Toby Jon Crouse
How Judge Crouse rules, drawn from 40 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Crouse
Toby Jon Crouse is a judge of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. Appointed by President Donald J. Trump, Judge Crouse received a commission on December 2, 2020.
Judge Crouse's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Crouse, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
- Standing Order 26-04: Immigration Habeas Cases ↗
- Standing Order 26-01: Use of Artificial Intelligence in Court Filings ↗
- Standing Order 25-04: Access, Service, and Management of Sealed Documents ↗
- Standing Order 25-03: Suspension of Local Rule 79.4 for Civil Sealed Files ↗
- Standing Order 2021-1: Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
How Judge Crouse decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Beerman v. Honeywell, Crouse declined to consider manufacturing and service records attached to a Rule 12 motion or convert it to summary judgment. Without those records or dispositive dates in the complaint, Honeywell had not established its statute-of-repose defense at the pleading stage.
“Without the extraneous evidence, Honeywell has not established that either statute of repose precludes the claims. ... it would be error to dismiss a claim based on them at this stage of the proceedings.”
In Stuart v. City of Topeka, Crouse denied renewed judgment as a matter of law after the jury’s discrimination verdict. He rejected the City’s pretext argument because the McDonnell Douglas burden framework no longer controlled after summary judgment and the trial evidence supported the verdict.
“That argument misapprehends the procedural posture of the case. ... ‘the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and burdens—disappear[s]’ after a plaintiff survives summary judgment by offering sufficient evidence of pretext.”
In Wagner’s preliminary-injunction case, Crouse found the Board had not established that Wagner made the statement it characterized as a true threat. Even viewed favorably to the Board, the evidence on whether he made it was in equipoise.
“Even viewed in the light most favorable to the Board, the evidence is in equipoise. ... This state of affairs leads to the conclusion that the Board has failed to establish that Mr. Wagner made the statement the Board now contends was a true threat.”
Procedural preferences
In Stuart v. City of Topeka, Crouse found that only one of the prevailing plaintiffs would have received the available promotion but for the City’s discrimination. He limited front-pay and back-pay relief accordingly, explaining that full awards to each plaintiff would exceed the harm caused.
“But for the City’s unlawful discrimination, only one Plaintiff would have been promoted to Major in 2021. ... Awarding front pay and back pay to each Plaintiff as if she had a 100% chance of promotion would make the City liable for more than what its unlawful discrimination caused, which would result in a ‘windfall’ to Plaintiffs.”
A renewed Rule 50(b) JMOL may only reassert the same grounds raised in the pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion (limited exception: new sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds the opponent does not object to). Preserve every JMOL ground in your Rule 50(a) motion before the case goes to the jury, or lose it.
“In moving for renewed judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), a party ‘can only reassert the same grounds for judgment as a matter of law that [it] first asserted in [its] pre-deliberation Rule 50(a) motion.’”
In Divot Board v. Golf Technologies, Crouse construed disputed patent terms using the specification and expert accounts of golf equipment. He found a general dictionary definition insufficient to displace their shared understanding of “spikes” in that field.
“Where the expert evidence suggests a shared particular context to spikes in the field of art, ordinary meaning cannot be determined primarily from dictionary definition.”
Cautions
Object contemporaneously and specifically at trial or the evidentiary challenge is waived for a new-trial motion. Crouse repeatedly rejected the City's new-trial complaints about 'me too' and other-employee testimony because the City either did not object when the evidence came in or objected only on a narrow ground; testimony admitted without objection cannot later support a new trial. (Note also: anecdotal 'me too' evidence of other employees' discrimination IS admissible when tied to the same decisionmaker and timeframe.)
“the City cannot complain about the evidence to which it did not object nor complain about the testimony that was introduced based on its few objections.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Honeywell’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 21, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“the City’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and its Motion for New Trial are DENIED.”
“the City’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial is denied, but its motion regarding front pay and back pay awards is granted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Wellsky's Partial Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 4, is GRANTED.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, Doc. 14, is GRANTED.”
“As a result, the motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution, Doc. 19, is denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 19, is GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Flender's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Doc. 7, is DENIED.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the City's motion for summary judgment, Doc. 100, is GRANTED, and Mar's motion to supplement, Doc. 143, is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Western World's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 146, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“LDG's Motions to Exclude Expert Testimony, Docs. 137, 139, and 144, are DENIED, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and DENIED as moot, respectively.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Jones's Motion to Suppress Evidence, Doc. 21, is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT the Report and Recommendation, Doc. 7, is adopted in full. The case is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Miller's motion to exclude the testimony of CNH's expert, Kirk Ney, Doc. 124, is DENIED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Walmart's Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 95, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 92, and Walmart's Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony, Doc. 93, are DENIED.”
“the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Doc. 92, and Walmart's Motion to Preclude Expert Testimony, Doc. 93, are DENIED.”
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 30 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 2 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 7 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 30 | 7 |
| Sep 2025 | 21 | 5 |
| Mar 2025 | 18 | 5 |
| Sep 2024 | 14 | 5 |
| Mar 2024 | 19 | 3 |
| Sep 2023 | 10 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 12 | 5 |
| Sep 2022 | 20 | 5 |
| Mar 2022 | 19 | 2 |
| Sep 2021 | 7 | 1 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the District of Kansas, not for Judge Crouse: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 967 | 7 months |
| Closed with no court action | 225 | 4.8 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 645 | 6.9 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 83 | 18.3 months |
| Closed during trial | 14 | 22.5 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 967 | 7 months |
| Sep 2024 | 912 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2023 | 909 | 7.7 months |
| Sep 2022 | 1,092 | 8.1 months |
| Sep 2021 | 1,063 | 8.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 1,180 | 8.2 months |
| Sep 2019 | 1,884 | 20.7 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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