William Francis Riley

United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa district Retired 1956 · served 1950–1956 Appointed by Harry S. Truman (Democratic) 20 signed orders read

Judge Riley no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Riley decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Riley required a summary-judgment movant to eliminate reasonable doubt about every material factual issue and every discernible route to recovery.

“all reasonable doubts touching the existence of a genuine issue as to a material fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment.”

He treated the public interest, rather than private-litigation standards alone, as the measure for statutory injunctive relief.

“The standards of public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief.”

Procedural preferences

Riley directed parties to discovery rather than requiring evidentiary detail in a short negligence pleading.

“Defendant has recourse to discovery proceedings to inform himself in greater detail.”

He enforced the jury-demand deadline even when he believed the case was particularly suitable for a jury.

“the requirements of the rule are not observed. The actual burden on the court in the preparation of the necessary findings and conclusions far exceeds that of the preparation of instructions to a jury.”

Cautions

Adding independent fraud and contract claims to a nonremovable injury claim could make the entire amended action removable.

“When he adopted the latter course, defendant then became entitled to exercise the right of removal conferred upon it by the statutes as to thé causes of action properly removable.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Community Builders, Inc. v. Painters & Decorators Local Union 246
· 1955-07-14
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“It is therefore ordered and adjudged that plaintiff’s motion to remand this action to the District Court of the State of Iowa in and for Polk County be and the same is hereby sustained.”

Sladek v. General Motors Corp.
· 1954-08-03
Motion to deem requests admitted (defendants) Denied

“Defendants’ motion must be overruled.”

Illinois-California Express, Inc. v. Duffy
· 1953-08-10
Motion for more specific statement (defendant) Denied

“The motion therefore in this respect must be overruled.”

Motions to strike (defendant) Denied

“The present motion to strike will therefore be overruled without prejudice to the defendant of raising such legal questions as above mentioned at an appropriate time during trial.”

United States v. Chamberlin
· 1951-11-13
Motion to dismiss preliminary injunction request (defendants) Moot / procedural

“The court sustained the motion insofar as it applied to a preliminary injunction”

Request for permanent injunction (United States) Granted

“the court proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, to which counsel for the defendant may make due exception, and will prepare and submit an order for injunctive relief consistent with this memorandum.”

Brewer v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co.
· 1951-05-26
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“It is therefore Ordered that defendant’s' motion for summary judgment herein be, and the same is, hereby denied.”

United States v. 1,616.97 Acres of Land
· 1955-03-23
Request for jury trial (landowners) Denied

“the issue of just compensation as to the tracts in question herein shall be determined by a commission of three persons to be appointed by this court.”

Request for jury trial (United States) Denied
United States v. Henderson
· 1953-10-15
Motion for judgment (United States) Granted

“The Government’s motion for judgment should be sustained.”

Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Coffelt
· 1951-04-30
Motion to dismiss counterclaim (plaintiff) Granted

“It is hereby Ordered that plaintiff’s motion should be and is sustained and that defendant’s couiterclaim be and it is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to proceed independently in the future upon any cause of action then found to exist.”

Petsel v. Chicago, B. & QR Co.
· 1951-11-07
Motion to restore jury trial (plaintiff) Denied

“an order will be entered denying the motion to set aside the previous order removing this case from the list of cases for trial by jury.”

Zamberletti v. Zamberletti
· 1952-06-03
Estate claim (plaintiff) Denied

“plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed with prejudice.”

Chicago, B. & Q. R. v. Blunk
· 1951-09-27
Demurrage charge claim (plaintiff) Granted

“Defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the amount of demurrage, and tax claimed, a total of $3133.89 with interest and costs. Judgment will therefore be entered for the plaintiff accordingly.”

Abramson v. United States
· 1955-07-05
Tax refund claim (plaintiffs) Granted

“Counsel for plaintiffs are asked to prepare and submit to counsel for the defendant for agreement a decree and judgment consistent with this memorandum of decision”

Motions to dismiss (United States) Denied

“The action of the court as disclosed by this memorandum of decision disposes of these motions because it is tantamount to overruling the same.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

No electronic case-level docket exists for Riley's tenure. The profile therefore makes no claim about complete caseload mix, duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.

A historical record

Judge Riley no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.