Karen M. Humphreys
How Judge Humphreys decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On discovery into a police officer's psychological records, Humphreys draws a careful line under Jaffee v. Redmond: PRE-EMPLOYMENT psychological evaluations are NOT privileged (they are hiring evaluations, not treatment, and the officer has no reasonable privacy expectation in information he knew the department would see), and a post-incident report's fitness-for-duty CONCLUSION is discoverable, but the actual treatment/counseling notes in a post-incident report ARE privileged and withheld. Practical lesson: in a Section 1983 excessive-force case before her, expect to obtain an officer's pre-employment evaluation and any fitness-for-duty determination (under a protective order), but not the substance of post-incident counseling.
“Thompson's pre-employment interview with Dr. Davis was in the context of the police department's hiring evaluation, not in the context of treatment. Under the circumstances, the Jaffee psychotherapist-privilege simply does not apply. ... The doctor's recommendation of fitness for duty is not protected by any privilege and shall be disclosed by defendants to plaintiff.”
On appointing counsel for IFP civil plaintiffs, Humphreys applies the Tenth Circuit's Castner factors and weighs the merit of the claims and the plaintiff's capacity to self-represent heavily -- she will review the underlying EEOC/state-agency investigative file to gauge merit, and a financially-eligible, diligent plaintiff can still be denied counsel if his claims look weak and he is articulate and the case is non-complex. She also keeps the analysis clean: a party's criminal history is irrelevant to the appointment-of-counsel question (even if discoverable for credibility). Practical lesson: a renewed motion for counsel that is 'nearly identical' to the first will be denied; a motion to reconsider is 'viewed with disfavor' after two denials.
“Based upon the review of that file, the court finds that plaintiff's claims do not have sufficient merit to warrant the appointment of counsel. Additionally, plaintiff participated meaningfully in the January 20, 2015 scheduling conference and was both responsive and articulate. At this time, plaintiff is found to be capable of presenting this non-complex case without the aid of counsel.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to compel N = 1 |
Granted in part: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for appointment of counsel N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to continue N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to compel (Doc. 140) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, consistent with the rulings herein.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 23) is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants' motion to continue mediation (Doc. 24) is GRANTED. Mediation in this case shall be held within sixty (60) days after the court rules on any dispositive motions.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Not enumerated this session. Humphreys was a Wichita referral magistrate (later Chief Magistrate Judge, suffix -KMH) handling discovery and case management across the district judges' civil dockets, plus dispositive R&Rs on pro se / IFP and Social-Security matters.