Ronald Earl Longstaff
How Judge Longstaff decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Longstaff treats the Daubert gatekeeping inquiry as potentially case-dispositive in technical products-liability cases. In Cummings v. Deere he excluded the plaintiff's causation expert as unreliable -- weighting heavily that the opinion was developed for litigation, was not peer-reviewed or tested against the ignition energy actually required, and that the expert's 'rebuttal' supplied calculations he had earlier admitted he never performed -- and because Iowa law then requires expert testimony for a complex product defect, the exclusion led directly to summary judgment. Practical lesson for counsel: in a technical product case before this judge, the admissibility fight over the causation expert may decide the whole case, so the expert disclosure must be complete and method-driven from the outset, not patched in rebuttal.
“Performing calculations and belatedly considering variables which an opposing expert correctly points out you did not do or know, and which you admitted you did not do or know, is not rebuttal -- it is clearly the interjection of new opinion evidence... such tactics weigh heavily in favor of finding that Dr. Roberts' opinions are not reliable, and are, in fact, a results-driven product of litigation.”
Cautions
In Heyne, Longstaff read the ADA's 'substantial limitation' and 'disability' requirements strictly, holding that being able to stand only two hours at a time -- while continuing strenuous carpentry work and where the plaintiff's own physician did not consider him disabled -- is not a substantial limitation on a major life activity, so the ADA claim failed at the threshold. He also held that being placed on forced/involuntary FMLA leave is not by itself an actionable FMLA retaliation injury. Counsel bringing ADA/FMLA claims before him should build a record that squarely satisfies the disability threshold rather than relying on the existence of an impairment or an adverse-feeling employment action.
“This Court agrees with the logic of these cases and holds that the ability to stand in place for only two hours is not a substantial limitation on the major life activity of standing under the ADA.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude expert N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, Deere's motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Charles Roberts, and motion for summary judgment are GRANTED. Deere's motion to strike portions of the testimony of Dr. Charles Roberts is denied as moot. IT IS ORDERED.”
“Given the Court's earlier decision to exclude the testimony of Dr. Roberts, Cummings has failed to present sufficient evidence -- i.e. expert testimony as to the defective nature of Deere's product -- to submit this case to a jury. Cummings' claim of product defect fails as a matter of law... Deere's motion for summary judgment is granted.”
“Deere's motion to strike portions of the testimony of Dr. Charles Roberts is denied as moot. IT IS ORDERED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, HGI's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. IT IS ORDERED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 295 days (N = 6).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 1 days (N = 3).
Sample of ~21 dockets that docket lists with Longstaff as assigned judge, filed 1993-2016, mostly civil with several prisoner-petition matters (many of the prisoner cases name 'Longstaff' as a defendant -- i.e. suits against the judge -- and were terminated administratively in days; those are excluded from the civil-duration sample below). Treat this as a rough caseload shape, not a census.