Eric Franklin Melgren
How Judge Melgren decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On Rule 12(b)(6) motions he parses the operative contract text closely and declines to imply duties the language does not impose, dismissing breach theories the plaintiff cannot tie to a specific contractual term.
“However, Article 1.6 of the Provider Agreement, only requires First Health to ensure the payors comply with the terms and conditions of Article 4. It does not impose a similar duty on First Health related to payors’ compliance with Article 5.”
Procedural preferences
Disposes of unopposed motions as uncontested under D. Kan. R. 7.1(c) when the opposing party lets the response deadline pass, without reaching the merits. Respond on time or risk an automatic grant.
“Defendants did not request an extension to respond, the deadline for them to respond has passed, and they have not filed a response to the Movants’ motion. Thus, consistent with D. Kan. R. 7.1(c), the Court considers and decides the Movants’ motion as uncontested.”
Holds pro se litigants to the same rules of procedure as represented parties while construing their filings with some leniency; uncontroverted facts under the summary-judgment local rules are taken as true against the non-responding party.
“Plaintiff is pro se, and the Court must afford him some leniency in his filings. A pro se litigant, however, is still expected to “follow the same rules of procedure that” apply to represented parties.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 6 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 4Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to deny defendants motions N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Schmanke’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants K-1 Hospitality’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 31) is DENIED as MOOT.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 44) is DENIED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 50) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant First Health’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 96) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Cox’s Motion to Dismiss Counts I-IV (Doc. 99) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Black Diamond Angus Ranch Partnership’s, Black Diamond Angus Ranch LLC’s, Warner Angus Morgans’s, and Warner Angus Ranch’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Wisler and Xpressions’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Trevino’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Sedgwick County’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 20) is GRANTED.”
“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant City of Wichita’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) is GRANTED.”