Nannette Jolivette Brown
How Judge Brown rules, drawn from 29 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Brown decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She treats default as a disfavored, drastic remedy: on a Rule 55(c) showing of excusable neglect (not willful), no prejudice to the plaintiff, and a meritorious defense, she will set aside a clerk's entry of default and grant leave to answer.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's 'Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default' is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court's Preliminary Entry of Default is SET ASIDE.”
For a represented pro se plaintiff who had not previously amended, she allowed a targeted amendment where additional facts might cure an employer-confidentiality claim, while dismissing legally unavailable claims with prejudice.
“Because Plaintiff filed this Complaint pro se, has not previously been granted leave to amend the Complaint, and has since retained counsel, the Court grants her leave to amend the Complaint to clarify the ADA claim against Jefferson Parish.”
Procedural preferences
She enforces her scheduling-order deadlines strictly: an eve-of-trial motion to extend the dispositive-motion and motion-in-limine cutoffs was denied where the movants showed no good cause under Rule 16(b) and had already filed a partial summary-judgment motion.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Moving Defendants' 'Joint Motion to Extend Motion Disposition Deadline' is DENIED.”
She may grant a targeted scheduling extension where the movant shows concrete good cause, while refusing broader trial or pretrial relief that is not yet necessary.
“Here, the Court finds that Defendants have established good cause for a continuance of the expert disclosure deadline. However, the Court finds that Defendants have not established good cause for a continuance of trial or the other pretrial deadlines at this time.”
Cautions
She rejects Second Amendment facial and as-applied challenges to the felon-in-possession statute (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)) under the Bruen/Rahimi framework, holding the felon bar consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation.
“the Court finds that Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional both on its face and as applied to Martin. The Fifth Circuit's ruling in United States v. Diaz forecloses the facial challenge ... Martin's as-applied challenge fails ... the Court denies the motion.”
She excludes expert opinions that cross from specialized knowledge into legal conclusions applying governing standards to the facts, while permitting testimony confined to industry practices and expertise.
“These opinions constitute impermissible legal conclusions because they apply the governing legal standards to the facts and effectively instruct the jury that Defendant breached duties owed to Plaintiff.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that GM Financial's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's motion for summary judgment is DENIED as untimely filed.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Stay is GRANTED. Within ninety days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff shall file a motion to reopen the case or a motion to extend the stay. Failure to do so will result in DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE of this matter without further notice.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's ‘Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Order’ is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that CorrectHealth Jefferson, LLC and Ironshore Specialty Insurance Co.’s ‘Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint’ is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Jarrod Carter’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Jason Williams’s Second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that SPARTA’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of any claims against Dr. Joseph Mabey. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's 33 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Moving Defendants' 'Joint Motion to Extend Motion Disposition Deadline' is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 45.0 days (N = 6).
From the enumerated 2021-2023 cases: a cluster of 'X v. United States' prisoner/habeas suits (thin docket record), federal criminal cases, many Hurricane Ida first-party insurance cases (Lloyds, State Farm, Bankers), and mortgage/negotiable-instrument diversity suits. NOS examples captured: 110 Insurance, Negotiable Instrument, Criminal, Prisoner/habeas.
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