Claria Horn Boom
How Judge Boom rules, drawn from 13 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Boom decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On Title VII employment claims she conducts a rigorous, evidence-focused McDonnell Douglas analysis and grants the defense summary judgment where documented performance problems predate the protected activity (defeating causation) and the plaintiff points to no pretext evidence.
“The Secretary's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 48] is GRANTED.”
Procedural preferences
She will not rule on summary judgment before adequate discovery: she denies a defendant's motion filed before the Rule 26(f) conference as premature, treating a Rule 56(d) request made in the opposition brief as sufficient rather than exalting form over substance.
“The Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 6] filed by Defendants Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. ... is DENIED without prejudice.”
In an insurance-coverage action overlapping state liability proceedings, Boom exercised the court's discretion to decline declaratory-judgment jurisdiction and dismissed without prejudice.
“the Court will exercise its broad discretion to decline jurisdiction over this matter under the Declaratory Judgment Act.”
When an agreement incorporates arbitration rules that assign jurisdictional questions to the tribunal, she treats that incorporation as clear delegation of threshold arbitrability and stays the litigation while the arbitrator decides that issue.
“the parties have clearly and unmistakably delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator.”
Cautions
Boom vigorously enforces the firm presumption against extending Bivens: applying the Ziglar/Egbert two-step she treats prisoner excessive-force as a new Bivens context and grants dismissal where any 'single reason to pause' (the PLRA, the BOP grievance program, the FTCA, prison-administration deference) counsels against a damages remedy.
“Defendant Sams's motion to dismiss, [R. 19], is GRANTED. ... Gardner's complaint, which asserts an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Sams, [R. 1], is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
A state attorney general's general, contingent, or discretionary authority is insufficient for an Ex parte Young suit without a concrete enforcement connection to the challenged statute.
“Any enforcement authority allocated to Defendant pursuant to K.R.S. §§ 15.020, 15.190, and 15.200 is both contingent and discretionary, and Plaintiff nowhere alleges that that Defendant will exercise that contingent, discretionary authority here.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant Sams's motion to dismiss, [R. 19], is GRANTED. ... Gardner's complaint, which asserts an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Sams, [R. 1], is DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 6] filed by Defendants Baptist Healthcare System, Inc. ... is DENIED without prejudice.”
“The Secretary's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 48] is GRANTED.”
“The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Batson, Best, and Louisville Metro, [R. 99], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Wilson, [R. 101], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“Defendants Wilson, Braden, Young, and Berry's Motion for Summary Judgment, [R. 48], is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Berry's Motion to Dismiss, [R. 68], is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“Defendants Brandon and Junior Smith's Motions to Dismiss, [R. 6], [R. 7], are DENIED as moot.”
“The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, [R. 1], is DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order, [R. 2], is DENIED.”
“Defendant Attorney General Russell Coleman's Motion to Dismiss, [R. 4], is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Defendant Attorney General Russell Coleman's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, [R. 10], is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Peggy Miles's Motion to Dismiss, [R. 10], is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment, [R. 22], is DENIED as moot.”
“The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, [R. 9; R. 29; R. 33; R. 36; R. 38], are GRANTED.”
“the Court will grant the Defendants’ and Intervenor-Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss and deny as moot the United States’ Motion to Compel.”
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