Leslie Emi Kobayashi
How Judge Kobayashi decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an early round of Second Amendment litigation over Hawaii's post-Bruen firearms-carry law, the judge found the state's public-safety justification for one restriction undercut by the state's own evidence that very few concealed-carry permits had historically been issued, reasoning that a rule burdening a small, largely law-abiding subset of permit holders was hard to justify on public-safety grounds at the preliminary stage.
“the challenged provisions only impact a substantially small subset of gun owners and, thus, the State's public safety argument is not persuasive... the vast majority of conceal carry permit holders are law-abiding.”
In a Clean Water Act citizen suit over Navy fuel-storage leaks, the judge treated dueling expert reports on the likelihood of future contamination as creating a triable factual dispute rather than resolving the credibility contest herself, declining a defendant's summary-judgment bid on that basis.
“in ruling on Defendants' Motion, this Court cannot determine issues of credibility or relative weight of evidence... this Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the issue of whether prior intermittent discharges of fuel products at the Facility are reasonably likely to recur.”
Distinguishes claims that are merely duplicative of a properly-pled theory from claims that must be dismissed outright, letting the case proceed on the surviving theory rather than dismissing the whole count.
“All three failure to warn claims are based on the same set of facts, and the claims can only proceed under a premises liability theory... the Court dismisses the failure to warn portions of Counts I and II as duplicative of the failure to warn portion of Count V.”
Procedural preferences
Dismisses official-capacity claims against government agencies and officials as duplicative of the claim against the underlying government entity itself, a recurring cleanup move in civil-rights suits naming both a municipality and its officials or departments.
“DCS is not a separate legal entity from the City... As to the claims against Mayor Blangiardi and Hashiro... 'There is no longer a need to bring official-capacity actions against local government officials, for under Monell... local government units can be sued directly for damages and injunctive or declaratory relief.' Therefore, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted insofar as Plaintiff's claims against DCS, Mayor Blangiardi, and Hashiro are dismissed.”
When a pro se plaintiff's filing lapses do not prejudice the opposing party, prefers a warning and the availability of lesser sanctions over dismissal, applying the Ninth Circuit's multi-factor test methodically rather than dismissing for procedural noncompliance alone.
“this Court finds that a Rule 41(b) dismissal is not warranted under the current circumstances of this case... Hermanns-Raymond is CAUTIONED that he must comply with all court orders and applicable court rules. Documents that do not comply with the applicable court orders and rules may be stricken.”
Cautions
Will vacate the court's own prior dismissal on reconsideration if the court itself misunderstood a threshold fact, rather than holding a pro se litigant to a dismissal built on the court's own error -- but the correction does not guarantee a different final outcome once the record is properly understood.
“Based on these clarifications and the Court's mistake regarding the criminal proceeding that formed the basis for its decision, the Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to VACATE the December 5, 2018 Dismissal Order and judgment and reopen this case.”
Repeatedly dismisses claims against individual defendants for supervisory or conspiracy liability when the complaint does not plead a distinct theory separate from the primary claims already pled against the same defendants -- a recurring pleading trap in multi-defendant civil-rights complaints in this district.
“Claim 7 merely pleads the theory of liability that supports Claims 4 and 5. As the three claims are currently pled, Claim 7 does not plead a claim for relief which is separate and distinct from Claims 4 and 5. The Maioho-Pohina Motion is therefore granted, insofar as Claim 7 is dismissed.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, filed June 23, 2023, is HEREBY GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The TRO Motion is GRANTED to the extent that the following provisions are enjoined: -the portions of Section 134-A(a)(1) that prohibit carrying firearms in parking areas owned, leased, or used by the State or a county which share the parking area with non-governmental entities...; -the entirety of Sections 134-A(a)(4) and (a)(12); -the portions of Section 134-A(a)(9) prohibiting the carrying of firearms in beaches, parks, and their adjacent parking areas; and -the portion of Section 134-E that prohibits carrying firearms on private properties held open to the public. The TRO Motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 19, 2025, is HEREBY DENIED.”
