Jane Elizabeth Magnus-Stinson

“Because Mr. Hayes's contention that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to his multiple convictions and consecutive sentences on double jeopardy grounds is not subject to dismissal, Respondent's second motion to dismiss, dkt. [15], is denied.”

“Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, [156], and Second Motion to Enforcement Settlement Agreement, [163,] are GRANTED. The Settlement Agreement reached between the parties is binding and enforceable and final judgement against Defendants in the amount of $275,000 will be issued by separate order.”

1915(e)(2) screening of a pro se Title VII complaint (Black employee alleging a racially hostile work environment). IFP granted. Hostile-work-environment claim against the EMPLOYER shall proceed, but conditioned on an amended complaint with corrected EEOC dates and a Right-to-Sue letter; Title VII claims against the four INDIVIDUAL defendants DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (no individual liability under Title VII, Williams v. Banning; amendment futile, Arreola). As a screening order, it is excluded from the motion statistics and counted only as an order read.

“The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [dkt. 9] is GRANTED, and plaintiff's claims are dismissed without prejudice.”

“Because there is no sanction affecting the fact or duration of confinement in this case, the petition must be dismissed as moot. The respondent's motion to dismiss [dkt. 6] is granted.”

“The Court GRANTS Chicago Title's motion to dismiss to the extent that 1) all claims against NWJ are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and 2) all claims against Mr. Jekogian, except for the claim on which the Court entered summary judgment in favor of Chicago Title for $343,301.39, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”

“Chicago Title's Motion to Enter Summary Judgment as a Final Judgment is DENIED AS MOOT.”

“the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [24] is denied without prejudice.”

“the plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction [3, 5, 6] are denied. The court has not acquired in personam jurisdiction over the remaining defendants.”

“For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Mr. Hayes' Motion to Remand, [Filing No. 10], and REMANDS this matter to the Marion Superior Court.”

“For the reasons detailed above, the Court GRANTS Mr. King's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 128], and DENIES Marion Circuit Court's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 141].”

“the Court GRANTS IN PART Mr. Rees' pending motion, [Filing No. 46], and concludes that it is appropriate for it to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Rees' remaining state law claims. Those claims are dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).”

“For these reasons, the Court DENIED Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. [Filing No. 59.]”