Wendy B. Vitter

In Gibson v. Scottsdale Insurance, Vitter denied an unopposed Rule 12(b)(7) motion because the movant addressed whether absent parties were required under Rule 19(a) but did not analyze indispensability under Rule 19(b).

“Simply put, a finding that a party is required under Rule 19(a), standing alone, cannot support dismissal -- the court must also find the absent party to be indispensable after an examination of the Rule 19(b) factors.”

In Gauthreaux v. United States, Vitter dismissed the adult plaintiffs’ FTCA claims because they filed suit one day before completing the six-month administrative process; the agency’s later denial did not cure the jurisdictional defect.

“Failure to completely exhaust administrative remedies prior to commencing a civil action under the FTCA is a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured through exhaustion after suit is filed.”

Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars state-agency and official-capacity claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (dismissed without prejudice), while qualified immunity disposes of individual-capacity claims on the merits (dismissed with prejudice); leave to amend denied where futile (Williams).

“Plaintiff Purnell Williams's claims against the Attorney General State of Louisiana, DCFS ... and Angela O'Brien in her official capacity are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”

In Otero v. Advocacy Center of Louisiana, Vitter dismissed claims against individual employees with prejudice because the employer, rather than those individuals, was the proper defendant under Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA.

“the proper defendant under a Title VII, Age Discrimination and Employment Act, or Americans with Disabilities Act claim, is the claimant's employer.”

In CMP v. Board of Commissioners, Vitter denied certification of an interlocutory appeal because she found no substantial ground for disagreement and an appeal would delay a case nearing trial.

“Exercising this discretion, the Court determines that, based on the absence of a substantial ground for difference of opinion and because an interlocutory appeal will not advance the ultimate termination the litigation, this is not one of those ‘exceptional circumstances justify[ing] a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment.’”

In Damond, she deferred a summary judgment ruling until the court could resolve a pending challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction.

“it would be improper for the Court to consider and rule on the Motion before considering Defendants’ jurisdictional attack made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).”

In a restaurant slip-and-fall case, Vitter denied the defendant’s separate summary-judgment motions on notice and unreasonable risk after finding that disputed facts about the restroom-floor condition required trial.

“are genuine issues of material fact that preclude a determination that the complained-of hazard did not constitute an unreasonable risk of harm.”

In a vessel limitation case, Vitter refused to lift a stay based on protective stipulations joined by only two claimants while other claimants remained outside the agreement.

“Motion must be denied because all claimants have not agreed to the stipulations.”

In Tran, Vitter denied the plaintiffs’ request for a curative Rule 56 process after they failed to identify needed deposition corrections or show why they could not present essential facts in opposition to summary judgment.

“Plaintiffs have not made any such showing that additional time is necessary prior to deciding the Rule 56 motions.”