Harold Michael Fong

United States District Court for the District of Hawaii district Retired 1995 · served 1982–1995 Appointed by Ronald Reagan (Republican) 25 signed orders read

Judge Fong no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Fong decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Fong treated actual availability, rather than nominal gross receipts, as the controlling principle for benefit-income calculations.

“In computing net income, the state may only include amounts actually and currently available, as set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D).”

A strong merits showing paired with irreparable harm supported preliminary relief against enforcement of the challenged statute.

“Accordingly, because the plaintiff has demonstrated a high probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, the court hereby GRANTS plaintiff Mr. Terry’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and ORDERS that the enforcement of the Hawaii Control Share Acquisition Statute § 416-171 and § 416-172 Hawaii Rev.Stat. (1985) be enjoined pending the final resolution of this lawsuit.”

Procedural preferences

At an early stage, he allowed a civil-rights claim to proceed despite imperfect pleading when discovery had barely begun.

“Where some of the defendants are as yet unidentified, and the proceedings are at such an early stage that there has been little time for discovery, it would be unduly harsh to dismiss the complaint solely because the pleading is less than perfect.”

He left a disputed, fact-specific viability determination for trial rather than resolving it solely by gestational age.

“The issue of viability, however, cannot be resolved by considering only the length of gestation which is what Dr. Smith did.”

Cautions

A potentially controlling agency relationship and unresolved control evidence defeated both dismissal and summary judgment.

“The question as to whether defendants ‘controlled’ LACLC to such an extent that would give rise to an agency relationship, and resulting liability, is best left to the trial court.”

Even after granting preliminary relief, he withheld permanent relief when material factual contentions remained unresolved.

“Because additional factual contentions which may be material need be resolved before final resolution of this case, that motion will be DENIED.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Ramos v. Universal Dredging Corp.
· 1982-09-17
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED;”

Motion for continuance (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion to continue the trial and the hearing on plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is therefore denied.”

Motions to strike (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Since this court did not consider the findings of the administrative law judge below in reaching this decision, plaintiff’s motion to strike is denied as moot.”

Puna Speaks v. Edwards
· 1982-12-17
Preliminary injunction (plaintiffs) Denied

“Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is therefore DENIED.”

Alexander v. Moore & Associates, Inc.
· 1982-12-30
Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Granted in part

“For the reasons given, partial summary judgment is GRANTED in favor of Plaintiffs on the status of UNI-CHECK as a credit reporting agency, and UNI-CHECK’s violation of §§ 1681 e(b) and i(c) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED in all other respects.”

Nishimoto v. Sunn
· 1983-01-06
Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and that, effective January 1, 1983, Defendant SUNN shall not include mandatory payroll deductions such as federal, State, Social Security taxes (F.I.C.A.), and temporary disability insurance (TDI) within the definition of ‘income’ in interpreting and determining ‘need’ as used in Section 602(a)(7) of Title 42 of the United States Code.”

Speaks v. Hodel
· 1983-01-14
Motion for reconsideration and injunction pending appeal (plaintiffs) Denied

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion, considered both as one for reconsideration and for an injunction pending appeal, is therefore DENIED.”

Baron v. Bryant
· 1983-01-27
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendants’ motions to dismiss, to strike plaintiff’s supplemental memorandum in opposition to motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for a continuance of hearing, and for summary judgment, is therefore DENIED.”

Motion to strike or continue (defendants) Denied
Summary judgment (defendants) Denied
Moore v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc.
· 1983-03-10
Summary judgment (defendant Honeywell) Granted

“Defendant Honeywell’s Motion for Summary Judgment is, and the same shall be, GRANTED as to both causes of action, and Judgment shall issue accordingly.”

Feher v. Department of Labor & Industrial Relations
· 1983-03-17
Application for interim attorneys fees and costs (plaintiff) Granted

“and costs in the amount of $18,592.92 is hereby GRANTED.”

Stancil v. Mergenthaler Linotype Co.
· 1984-02-29
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“In light of the foregoing, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the grounds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Frost v. City and County of Honolulu
· 1984-04-13
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”

Windward City Center v. Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance
· 1985-07-30
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“ACCORDINGLY, defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is hereby GRANTED.”

Terry, on Behalf of C. Herman Terry Charitable Remainder Unitrust v. Yamashita
· 1986-06-13
Preliminary injunction (plaintiff) Granted

“Accordingly, because the plaintiff has demonstrated a high probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, the court hereby GRANTS plaintiff Mr. Terry’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and ORDERS that the enforcement of the Hawaii Control Share Acquisition Statute § 416-171 and § 416-172 Hawaii Rev.Stat. (1985) be enjoined pending the final resolution of this lawsuit.”

Preliminary injunction (defendant International Holding Capitol Corporation) Denied

“It is further ordered that defendant International Holding Capitol Corporation’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED.”

Motion for permanent injunction (plaintiff) Denied

“Because additional factual contentions which may be material need be resolved before final resolution of this case, that motion will be DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The available assigned-case metadata covers a narrow early-electronic cohort and does not establish the distribution of Fong’s full career caseload.

A historical record

Judge Fong no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.