“Defendant's Motion is hereby granted insofar as the portions of Counts I and II alleging failure to properly test water samples for petroleum are dismissed with prejudice, and the portion of Count II alleging failure to properly remediate affected homes, and the portions of Counts I and II alleging failure to test for petroleum are dismissed. The Motion is denied insofar as the portion of Count II alleging failure to properly remediate affected homes, and the portions of Counts I and II alleging failure to test for petroleum are dismissed without prejudice.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the State's Motion to Remand, filed November 29, 2023, is HEREBY DENIED.”
“Defendants' Motion is GRANTED insofar as the State's First Amended Complaint, filed November 6, 2023 in state court and replaced by the version filed in this district court on August 19, 2024, is DISMISSED. The Motion is DENIED insofar as the dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The State is GRANTED leave to file a second amended complaint.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Complaint, filed October 30, 2023, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendants' Motion is GRANTED insofar as: the claims against DCS, Mayor Blangiardi, and Hashiro are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and the claims alleging violations of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Plaintiff's claims alleging discrimination in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Hawai`i Constitution are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Remand is denied.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions is denied.”
“The City Motion is GRANTED, insofar as all of Hall's claims against the City are DISMISSED. The City Motion is DENIED, insofar as the dismissal is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“The Maioho-Pohina Motion is GRANTED, insofar as Hall's claims against Maioho-Pohina in Claim 4 and Claim 7 are DISMISSED. The Maioho-Pohina Motion is DENIED as to Hall's claim against Maioho-Pohina in Claim 5, and the motion is DENIED, insofar as the dismissal of Hall's claims against Maioho-Pohina in Claim 4 and Claim 7 is WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“Lewis's Motion to Dismiss Complaint Filed July 5, 2024 (Dkt. 1), filed April 9, 2025, is HEREBY DENIED.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed June 19, 2019, is HEREBY DENIED.”
“the S&G Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts Three, Six, and Seven, of the Second Amended Counterclaim, and Counts One Through Four of the First Amended Third Party Complaint, filed May 28, 2021, is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The S&G Parties' Motion is: GRANTED insofar as summary judgment is granted in favor of Bade-Castro as to Third-Party Count I; DENIED AS MOOT as to Counterclaim Count VII and Third-Party Count IV; and DENIED as to Counterclaim Count III, Counterclaim Count VI, Third-Party Count II, and Third-Party Count III.”
“Oliver's Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Dismissal Order and judgment are VACATED.”
A mandatory pre-answer screening of a pro se prisoner's Section 1983 complaint under 28 U.S.C. sections 1915(e) and 1915A(a), not a ruling on a party motion. The court held: 'Plaintiff's claims for damages against all Defendants named in their official capacities are DISMISSED... The Complaint is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)(1) for Plaintiff's failure to state a colorable claim for relief. Plaintiff's claims against official capacity Defendants and for prospective injunctive relief are dismissed with prejudice. All other claims are dismissed with leave granted to amend.' The complaint alleged a retaliatory prison transfer after the plaintiff filed a grievance; the court found the access-to-courts, conspiracy, and retaliation theories insufficiently pled but allowed amendment on all but the barred official-capacity and mootness grounds.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Her general civil docket includes civil-rights suits against state and county governments and officials (including child-welfare and police-conduct claims), habeas corpus petitions (state and federal), Social Security appeals, prisoner civil-rights and post-conviction matters, employment and trade-secrets disputes, insurance and contract removals, and larger environmental and public-interest litigation such as the Red Hill Navy fuel-contamination cases and Second Amendment challenges, drawn primarily from the Honolulu division with cases also arising from Maui and Kauai.
Put Judge Kobayashi's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Kobayashi actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Kobayashi's own signed orders and cites them.