Christine Noland
Judge Noland no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Noland decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Procedural preferences
She holds the party that moves for summary judgment to its initial burden regardless of who it is: when a pro se plaintiff moves for judgment in his own favor without a statement of undisputed facts, affidavits, or competent evidence, she recommends denying the motion rather than reaching the merits, and refers the case back for further proceedings.
“The plaintiff's motion should be denied because he has not met his initial burden of establishing the absence of disputed material facts. ... in the absence of any attempt by the plaintiff to properly support his motion through competent evidence ... his motion is subject to dismissal as a matter of law.”
She enforces the Prison Litigation Reform Act exhaustion requirement strictly, requiring proper completion of every step of the prison grievance process before suit; grievances rejected on initial screening for containing 'multiple claims,' or filed or concluded after the complaint, do not exhaust, and unexhausted claims are dismissed (including sua sponte and as to unserved defendants where the failure is clear on the record).
“not only must the prisoner exhaust all available remedies, but such exhaustion must be proper, including compliance with all prison deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”
In diversity and declaratory-judgment matters she writes a thorough, authority-heavy analysis: faced with a request to declare indemnity rights, she applied the Declaratory Judgment Act discretion factors and Louisiana's Meloy rule to recommend dismissal as premature, declining to resolve an indemnitor's duty to defend before the indemnitee's fault is adjudicated on the merits.
“it is premature to request that this Court resolve the indemnification issue, and any decision by the Court at this juncture would not completely resolve that issue.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“it is recommended that the Motion to Dismiss Action as to FEMA or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 14) filed by defendant, United States of America, on behalf of the United States Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, should be GRANTED; that the Motion to Dismiss FEMA's Motion for Summary Judgment, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff (R. Doc. 17) should be DENIED; and that plaintiff's claims against FEMA, the State of Louisiana, and George Cotton should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“the Motion to Dismiss FEMA's Motion for Summary Judgment, Alternatively, Motion for Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff (R. Doc. 17) should be DENIED”
“it is recommended that the Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, and Alternative, Rule 56 Summary Judgment (R. Doc. 25) filed by defendant, Turner Industries Group, L.L.C., be GRANTED and that this matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as premature because Turner's obligation to indemnify and provide cost of defense cannot be determined until there has been a judicial finding in state court as to the liability, if any, of plaintiff, Exxon Mobil Corporation.”
“It is recommended that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment rec.doc.no. 9, be denied, and that this matter be referred back for further proceedings.”
“It is recommended that the defendants' motion for summary judgment, rec.doc.no. 29, be granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claims against the moving defendants, without prejudice, as a result of the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as mandated by 42 U.S.C. 1997e, but with prejudice to his refiling the same claim in forma pauperis.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Her enumerable assigned docket has two parts: a 28 U.S.C. 636(c) CONSENT civil docket -- chiefly removed diversity insurance and personal-injury suits (e.g. Wal-Mart, Allstate), employment-discrimination cases, ERISA, and Social Security disability appeals, on which she entered the final judgment -- and duty-magistrate criminal-misdemeanor and miscellaneous (tax-indebtedness, 'In Re', IFP) matters. The consent civil cases typically ran several months to a year from filing to judgment.
A historical record
Judge Noland no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.