Scott Elgin Reed
How Judge Reed rules, drawn from 13 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Reed no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Reed decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In T-Birds, Reed refused to resolve a counterclaim summarily where the record contained genuine factual disputes.
“If there is a disputed factual issue before the Court, it should not be resolved upon motion for summary judgment.”
Procedural preferences
In Kentucky Solar, Reed protected a manufacturing trade secret where the requesting party had not shown that the formula was directly relevant and necessary.
“In view Of the value of the formula trade secret, the process used to manufacture Fireguard, to Kentucky Solar Energy Controls, Inc., and the lack of evidence that the formula is directly relevant and necessary to defendant’s position, the Magistrate’s recommendation is appropriate.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“That the motion of Paul C. Turner, plaintiff, for the appointment of counsel is hereby DENIED;”
“That the motion on Paul C. Turner, plaintiff, for a formal request by the Court to local counsel to handle plaintiff’s case, is hereby DENIED;”
“That the defendant’s motion to file its Second Amended Petition for Removal is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the defendant’s motion for a motion to compel discovery is hereby DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion of plaintiff to transfer this action to Covington is hereby DENIED.”
“That the Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis be, and the same is hereby, granted.”
“That the Motion for a Declaratory Judgment and Temporary Restraining Order be, and the same is hereby, denied.”
“Furthermore, the Court is of the opinion that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and that plaintiffs’ complaint must be dismissed.”
“Accordingly, the motion of the defendant Touche Ross to dismiss Count VII and Count VIII of the plaintiff’s amended complaint will be denied by separate order.”
“That the objections of plaintiff to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate be SUSTAINED;”
“That the motion of plaintiff for summary judgment be GRANTED and that of the defendant DENIED;”
“That the motion of defendants to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint due to a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is hereby DENIED;”
“That the request of defendants that the Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the motion of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, defendant, that the claim against it of William D. Crutcher, plaintiff, under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, be dismissed is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the motion of the Governor of Kentucky, John Y. Brown, Jr. that the portion of the claim of William D. Crutcher, against him in his official capacity which requests monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, be dismissed is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the motion of the Governor of Kentucky, John Y. Brown, Jr. that the portion of the claim of William D. Crutcher against him in his official capacity which requests prospective injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 be dismissed is hereby DENIED;”
“That the motion of the Governor of Kentucky, John Y. Brown, Jr. that the claim of William D. Crutcher against him individually under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 be dismissed is hereby DENIED;”
“That the motion of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the Governor of Kentucky, John Y. Brown, Jr., individually and in his official capacity, that the claim against them of William D. Crutcher under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq. be dismissed is hereby DENIED.”
“That the defendant’s motion to dismiss Kyle’s personal injury claim is construed as a motion for summary judgment and the relief sought is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim is hereby DENIED.”
“That the motions of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., plaintiff, and Monroe Prater, defendant, for summary judgment directing that Metropolitan pay the basic insurance proceeds to Monroe Prater, are hereby GRANTED;”
“That the motion of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., plaintiff, for summary judgment on the counterclaim against it by Monroe Prater, defendant, is hereby DENIED;”
“That the motion of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., plaintiff, for judgment on the pleadings on its claim against Albert Thompson, Administrator of the Estate of Aileen T. Prater, defendant, is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the motion of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., plaintiff, for judgment on the pleadings on its claim against Gary Prater, defendant, is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the motion of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., plaintiff, for a default judgment on its claim against Timothy Prater, defendant, is hereby GRANTED;”
“That the motion of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., plaintiff, for the award of attorneys’ fees and costs, is hereby DENIED;”
“Accordingly, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion to compel discovery of the October 17, 1977 memorandum.”
“The Court finds that the memorandum of October 31, 1977 does not contain evidence of subsequent remedial measures, therefore the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery as to that document is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
No assigned Eastern District docket records were returned under the four searched Reed name variants.
A historical record
Judge Reed no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.