Rachel E. Schwartz
How Judge Schwartz decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Schwartz does not look at cash on hand alone — she compares the movant's monthly income to monthly expenses, and if the surplus exceeds the filing fee she will recommend denial even when the movant currently has little or no cash, typically pairing the denial with a 30-day window to pay. To win IFP before her, a pro se plaintiff should show that required, recurring expenses leave no realistic surplus over the $405 fee.
“Judges in this district have denied IFP motions when monthly income exceeds monthly expenses by an amount that would enable the movant to pay the filing fee, even when the movant does not currently have enough cash on hand to pay the filing fee.”
On 1915(e) screening of a pro se complaint, Schwartz applies the Rule 12(b)(6) / Iqbal-Twombly plausibility standard strictly: the complaint must say what each defendant did, when, how it harmed the plaintiff, and which specific legal right was violated. Vague invocations of 'civil rights' and constitutional amendments without supporting facts will not survive, and she will not construct a legal theory or supply facts for the litigant.
“mere 'labels and conclusions,' and 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.”
For a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim she requires a plausible allegation that each named defendant acted under color of state law; naming a person only by title or as a private party, without facts tying them to state authority or to joint action with a state actor, is fatal. When all federal claims fail on screening she declines supplemental jurisdiction and dismisses state-law claims without prejudice.
“There are no allegations that Defendant Wright acted under color of law or abused any power that they possess by virtue of state law. This alone warrants dismissal of any § 1983 claim Plaintiff may be raising against Defendant Wright.”
Procedural preferences
Before recommending dismissal of a pro se complaint on screening, Schwartz first puts the plaintiff on written notice of the specific Rule 8 / pleading deficiencies and gives an opportunity to amend; only after the plaintiff declines or fails to amend does she recommend dismissal, reasoning that further amendment would be futile. Her R&Rs carry the standard 14-day written-objection admonition (28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2), D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4(b)).
“It would be futile to give Plaintiff another opportunity to amend because the Court already gave Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint to address the concerns the Court detailed in writing to Plaintiff, but she declined. The Court therefore recommends dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motion for leave to proceed ifp N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Because Plaintiff appears to have a more than $1,100 in excess monthly income—far exceeding the $405 filing fee—Plaintiff has not established that his access to the Court would be seriously hampered by requiring him to pay the filing fee, and he has not established an inability to pay the filing fee. For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Judge deny the Application and direct Plaintiff to pay the filing fee within thirty days of an order on this Report and Recommendation.”
Schwartz's OWN signed 18-page R&R recommending dismissal of a pro se IFP complaint on 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening for failure to state a claim, and declining supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims. Detailed 42 U.S.C. 1983 analysis: plaintiff named defendants only by label, alleged no facts showing what each defendant did or that they acted under color of state law, and her constitutional citations (e.g. Eleventh Amendment) created no private right of action. The court had already given her a chance to amend, which she did not take, so further amendment would be futile. Rules on no party motion; excluded from motion stats. Adopted by District Judge (not separately fetched here).
District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree's Memorandum & Order (read in full) ACCEPTING, ADOPTING, and AFFIRMING Schwartz's 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening R&R (her Doc. 15, 2024-10-15) dismissing plaintiff's federal claims for failure to state a claim and declining supplemental jurisdiction; the same order also AFFIRMED Schwartz's Order (Doc. 20) denying plaintiff's motion to recuse (the recusal motion itself is captured with dates in docket_layer). Screening dismissal rules on no party motion; excluded from motion stats. Signer of THIS document is Crabtree (signer_confirmed false), so it is recorded as Schwartz's recommendation adopted.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 6) issued by United States Magistrate Judge Rachel E. Schwartz on August 30, 2024, is ACCEPTED, ADOPTED, and AFFIRMED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees (Doc. 3) is DENIED.”
District Judge John W. Broomes's Memorandum & Order (read in full) ADOPTING Schwartz's R&R (her Doc. 12, 2022-06-21) recommending dismissal of a pro se complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction: no complete diversity between the parties and no federal question. A sua sponte jurisdictional dismissal that rules on no party motion; excluded from motion stats. Signer is Broomes (signer_confirmed false); recorded as Schwartz's recommendation adopted.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 94 days (N = 1).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 7 days (N = 4).
Not systematically enumerated. docket shows Schwartz-assigned dockets are predominantly criminal magistrate (mj) matters (initial appearances/complaints, terminated within days) plus 636(b) referrals on civil cases assigned to district judges (Crabtree, Broomes, Robinson, etc.). The Hubbard case analyzed below is a pro se civil-rights complaint referred to her.