Theresa Lazar Springmann
How Judge Springmann rules, drawn from 12 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Springmann decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Reads consumer-protection statutes for substance over form, treating a deferred-payment arrangement as 'credit' under the Truth in Lending Act regardless of how the contract is labeled.
“the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED (DE 35).”
In the reviewed Social Security fee order, Springmann began with the contingency agreement and found the requested amount reasonable in light of the successful result, contingent risk, effective hourly rate, and absence of undue delay or overreaching, while requiring refund of the earlier fee-shifting award.
“For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees Under 42 U.S.C. 406(b) [ECF No. 47]”
In the reviewed indenture-trustee dispute, she treated the parties' contract as the source of the trustee's duties and applied the economic-loss doctrine where the alleged tort injury duplicated the contractual loss.
“Consequently, the economic loss doctrine provided an independent basis to dismiss the Plaintiffs' tort claims.”
In the reviewed pension-benefits dispute, she ordered direct payment rather than remand after resolving the domestic-relations order's qualification as a legal question and finding no further issue for the trustees to consider.
“There is nothing further for the Trustees to consider on remand, and the Court will direct the Fund to remit to the Plaintiff the segregated amounts owed to her.”
Procedural preferences
On summary judgment in Section 1983 excessive-force cases, construes the facts for the nonmovant and declines qualified immunity where the right was clearly established and fact issues remain, granting the motion in part and denying it in part.
“The Fort Wayne Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 27] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
On a post-judgment motion to amend, grants leave to recharacterize a claim on the same facts but denies leave to add a new claim that would unduly prejudice a defendant who has already won summary judgment.
“the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint [EOF No. 89]. The Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs' Motion as to Count I, a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment ... and DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion as to Count II, a state law claim for false imprisonment against all Defendants.”
On reconsideration, Springmann looks to the substance rather than the title of a self-represented filing but requires a manifest legal error or genuinely new evidence; disappointment, reargument, and an unexplained service failure did not reopen the judgment.
“Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES the relief requested in the Plaintiff’s Denial of Order [ECF No. 6].”
At prisoner screening, she allowed excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims to proceed where a compliant detainee alleged an officer slammed his head into concrete without provocation while another officer watched.
“GRANTS Terrell K. Brown leave to proceed against Officer Lonkar in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for subjecting him to one incident of excessive force”
In the reviewed contract summary-judgment ruling, she required concrete evidence identifying which repairs missed the cure period; a managing partner's general statement did not create a trial issue when it failed to identify any particular late repair.
“Given that the Plaintiff signed an acknowledgement that repairs were conducted on April 1, 2015, and fails to identify any repairs that were not completed by that date, Kenney's vague testimony as to the timing of the repairs is insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact”
In the reviewed jail-medical-care case, she required evidence connecting the challenged staffing or emergency protocol to a substantial risk and the injury; conclusory assertions did not sustain a municipal-policy claim.
“The Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that an alternative reporting system or a different emergency services protocol was necessary to avoid deliberate indifference to the inmates' serious medical conditions, or would have changed the outcome of Vaught's treatment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 33) is DENIED, and the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED (DE 35).”
“the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED (DE 35).”
“The Fort Wayne Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 27] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“Defendant Robert Hatfield's Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 29] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“the Fort Wayne Defendants' Motion to Strike [DE 56] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“the Defendant's Motion to Exclude Time [DE 31] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“the Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendant City of Hammond on all claims asserted against it; ... summary judgment is DENIED as to Derrick Gray's and Yolanda Gray's claims of excessive force and claims of unreasonable search and seizure”
“the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend/Correct Complaint [EOF No. 89]. The Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs' Motion as to Count I, a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for violation of the Fourth Amendment ... and DENIES the Plaintiffs' Motion as to Count II, a state law claim for false imprisonment against all Defendants.”
“For the reasons stated above, the Court hereby GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Attorney’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys Fees Under 42 U.S.C. 406(b) [ECF No. 47]”
“Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES the relief requested in the Plaintiff’s Denial of Order [ECF No. 6].”
At screening, the court allowed a pretrial detainee to proceed on excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims where he alleged that an officer slammed his head into concrete after he had complied and another officer watched. The jail and unrelated claims were dismissed. Verbatim disposition: 'GRANTS Terrell K. Brown leave to proceed against Officer Lonkar in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for subjecting him to one incident of excessive force' and 'GRANTS Terrell K. Brown leave to proceed against Officer Greenee in his individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for failing to intervene.'
“For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure to State a Claim [ECF No. 38] is GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 35], and DENIES the Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 39].”
“For these reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART the QCC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 69] and GRANTS IN PART the Whitley County Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 71]. The Court DENIES the Motions with respect to all state-law claims, RELINQUISHES supplemental jurisdiction over these state-law claims, and REMANDS the case to the Huntington Superior Court.”
“Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Fund's Motion to Transfer Case [ECF No. 47], GRANTS the Fund's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 42] the Plaintiff's state law conversion claim, and DENIES the Fund's Motion for Judgment on the Administrative Record [ECF No. 7].”
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