William Charles Lee

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana district Retired 2024 · served 1981–2024 Appointed by Ronald Reagan (Republican) 22 signed orders read

Judge Lee no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Lee decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In CERCLA contribution disputes, he required proof that a settling party had actually admitted or been adjudicated liable before treating its cost-recovery claim as a time-barred contribution claim -- strict liability alone was not enough.

“Even though liability is strict under CERCLA, it is obvious that legal liability cannot attach until a party has either admitted liability or has been adjudicated as liable.”

On pollution exclusions in general-liability policies, he read the clause literally, holding that the relevant intent question is whether the discharge itself was deliberate, not whether the insured foresaw or intended the resulting damage.

“it is clear that the focus is on the act of discharging wastes and pollutants and not on the damage caused by that act.”

Procedural preferences

He enforced Local Rule 56.1's summary-judgment fact-statement requirements strictly, striking affidavit paragraphs -- even from a pro se prisoner-plaintiff -- that were not shown to be based on personal knowledge.

“Perrey has not shown a personal knowledge of Morrow's job responsibilities and paragraph 7 of his Affidavit will be stricken.”

Cautions

A concession made in a response brief was treated as dispositive: when a plaintiff offered to drop a claim, he entered dismissal of that claim with prejudice outright rather than simply denying the underlying motion as moot.

“Mudd states that he 'agrees to dismiss his Monell claims against the City of New Haven, with prejudice.' ... Accordingly, Mudd's claim against the City of New Haven is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Long, unexplained delay in asserting a claim was treated as an independent bar to relief: on remand from the Seventh Circuit, he granted summary judgment for the City on laches grounds over a plaintiff's multi-year delay in seeking indemnification.

“the motion will be granted.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Matter of Busick
· 1986-10-03
Bankruptcy appeal (debtor/appellant) Granted

“For the reasons which follow, the order of the bankruptcy court will be reversed.”

United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc.
· 1993-07-08
Objection to magistrate order (third-party defendants (appellants opposing severance)) Granted

“For the following reasons the Magistrate Judge's Order is REVERSED.”

United States v. SCA Services of Indiana, Inc.
· 1994-10-03
Motion for reconsideration (third-party defendants) Denied

“the third-party defendants' motion to reconsider is hereby DENIED.”

Motion for certification interlocutory appeal (third-party defendants) Denied

“the third-party defendants' alternative motion for certification of interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1292(b) is also hereby DENIED.”

Indiana Gas Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
· 1996-10-02
Summary judgment (defendant (insurer)) Granted

“summary judgment will be granted in favor of Home (and all joining defendants) on this issue.”

Summary judgment (defendant (insurer)) Granted

“summary judgment will be granted in favor of LMI on this issue.”

Stratton v. United States
· 1998-12-11
Motions to dismiss (government) Granted

“the Government's motion to dismiss will be granted.”

Boyd v. Herron
· 1999-03-15
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the motion will be granted.”

Braaksma v. Wells Community Hospital
· 2000-05-25
Motions to dismiss (plaintiff) Granted

“Braaksma's motion to dismiss will be granted.”

Daniels v. Area Plan Commission of Allen County
· 2000-12-19
Motions to strike (plaintiff) Granted

“the motion to strike will be granted”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“the Daniels' motion for summary judgment will be granted”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“the Plan Commission's motion for summary judgment will be denied.”

Linnemeier v. Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne
· 2001-07-20
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“the Defendants' motions to dismiss will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”

Ball-Foster Glass Container Co. v. American Flint Glass Workers Union
· 2002-01-03
Summary judgment (defendant (union)) Granted in part

“the Union's motion for summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part”

Summary judgment (plaintiff (employer)) Denied

“Saint-Gobain's cross-motion for summary judgment will be denied.”

Lombardo v. Forbes
· 2002-03-21
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the federal claims will be DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part.”

Krieg v. Seybold
· 2006-04-03
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment will be denied”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted as to all federal claims.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median motion-to-ruling time: 18 days (N = 1).

Across the sampled cohorts, his caseload mixed employment discrimination, prisoner habeas and civil-rights, general contract and tort, insurance-coverage, and Social Security appeals. By his final years (2023), the great majority of his active docket was Social Security disability appeals, most resolved within a few months by the Commissioner's own unopposed motion for a sentence-four remand rather than by contested briefing.

A historical record

Judge Lee no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.