John Thomas Marten
How Judge Marten decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a Title IX student-harassment claim he applies the four-factor school-district-liability test from Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: actual knowledge, deliberate indifference, harassment so severe/pervasive/objectively offensive, and deprivation of educational access. A plaintiff who cannot meet all four loses on summary judgment.
“A plaintiff must allege four factors to state a claim of school district liability under Title IX. He must allege that the district (1) had actual knowledge of and (2) was deliberately indifferent to (3) harassment that was so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive that it (4) deprived the victim of access to the educational benefits or opportunities provided by the school.”
He enforces res judicata under the Tenth Circuit's transactional test and is explicit that the policy goal is to discourage piecemeal litigation: claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts must all be brought in the first action.
“There is a danger that plaintiff’s separate suits tend to create piecemeal litigation, requiring defendants to expend additional resources in defending against a suit. The court discourages such an approach to litigating in the courts.”
Procedural preferences
Disposes of unopposed dispositive motions as uncontested under D. Kan. Local Rule 7.4 when the response deadline passes (even after multiple extensions), then adds a brief merits explanation. Respond on time or risk an automatic grant.
“Accordingly, plaintiff had until July 10, 2008, to file a response, yet failed to do so. As such, pursuant to Local Rule 7.4, defendants’ motion is granted as an uncontested motion.”
Will dismiss a case for lack of prosecution under the court's inherent power when a plaintiff ignores a show-cause order, rather than reaching a pending motion's merits.
“The “court has inherent power, in the exercise of sound discretion, to dismiss a cause for want of prosecution.” ... Exercising its discretion, the court dismisses plaintiff’s claims against Adams for lack of prosecution.”
Cautions
On a request for emergency injunctive relief, undue delay in seeking the order is held to undercut any presumption of irreparable harm; a movant who waited months or years after notice should expect that delay to count against the TRO. He will also abstain from enjoining ongoing state foreclosure proceedings.
“Delay in seeking relief, however, undercuts any presumption [of] irreparable harm [and] may justify denial of a preliminary injunction ... The Conners make no explanation for delaying seeking relief until their eleventh-hour ex parte motion to stay the foreclosure.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 3Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 4 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to transfer venue N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for temporary restraining order N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Exercising its discretion, the court dismisses plaintiff’s claims against Adams for lack of prosecution.”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 6th day of August, 2010, that the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 9) is denied, and defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 6th day of August, 2010, that the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 9) is denied, and defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 16th day of May 2006, that the court grants defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 10).”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2008, that motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 6) is granted, and the alternative motion to transfer is denied as moot.”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 28th day of July, 2008, that motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 6) is granted, and the alternative motion to transfer is denied as moot.”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 27th day of June, 2012, that the plaintiffs’ Motions for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 4), Emergency Motion for Hearing (Dkt. 5), and Revised Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 8) are hereby denied.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 31st day of July, 2013, that the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 85) is granted.”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 27th day of August, 2007, that plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 24) is denied and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 61) is granted with respect to Count I and denied with respect to Count II.”
“IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 27th day of August, 2007, that plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 24) is denied and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 61) is granted with respect to Count I and denied with respect to Count II.”