Stephen Henley Locher
How Judge Locher rules, drawn from 16 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Locher
Stephen Henley Locher is a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Appointed by President Joseph R. Biden, Judge Locher received a commission on July 18, 2022.
Judge Locher's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Locher's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Locher decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Snyder v. Arconic Corp., Locher granted the employer summary judgment on a religious-discrimination claim because the employee identified no religious belief requiring the challenged post and gave no advance notice that he needed an exception to the company policy.
“In the absence of a conflict, however, the law does not require the employer to give preferential treatment to an employee who violates a religiously neutral policy even if the violation is motivated by religious beliefs, particularly if the employer has no reason to believe, in advance, that an accommodation is needed... As Snyder has not identified any religious belief or practice that required him to post his message, and as there is no evidence that he placed his employer on notice that he needed an accommodation from company policy prior to violating it, he has failed as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case for religious discrimination.”
When a federal statute delegates investigative and adjudicatory duties to a private regulator, Locher has treated common-law damages claims arising from those delegated functions as barred by regulatory immunity. In paired youth-gymnastics cases, he applied that protection to both affirmative regulatory acts and alleged failures to act. Counsel opposing this defense should distinguish conduct performed in the entity's private capacity from conduct tied to its delegated regulatory role.
“Because SafeSport is entitled to regulatory immunity from claims like the ones raised by Plaintiffs here, the Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss in Case Nos. 4:26-cv-00001 (ECF 29) and 4:26-cv-00004 (ECF 29). SafeSport is dismissed from the cases.”
In an immigration detention case, the court retained a bond-hearing remedy after an appellate ruling changed its statutory analysis. It treated the detainee’s earlier release and the lack of an individualized hearing as significant to the procedural due process claim.
“Here, the risk of erroneous deprivation is severe because Respondents are proposing essentially no procedure at all.”
In Carter v. Health Insurance King Agency, he denied a personal-jurisdiction dismissal at the pleading stage after resolving disputed facts about an employee’s call and authority in the plaintiff’s favor.
“At this stage, the Court must resolve factual disputes in Carter’s favor.”
Procedural preferences
In Snyder v. Arconic, Locher treated portions of summary-judgment fact statements as undisputed when a party denied an entire paragraph but supported its denial only in part. He explained that the accurate response would have been 'admitted in part and denied in part.'
“The Court likewise treats facts as 'undisputed' in other places where one side or the other purported to 'deny' an entire paragraph but only provided support for the denial as to some portion of the paragraph. See id. In these circumstances, the correct nomenclature would have been that the statement is 'admitted in part and denied in part.'”
In Penguin Random House, LLC v. Robbins, Locher evaluated the preliminary injunction request under three possible First Amendment standards. He found the plaintiffs likely to prevail under the two standards he considered the best fit for the school-library restrictions, while explaining that they had not met their burden under Hazelwood.
“For reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs are likely to prevail in establishing that the unconstitutional applications of Senate File 496 substantially outweigh the constitutional applications if the governing standard is the Ginsberg standard for obscenity as applied to minors and/or the 'substantial and reasonable governmental interest' standard established in Pico and Pratt. Plaintiffs have not, however, satisfied their burden if the Hazelwood standard applies... Because the Court believes the first two standards are the best fit in the circumstances presented here, it concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden.”
In Galanakis v. City of Newton, he dismissed two amended counterclaims with prejudice after the officers had twice failed to plead a viable claim and the record showed no basis for another amendment.
“because there is nothing in the record to suggest they could state a plausible claim if given a third chance, the dismissal is WITH PREJUDICE.”
Cautions
In Yugar-Cruz v. McCleary, Locher denied a motion to enforce his earlier release order after finding that ICE had obtained a travel document, satisfying the order’s changed-circumstances condition. He also declined the requested third-country-removal relief in light of stays entered in the related class litigation.
“This satisfies the Court’s requirement that there be ‘changed circumstances’ and a ‘significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Court therefore DENIES Snyder's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“The Court GRANTS the Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by the Penguin House Plaintiffs and GRANTS IN PART the Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by the GLBT Youth Plaintiffs. All Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or acting in furtherance of the provisions of Senate File 496 that: (i) require the removal of books from school libraries that are not ‘age-appropriate’; and (ii) prohibit any ‘program, curriculum, test, survey, questionnaire, promotion, or instruction relating to gender identity or sexual orientation to students in kindergarten through grade six.’”
“The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Pending further proceedings, Defendants are hereby ENJOINED from enforcing or acting in furtherance of the provisions of Senate File 496 that require the removal of books from school libraries that are not ‘age-appropriate.’”
“After careful review, the Court GRANTS Yugar-Cruz’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF 1) and orders him RELEASED on reasonable conditions of supervision consistent with 8 CFR § 241.13(h).”
“The Motion to Enforce is DENIED. (ECF 17.)”
“Thus, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Midland’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF 43.) The breach of contract and RICO claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The common law fraud and innocent misrepresentation claims will proceed.”
“Because SafeSport is entitled to regulatory immunity from claims like the ones raised by Plaintiffs here, the Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss in Case Nos. 4:26-cv-00001 (ECF 29) and 4:26-cv-00004 (ECF 29). SafeSport is dismissed from the cases.”
“Because SafeSport is entitled to regulatory immunity from claims like the ones raised by Plaintiffs here, the Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss in Case Nos. 4:26-cv-00001 (ECF 29) and 4:26-cv-00004 (ECF 29). SafeSport is dismissed from the cases.”
“Petitioner’s Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF 4) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“His Motion for Injunctive Relief is DENIED AS MOOT”
“Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration (ECF 24) is GRANTED IN PART insofar as the Court is now relying entirely on principles of due process to conclude that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. The Motion for Reconsideration is otherwise DENIED.”
“therefore DENIES Health Insurance King’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.”
“The Court therefore DENIES DHHS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (ECF 22).”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 185.5 days (N = 10).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 54 days (N = 30).
- The reviewed sample covers about 21 cases from 2020 through 2026.
- It is weighted toward six related Midwest Energy Emissions Corp. patent suits, most of which were still pending when reviewed, and also includes immigration-detainee and other habeas petitions, employment and civil-rights cases, consumer-credit claims under the FCRA, and personal-injury matters.
- It is a limited case sample rather than a complete docket census.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 1 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2024 | 1 | 1 |
| Sep 2023 | 1 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, not for Judge Locher: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 395 | 8 months |
| Closed with no court action | 161 | 9.1 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 222 | 5.8 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 4 | not reported |
| Closed during trial | 8 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 395 | 8 months |
| Sep 2024 | 360 | 7.6 months |
| Sep 2023 | 363 | 8.9 months |
| Sep 2022 | 311 | 10.5 months |
| Sep 2021 | 372 | 9.5 months |
| Sep 2020 | 339 | 7.7 months |
| Sep 2019 | 341 | 9.4 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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