Tanya Walton Pratt
How Judge Pratt rules, drawn from 41 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Pratt
Tanya Walton Pratt is a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Pratt received a commission on June 15, 2010.
Judge Pratt's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Pratt, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Filing
Courtesy copies do not need to be submitted to chambers.
“It is not necessary to submit courtesy copies to chambers.”
Trial
File sentencing memoranda no later than one week before the sentencing hearing.
“all sentencing memorandums should be filed no later than one week prior to the scheduled sentencing hearing”
Trial
File a good-cause objection to using a treating health care provider’s deposition instead of live trial testimony at least 30 days before trial.
“a written objection to the presumption, containing a showing of good cause why the admission of deposition testimony only from that witness would be prejudicial, must be filed at least 30 days before the trial date”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
- General Order Re: Procedures for Sealed Filings ↗
- General Order Re: Procedures for the Filing, Service, and Management of Highly Sensitive Documents ↗
- Order Regarding Prisoner Electronic Filing Program ↗
- General Order/Administrative Policy 2024-35 - Electronic Submissions to the Court by Pro Se Litigants ↗
- General Order Re: Presentation of Contaminated Materials for Filing ↗
How Judge Pratt decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Batts’s credit reporting suit, Pratt denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss after finding that the amended complaint plausibly alleged claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
“the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Dkt. [39] and Dkt. [41] are DENIED. These claims have survived the initial hurdle of a motion to dismiss.”
In Robertson v. Knight, Pratt found that confiscating one state-issued shirt without discipline or a reimbursement obligation was insufficiently adverse to support Robertson's retaliation claim.
“The Court finds that confiscation of a state-issued shirt is not sufficiently adverse to satisfy the second prong of a First Amendment retaliation claim.”
In an asset-preservation dispute, Pratt waived the usual bond for a fourteen-day restraining order after finding no evidence of monetary loss to the restrained parties.
“Absent any evidence that Defendants will incur monetary damages from the TRO, and considering the extraordinary circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs need not post a bond.”
At the pleading stage, she allowed a trafficking-survivor claim against a hotel franchisor to proceed based on a plausible actual-agency theory.
“Because A.F. has plausibly alleged a TVPRA claim against Wyndham, Wyndham's Motion to Dismiss is denied.”
Procedural preferences
In Hudson v. Butts, Pratt denied a pre-answer dismissal motion based on exhaustion because the complaint did not establish the defense and the defendants relied on an affidavit outside the pleadings.
“The motion to dismiss [Dkt. 13] is denied because the complaint does not show on its face that the plaintiff's claim is deficient under the PLRA and because the court is not able to act on the motion based on materials outside the pleadings.”
In fraudulent-joinder analysis she looks beyond the current pleading to prior pleadings and summary-judgment-type evidence when predicting whether a nondiverse defendant faces any reasonable possibility of liability.
“This analysis, contrary to Tole's assertions, ‘requires the Court to look beyond the pleadings when testing for fraudulent joinder.’”
She denied a motion to strike embedded in a reply brief because local rules require a separately filed motion.
“The Motion to Strike is therefore improper. S.D. Ind. Local R. 7-1(a) (‘A motion must not be contained within a brief, response, or reply to a previously filed motion, unless ordered by the court.’).”
Cautions
In Jackson v. Knight, Pratt granted the defendants summary judgment on exhaustion after Jackson's grievance was rejected and he did not properly resubmit it; she dismissed the action without prejudice.
“The defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt 27] is granted. Judgment dismissing this action without prejudice shall now issue.”
In a debt-collection case, she rejected the collector’s bona fide error defense where its employee instructions lacked any safeguard to detect mistakes.
“Merely telling employees what to do without providing any safeguard to check their work does not constitute a reasonable procedure to avoid errors.”
In a securities pleading dispute, using the word “prospectus” did not cure the failure to allege a qualifying prospectus; the federal claim was dismissed without prejudice.
