Tanya Walton Pratt
How Judge Pratt decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She liberally construes pro se pleadings and denies a 12(b)(6) motion where the claim is tied to specific, plausible factual allegations.
“the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Dkt. [39] and Dkt. [41] are DENIED. These claims have survived the initial hurdle of a motion to dismiss.”
Procedural preferences
She treats PLRA exhaustion as an affirmative defense that cannot be resolved on a pre-answer motion to dismiss using an affidavit outside the pleadings; the defense must be raised on a proper summary-judgment record.
“The motion to dismiss [Dkt. 13] is denied because the complaint does not show on its face that the plaintiff's claim is deficient under the PLRA and because the court is not able to act on the motion based on materials outside the pleadings.”
Cautions
She strictly enforces PLRA administrative exhaustion at summary judgment, granting the defense judgment where a prisoner's grievance was rejected and never properly resubmitted through the grievance process.
“The defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt 27] is granted. Judgment dismissing this action without prejudice shall now issue.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Hill-Rom's Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 24) is GRANTED. All claims against Hill-Rom are dismissed without prejudice. Comedica is granted leave to file an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Entry.”
“the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #20) is GRANTED ... no evidence casts doubt on the Club's stated reason for firing Ms. Wampler or suggests that her Indonesian race or national origin was in any way a motivating factor in that decision.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. #48) is DENIED ... any amendment would ultimately be futile.”
“The defendants' motion for summary judgment [dkt 27] is granted. Judgment dismissing this action without prejudice shall now issue.”
“The motion to dismiss [Dkt. 13] is denied because the complaint does not show on its face that the plaintiff's claim is deficient under the PLRA and because the court is not able to act on the motion based on materials outside the pleadings.”
“the Defendants' Partial Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 22) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Motion is granted in that Plaintiffs Elijah and Owen are dismissed as named parties. In all other respects, the Plaintiffs have survived the initial hurdle of a Motion to Dismiss.”
“Defendants Motion to Dismiss Thompson's Second Amended Complaint (Filing No. 101) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Thompson's claims for Count I: Discrimination under Title IX, Count II: Discrimination under Title VI, and Count V: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, have survived ... The claims for Count III: Violation of Section 1981; Count IV: Violation of Section 1983; Count VI: Retaliation under Title IX; and Count VII: Breach of Contract are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“Thompson's Motion to Convert Defendants' Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 139) is DENIED.”
“United Way's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 49) is GRANTED. Jackson-Nibbs' claims are DISMISSED, the trial and final pretrial conference are hereby VACATED, and final judgment will issue under separate order.”
“Jackson-Nibbs' Motion for Leave to File Surreply (Filing No. 65) is DENIED.”
“Gema's Motion (Filing No. 82) is granted as to no invalidity of the Gema Patents; granted as to infringement of the Gema Patents by Part Nos. [list]; denied as to infringement ... by Part Nos. [list]; and denied as to infringement of the Gema Trademarks.”
“FIF's Motion (Filing No. 85) is granted as to the marking statute, 35 U.S.C. § 287(a); denied as to the nominative fair use defense; granted as to laches; and denied as moot as to acquiescence.”
“the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Dkt. [39] and Dkt. [41] are DENIED. These claims have survived the initial hurdle of a motion to dismiss.”
“Equifax's Rule 56(d) Motion (Dkt. 54) is granted and Batts' premature motion for summary Judgment, (Dkt. 50), is denied without prejudice.”
“Lilly's Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Counterclaims (Filing No. 37) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted as to Count II: Injunctive Relief in its entirety and as to Count I: Defamation & Defamation Per Se for PWL's claims concerning Asserted Statement #1 ... and Asserted Statement #3 ... The Motion is denied as to Count I ... Asserted Statement #2.”
“The Court further GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 382; Filing No. 385; Filing No. 387). The motions are GRANTED as to 400 N. Forsythe, Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief and property damage, and Plaintiffs' battery and strict liability claims. The Court DENIES the motions as to all other issues and claims. The remaining case shall proceed to trial or settlement.”
“The Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Dkt. [76], is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.”
Put Judge Pratt's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Pratt actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Pratt's own signed orders and cites them.