Julie Ann Robinson
How Judge Robinson decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On post-trial Rule 50(b)/Rule 59 challenges to a general jury verdict, she will not disturb the verdict if the award can rest on damages components the movant did NOT challenge. Attacking the evidentiary support for one project/component is futile when the lump-sum verdict could be explained entirely by other, unchallenged components. To win, attack every theory the verdict could rest on.
“even assuming that Defendants are correct and that there was no sufficient evidence to support an award of damages for the Grand Lodge or SWAT 15 projects, Defendants cannot show that the verdict is “clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly against the weight of the evidence””
Procedural preferences
On Title VII administrative exhaustion: failing to check the race/sex box on an EEO charge creates a rebuttable presumption that the claim is not asserted, and it is rebutted only if the charge's narrative sets forth that basis. A charge that frames mistreatment as injury- or retaliation-based does NOT exhaust race or sex claims, because no race/sex investigation could reasonably be expected to follow. Make sure the EEO charge narrative names the protected status you later sue on.
“Plaintiff gave no indication in her EEO complaint that her claims were based on race or sex discrimination such that an administrative investigation would reasonably be expected to follow, even under a liberal construction of the EEO complaint.”
Cautions
On § 1983 supervisory liability, pleading that a defendant was 'in charge' is not enough. The complaint must allege an affirmative link — that the supervisor personally participated, or had actual knowledge of the violation and acquiesced in its continuance. There is no vicarious or strict supervisor liability under § 1983.
“Plaintiff only alleges that Detective Wheeles was “in charge,” which is not sufficient to establish supervisory liability under § 1983.”
Enforces the District of Kansas local rules on briefing deadlines. Failing to timely respond to a dispositive motion means it is treated as uncontested and ordinarily granted (D. Kan. Rule 7.4), independent of the merits. File on time or move for leave out of time.
“Plaintiff has not responded to defendant’s motion to dismiss, leaving defendant’s motion uncontested. As a result of plaintiff’s failure to respond, the Court grants defendant’s motion.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Motion for new trial N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment as a matter of law N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted.”
“Because the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s remaining claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, it need not reach Defendant’s alternative motion for summary judgment as it is moot.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendants’ Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial (Doc. 150) is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Defendants’ Joint Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion for New Trial (Doc. 150) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial on Issue of Damages (Doc. 151) is DENIED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant Bryan Wheeles’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) is granted.”