Donald Eugene O'Brien
Judge O'Brien no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge O'Brien decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
O’Brien let the first-filed rule operate normally when a declaratory plaintiff faced a concrete trademark dispute and no compelling exception favored later litigation.
“No compelling circumstances exist requiring this Court to deviate from the first filed rule and dismiss the Plain*944tiffs Complaint.”
In benefit litigation, he required the administrator’s experts to evaluate the claimant’s actual executive duties rather than a generic sales occupation.
“the court cannot conclude, on the record before it, that Hartford did not abuse its discretion in determining that Meylor was not disabled at the time it terminated his long-term disability benefits.”
Procedural preferences
O’Brien read a self-filed administrative charge liberally but did not extend the same indulgence to a later attorney-drafted amendment.
“The Court can stretch the scope of Plaintiff’s administrative complaint only so far.”
Exceptional post-trial facts justified targeted depositions before the court ruled on a pending new-trial motion.
“The Court concludes that the necessary prima facie showing has been made under Rule 60(b) to permit the plaintiff to take the deposition of Jim Rand concerning his rehiring.”
Cautions
A party’s participation in offensive workplace joking did not by itself erase factual disputes about repeated discriminatory harassment.
“a plaintiffs failure to grasp the hypocrisy of some of his actions is not generally grounds for summary judgment.”
O’Brien refused to expand a federal Indian-contract statute beyond its text when the agreement was a land lease rather than a services contract.
“Leases of land are not services in relation to land within the meaning of § 81.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.”
“Defendant IC & E’s motion for summary judgment, Docket No. 39, is granted in part/denied in part.”
“Plaintiffs motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), Doc. No. 73, is denied.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Docket No. 16, is granted in part/denied in part.”
“the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, Docket No. 68, is denied.”
“defendant’s motion for a new trial, Docket No. 68, is denied.”
“defendant’s motion to alter or amend judgment, Docket No. 68, is denied in part and granted in part.”
“the plaintiffs motion for attorney fees and costs, Docket No. 71, is granted in the amount of $20,000.00, in attorney fees and $1,587.88 in costs, to be paid by the defendant.”
“defendant Hartford’s Motion For Summary Judgment is denied.”
“the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 7) is sustained.”
“The defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 18) is denied.”
“the plaintiffs’ motion to remand is denied.”
“the plaintiffiappellant’s appeal from the Bankruptcy court’s ruling is denied.”
“defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted”
“plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“defendant’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or in the alternative for a new trial (Docket No. 217) is denied.”
“the decision of the ALJ is affirmed as to the decision that there is no disability proven during the window period from September 25, 1989, to April 15, 1992.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
No case-level docket assigned under O'Brien’s name was returned for his Northern District service. The profile therefore makes no claim about complete caseload mix, case duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.
A historical record
Judge O'Brien no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.