“A failure to allege a prospectus was dispositive for the previous Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 32), and it is dispositive here.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Hill-Rom's Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 24) is GRANTED. All claims against Hill-Rom are dismissed without prejudice. Comedica is granted leave to file an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Entry.”
“the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #20) is GRANTED ... no evidence casts doubt on the Club's stated reason for firing Ms. Wampler or suggests that her Indonesian race or national origin was in any way a motivating factor in that decision.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. #48) is DENIED ... any amendment would ultimately be futile.”
“The defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt 27] is granted. Judgment dismissing this action without prejudice shall now issue.”
“The motion to dismiss [Dkt. 13] is denied because the complaint does not show on its face that the plaintiff's claim is deficient under the PLRA and because the court is not able to act on the motion based on materials outside the pleadings.”
“the Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 22) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is granted in that Plaintiffs Elijah and Owen are dismissed as named parties. In all other respects, the Plaintiffs have survived the initial hurdle of a Motion to Dismiss.”
“Defendants Motion to Dismiss Thompson's Second Amended Complaint (Filing No. 101) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Thompson's claims for Count I: Discrimination under Title IX, Count II: Discrimination under Title VI, and Count V: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, have survived ... The claims for Count III: Violation of Section 1981; Count IV: Violation of Section 1983; Count VI: Retaliation under Title IX; and Count VII: Breach of Contract are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Thompson's Motion to Convert Defendants' Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 139) is DENIED.”
“United Way's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 49) is GRANTED. Jackson-Nibbs' claims are DISMISSED, the trial and final pretrial conference are hereby VACATED, and final judgment will issue under separate order.”
“Jackson-Nibbs' Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Filing No. 65) is DENIED.”
“Gema's Motion (Filing No. 82) is granted as to no invalidity of the Gema Patents; granted as to infringement of the Gema Patents by Part Nos. [list]; denied as to infringement ... by Part Nos. [list]; and denied as to infringement of the Gema Trademarks.”
“FIF's Motion (Filing No. 85) is granted as to the marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287(a); denied as to the nominative fair use defense; granted as to laches; and denied as moot as to acquiescence.”
“the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Dkt. [39] and Dkt. [41] are DENIED. These claims have survived the initial hurdle of a motion to dismiss.”
“Equifax's Rule 56(d) Motion (Dkt. 54) is granted and Batts' premature motion for summary Judgment, (Dkt. 50), is denied without prejudice.”
“Lilly's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaims (Filing No. 37) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted as to Count II: Injunctive Relief in its entirety and as to Count I: Defamation & Defamation Per Se for PWL's claims concerning Asserted Statement #1 ... and Asserted Statement #3 ... The Motion is denied as to Count I ... Asserted Statement #2.”
“The Court further GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 382; Filing No. 385; Filing No. 387). The motions are GRANTED as to 400 N. Forsythe, Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief and property damage, and Plaintiffs' battery and strict liability claims. The Court DENIES the motions as to all other issues and claims. The remaining case shall proceed to trial or settlement.”
“The Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Dkt. [76], is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.”
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 4 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 4 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 4 | 4 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2024 | 3 | 2 |
| Sep 2023 | 3 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 8 | 4 |
| Sep 2022 | 2 | 7 |
| Mar 2022 | 4 | 6 |
| Sep 2021 | 13 | 2 |
| Mar 2021 | 3 | 6 |
| Sep 2020 | 4 | 4 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, not for Judge Pratt: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 2,443 | 11.2 months |
| Closed with no court action | 70 | 2.3 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 1,083 | 5.1 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 1,283 | 26.3 months |
| Closed during trial | 7 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 2,443 | 11.2 months |
| Sep 2024 | 2,243 | 9.9 months |
| Sep 2023 | 2,050 | 9.6 months |
| Sep 2022 | 2,896 | 12.7 months |
| Sep 2021 | 2,988 | 11.9 months |
| Sep 2020 | 2,419 | 7.3 months |
| Sep 2019 | 3,168 | 8.2 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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