Samuel Alfred Crow
How Judge Crow decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a prisoner's due-process challenge to administrative segregation he applies the Sandin 'atypical and significant hardship' test and the four DiMarco factors, and defers to prison officials' security judgments — segregation tied to a legitimate penological interest (here, a group transfer after assaults on staff) does not implicate a protected liberty interest.
“the decision to segregate the Maryland prisoners involved a legitimate penological purpose ... the court does not find that the plaintiff’s conditions of confinement in administrative segregation created an atypical hardship.”
He will convert a Rule 12(b)(6)/12(c) motion to summary judgment when the movant relies on documents outside the pleadings, but holds that no separate conversion notice is needed where the non-movant has already had a full opportunity to respond (e.g. ignored a show-cause order) and so is not prejudiced.
“This case presents the unusual situation in which plaintiff will not be prejudiced by the court’s conversion, without further notice, of defendant’s motion from a judgment on the pleadings to a summary judgment motion.”
Procedural preferences
On habeas, he enforces the exhaustion requirement but exercises discretion toward pro se petitioners: rather than dismissing an unexhausted 2254 petition outright, he may direct a status report and give the petitioner time to decide whether to return to state court, especially where state procedure created genuine confusion.
“Based upon the procedural history of this case, the Court will allow Petitioner additional time to decide whether she wishes to pursue additional state-court remedies to attempt to exhaust her claims.”
Cautions
Rule 60(b) relief from judgment is treated as extraordinary; a litigant who merely reargues points already decided, or raises facts that were available earlier, will not get relief. Bring your best argument the first time.
“Rule 60(b) is not a means “to reargue an issue previously addressed by the court when the reargument merely advances new arguments or supporting facts which were available for presentation at the time of the original argument.””
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Judgment on the pleadings N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for relief from judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to appoint counsel N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings under Fed.R.Civ. Pro. 12(c) is converted to a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56, and is granted.”
“IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED plaintiff’s motion to amend judgment (Doc. 68), motion to reconsider (Doc. 69) and motion to alter judgment (Doc. 71) are denied.”
28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition. On initial Rule 4 review, Crow found the claims appeared unexhausted (petitioner conceded she had not presented them to the Kansas appellate courts) but, recognizing her understandable confusion about appealing a 60-1507 denial entered in her criminal case, declined to dismiss and instead directed her to file a status report on whether she would return to state court. Rules on no party motion; recorded as a screening order. Grounding quote: "IT IS THEREFORE ORDERD that Petitioner is granted until and including December 10, 2021, to file a written status report informing the Court whether she intends to pursue further state-court remedies on her claims."
“IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED the motion of defendant Stermer to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment (Doc. 28) and the motion of plaintiff to dismiss defendants Stermer and Martin (Doc. 33) are granted.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Martin and Richardson (Doc. 30) is granted.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Stouffer (Doc. 35) and his motion for summary judgment against defendants Richardson and Martin (Doc. 37) are denied.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against defendant Stouffer (Doc. 35) and his motion for summary judgment against defendants Richardson and Martin (Doc. 37) are denied.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time and for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 34), his motion for the appointment of counsel (Doc. 38), and his combined motion for the appointment of counsel and to expedite (Doc. 41) are denied.”