment in its favor is GRANTED and the claim of plaintiff, Arthur L. Schultheiss will be DISMISSED.”
“Accordingly, the motion to strike the memorandum and the affidavit is DENIED.”
“the motion by Marlin Drilling Co., Inc. for summary judgment is GRANTED to the extent that David W. Poole cannot maintain a Jones Act claim against the defendant. A sufficient evidentiary basis does not exist at this time, however, to hold that the plaintiff does not have a claim under general maritime tort law against the defendant Marlin Drilling Co., Inc. Accordingly, the motion is DENIED to the extent that the defendant seeks dismissal of the plaintiff's general maritime tort claims.”
“We grant the motion to dismiss the Army and its Corps of Engineers as defendants because the United States is the only proper party defendant in FTCA suits.”
“Accordingly, we GRANT the DOI's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.”
“Accordingly, we DENY Lunday-Tha-gard's Motion for Reconsideration.”
“Accordingly, the motion to remand is GRANTED.”
Title VII sex-discrimination bench trial over a Postal Service promotion. Applying the McDonnell Douglas / Burdine framework, Veron found the plaintiff established a prima facie case but that the Postal Service selected a more experienced male candidate for legitimate, non-pretextual reasons, and entered judgment for the defendants.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 73 days (N = 20).
As a district judge in the Lake Charles Division (1977-1990), Veron carried a general civil and criminal docket. The retained enumeration is a slice of 1983-1989 cases -- by their captions a mix of oil-and-gas and oilfield-service disputes, maritime and admiralty matters, banking and insurance cases, and prisoner and civil-rights suits typical of southwest Louisiana (e.g. Sample v. Amoco Production, Pirkey v. Despot Exploration, Holt Cargo Systems v. M/V River Oshun, European American Bank v. Broadhurst Sikes, Craig v. Beauregard Parish Jail). Nature-of-suit codes are not retained, so the mix is described chiefly from the captions. The referral magistrate on much of this docket was James Travis Trimble, Jr.
A historical record
Judge Veron no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.