Harold Duane Vietor

United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa district Retired 2016 · served 1979–2016 Appointed by Jimmy Carter (Democratic) 21 signed orders read

Judge Vietor no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Vietor decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Vietor distinguished medical care from willful conduct outside treatment when applying a medical-malpractice limitation period.

“Rape is not patient care activity.”

He required warrant affidavits to disclose facts that materially affected an informant's reliability rather than presenting a misleadingly clean account.

“Judge Houlihan needed that information, together with detailed information about the Cooperation and Plea Agreement, in order to independently and adequately judge the reliability of the informant and make an informed determination of whether probable cause existed.”

Procedural preferences

Vietor required fraudulent joinder to be pleaded specifically and supported by strong evidence before allowing removal.

“An assertion of fraudulent joinder must be alleged with particularity and supported by clear and convincing evidence.”

He applied the traditional demanding standard at the pleading stage, allowing claims to proceed when facts could still establish relief.

“A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted only if ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”

Cautions

A transfer request needed concrete witness information; general assertions that witnesses and documents were elsewhere carried little weight.

“Hartbrodt does not, however, provide any more specific information regarding who the necessary witnesses are.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Vrban v. Deere & Co.
· 1996-11-19
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendant Deere' & Company’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.”

Doe v. Cherwitz
· 1995-08-28
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted in part

“Defendant Gordon Cherwitz’s motion for summary judgment, which is joined in by defendant The Davenport Clinic, is DENIED, except as provided below.”

Accordino v. Langman Construction, Inc.
· 1994-08-23
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The motion to dismiss filed by defendant Wayne Davis on April 22, 1994, is GRANTED as to plaintiffs first and second claims, those under Title VII, and IT IS ORDERED that those claims be DISMISSED with prejudice.”

In Re Brown
· 1994-06-13
Bankruptcy appeal (debtors) Granted

“The bankruptcy court’s order overruling debtors’ objection to the IRS’s proof of claim is REVERSED and the order dismissing the case is VACATED. IT IS ORDERED that this case be REMANDED to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Wright v. Shalala
· 1993-09-13
Social security appeal (claimant) Granted

“IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Secretary is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to her for further proceedings and a new decision in accordance with this opinion.”

Drost Equipment, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
· 1985-03-07
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“IT IS ORDERED that this case be remanded to the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, and that defendant pay all costs incurred in connection with the removal and remand.”

Lacy v. Sullivan
· 1992-06-15
Social security appeal (claimant) Granted in part

“Because the Secretary did not apply the proper legal standard, the decision of the Secretary is REVERSED and REMANDED to the Secretary.”

Great Rivers Cooperative v. Farmland Industries, Inc.
· 1996-07-03
Summary judgment (defendants) Denied

“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on count VI of the complaint of plaintiff Tacey is DENIED.”

High v. Sperry Corp.
· 1984-03-16
Motions to strike (defendant) Granted

“Defendant’s motion to strike the words ‘and maliciously’ from count II of the complaint is granted, and the words ‘and maliciously’ are hereby stricken from count II of the complaint.”

Motion to strike punitive damages (defendant) Granted

“Defendant’s motion to strike plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under the Iowa Civil Rights Act in count III of the complaint is granted, and paragraph (b) of the count III prayer is stricken.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion to dismiss count IV of the complaint is denied.”

J. E. Sieben Construction Co. v. City of Davenport
· 1980-08-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant city) Denied

“Defendant city of Davenport’s motion to dismiss is overruled.”

Nelson v. Minner
· 1985-03-08
Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Denied

“Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is denied.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and it is ordered that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed.”

Motion for attorneys fees (defendant) Denied

“This is not such a case and defendant’s request is denied.”

Fred Nesbit Distributing Co. v. United States
· 1985-03-07
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is overruled.”

Summary judgment (United States) Granted

“Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and it is ordered that plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The classified active-tenure decisions largely predate a representative electronic case-level docket. The profile therefore makes no claim about complete caseload mix, duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.

A historical record

Judge Vietor no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.