Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr.

“IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion of defendant WoodHouse SPAS Corporation to dismiss plaintiff's claims against it, Record Doc. No. 21, be GRANTED and that plaintiff's claims against WoodHouse SPAS Corporation, incorrectly named in the complaint as Woodhouse Day Spa Corporation or Woodhouse Day Spa, be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as unopposed.”

In a pro se prisoner mail-interference and retaliation suit under Section 1983, the plaintiff never completed the pauper application and stopped responding to the clerk's deficiency notice. Wilkinson recommended sua sponte dismissal without prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).

In a pro se prisoner conditions-of-confinement suit, the plaintiff was transferred among correctional facilities multiple times and repeatedly failed to respond to court orders, including one directing a response to a pending motion to dismiss. Wilkinson recommended sua sponte dismissal with prejudice for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).

“IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and that all of plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, plaintiff to bear all costs of this proceedings.”

“Thus, Courtade's claim of retaliation under the ADEA fails to contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is granted.”

“Under the same settled Fifth Circuit case law, the comments that Barrett allegedly made concerning Courtade's age and Harrah's termination of her employment do not rise to the high level of outrageousness required to state a cognizable intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. ... Accordingly, defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is granted.”

“IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and that all of plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, plaintiff to bear all costs of this proceedings.”

“IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as follows... defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of untimeliness is denied as to plaintiff's claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act... Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law on plaintiff's race and disability discrimination claims under Section 1981, Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.”

“For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Record Doc. No. 15, is GRANTED and that plaintiff's state law claims of conversion, abuse of process and malicious prosecution are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

“For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and that plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

“On the current record, Pontchartrain has not produced admissible evidence to meet its burden under Rule 56. ... In these circumstances, I find that granting summary judgment is not appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), (e). Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED.”

“For all the forgoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that defendant's motion be DENIED and that the instant matter be TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida.”

“For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' partial motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART in that plaintiff's claims of race discrimination against Kolwe in his official capacity under Sections 1981 and 1983 and against Kolwe in his individual and official capacities under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law and Title VII are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.”

“Defendants have not carried their burden to substantiate the absence of material disputed facts with respect to Kolwe's qualified immunity defense. Accordingly, their partial motion for summary judgment is denied as to plaintiff's race discrimination claims against Kolwe in his individual capacity under Sections 1981 and 1983.”