Wendy B. Vitter
How Judge Vitter decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Federal Arbitration Act + a delegation clause strongly favors arbitration, and the FAA preempts contrary Louisiana law (La. R.S. 23:921) -- arbitration compelled in Priebe.
“This Court has no reason to believe that the Fifth Circuit would reach a different conclusion regarding La. R.S. 23:921, which includes statutory language very similar to La. R.S. 9:2779. Thus, the Court agrees with Defendant that the FAA preempts La. R.S. 23:921(A)(2).”
On summary judgment a movant who points to the ABSENCE of record evidence on an essential element shifts the burden; the non-movant cannot survive on conclusory assertions or 'only a scintilla of evidence' -- but an UNOPPOSED motion is not auto-granted, the movant's burden is unchanged.
“a party moving for summary judgment is not entitled to have their motion granted simply because their motion is unopposed. Rather, its burden remains the same as if the motion was opposed; the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Procedural preferences
Does NOT rubber-stamp unopposed motions and demands the COMPLETE doctrinal analysis: a Rule 12(b)(7) motion must work through both Rule 19(a) ('required') and Rule 19(b) ('indispensable'); a required-party finding alone cannot support dismissal, and the remedy for an un-joined required party is joinder, not dismissal. She DENIED this motion although the plaintiff filed no opposition.
“Simply put, a finding that a party is required under Rule 19(a), standing alone, cannot support dismissal -- the court must also find the absent party to be indispensable after an examination of the Rule 19(b) factors.”
Strict on jurisdictional prerequisites: FTCA administrative exhaustion (28 U.S.C. 2675(a)) is jurisdictional and must exist at filing -- a premature suit is dismissed even if filed one day early and even though the agency later denied the claim.
“Failure to completely exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing a civil action under the FTCA is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured through exhaustion after suit is filed.”
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars state-agency and official-capacity claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (dismissed without prejudice), while qualified immunity disposes of individual-capacity claims on the merits (dismissed with prejudice); leave to amend denied where futile (Williams).
“Plaintiff Purnell Williams's claims against the Attorney General State of Louisiana, DCFS ... and Angela O'Brien in her official capacity are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Reads recurring employment doctrine narrowly even on unopposed motions: under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA only the EMPLOYER is a proper defendant, so individual-employee claims are dismissed with prejudice (Otero, Wallace).
“the proper defendant under a Title VII, Age Discrimination and Employment Act, or Americans with Disabilities Act claim, is the claimant's employer.”
Cautions
Pro se litigants who ignore court orders, scheduling deadlines, and discovery obligations: after repeated warnings and multiple status conferences she will dismiss with prejudice under Rule 41(b) (McDonald). Pro se status does not excuse non-compliance with the Rules.
“A litigant's pro se status neither excuses his failure to effect service nor excuses him for lack of knowledge of the Rules of Civil Procedure.”
Serial/repetitive filings: she tracked Williams's child-support suit as the 'third in [a] trilogy' and dismissed with leave-to-amend denied as futile.
“No amendment would change this. Accordingly, the Court dismisses this matter without granting Williams an additional opportunity to amend his claims.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 6 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to compel arbitration N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to vacate sentence N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R.doc.12) is GRANTED and all of plaintiff's claims against Lois V. Simpson and Ronald K. Lospennato are DISMISSED with prejudice and plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against defendant, Advocacy Center of Louisiana, is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Partial Motion to Dismiss filed by the United States of America is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that Michael and Sheena Gauthreaux's FTCA claims against the United States of America are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Advanced Structural Technologies, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that Defendant seeks to compel arbitration of this matter, but DENIED to the extent that Defendant seeks a dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff's claims.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Lawsuit for Failure to Prosecute is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants' 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(7) for Failure to Join a Party, or in the Alternative, Motion to Compel Joinder and to Stay Proceedings is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's Motion Under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody is DENIED.”
“IT IS ORDERED that Defendants Attorney General State of Louisiana and Angela O'Brien's Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows: 1. Plaintiff Purnell Williams's claims against the Attorney General State of Louisiana, DCFS, incorrectly identified as Louisiana Department of Social Services and Child Support Enforcement Division, and Angela O'Brien in her official capacity are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2. Plaintiff Purnell Williams's claims against Angela O'Brien in her individual capacity are DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 261 days (N = 20).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 71 days (N = 7).
Illustrative caseload texture only; not weighted counts. No FJC IDB baseline loaded for this record.