Steven Daniel Grimberg

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta Division) Appointed by Donald Trump (Republican) 6 signed orders read

How Judge Grimberg decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Strong stated preference for resolving disputes on the merits over procedural technicalities; construes renewal/saving statutes and Rule 15 leave-to-amend liberally toward that end, and reads excusable-neglect (Pioneer) elastically to excuse short, good-faith filing delays.

“Given the strong public policy in both Tennessee and Georgia favoring disposition of a case on its merits, the Court finds it is appropriate to apply Tennessee's renewal statute and allow Plaintiffs leave to amend their Renewal Complaint.”

Prioritizes resolving qualified- and sovereign-immunity questions at the earliest possible stage, and will reopen a defaulted posture to let immunity defenses be heard.

“Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”

Procedural preferences

Enforces civil-procedure mechanics strictly even against pro se parties: a default judgment requires the Clerk's Rule 55(a) entry of default first; and his Standing Order bars piecemeal/successive summary-judgment motions and denies premature Rule 56 motions filed before discovery under Rule 56(d).

“Richardson has not complied with step one of Rule 55(a) by filing a motion for the Clerk's entry of default. This is not a mere persnickety technicality; the law is clear that the clerk's entry of default must precede an application for default judgment.”

Motion outcomes

Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.

Summary judgment
N = 4
Granted: 1Granted in part: 2Moot / procedural: 1 counts only
Motions to dismiss
N = 2
Granted in part: 1Moot / procedural: 1 counts only
Judgment on pleadings
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion to amend
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only
Motion to set aside default
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only
Default judgment
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion for contempt
N = 1
Denied: 1 counts only
Motion to exclude
N = 1
Granted: 1 counts only

A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Lucas v. City of Duluth, Georgia
1:24-cv-05064-SDG · 2025-09-30
Judgment on pleadings (defendant) Denied

“The partial motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants City of Duluth, Vegter, and Bustamente [ECF 17] is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Lucas's first motion for partial summary judgment [ECF 21] is DENIED as premature. Lucas is GRANTED LEAVE to file a renewed motion for summary judgment within 30 days of this Order.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“The Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Hunter, Rodriguez, and Lee-Foon [ECF 29] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants Hunter and Rodriguez are DISMISSED as defendants in this case.”

Richardson v. David
1:23-cv-05963-SDG · 2025-03-28
Motion to set aside default (defendant) Granted

“Defendant City of Atlanta Police Department's motion to set aside default [ECF 9] is GRANTED as amended. Defendant Rontarin David's motion to set aside default [ECF 11] is GRANTED as amended.”

Default judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Since Richardson did not file a motion for entry of default by the Clerk, his motion for default judgment is at best premature, and therefore DENIED.”

Motion for contempt (plaintiff) Denied

“APD is a governmental entity, and this case is based on federal question jurisdiction, so APD is not required to file a disclosure statement. Accordingly, Richardson's motion for contempt is DENIED.”

Sanders v. Elmington Property Management, LLC
1:22-cv-03985-SDG · 2023-08-21
Motion to amend (plaintiff) Granted

“the Motion to Amend [ECF 26] is GRANTED, and the Motion to Dismiss [ECF 29] is DENIED.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Moot / procedural

“Because the Court grants the Motion to Amend, the Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot. Even if Defendants' motion were not moot, it would still be denied.”

Byrd v. The Gwinnett County School District
1:22-cv-01457-SDG · 2024-03-31
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“The District's motion for summary judgment [ECF 49] is DENIED as to Byrd's Title VII retaliation claim, and GRANTED as to his remaining claims.”

York v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.
1:21-cv-03515-SDG · 2024-03-30
Motion to exclude (defendant) Granted

“Publix's motion to exclude the Yorks' expert [ECF 37] is GRANTED, and its motion for summary judgment [ECF 38] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“its motion for summary judgment [ECF 38] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Yorks' negligence and loss of consortium claims shall proceed to trial.”

Nealy v. SunTrust Bank
1:19-cv-02885-SDG · 2021-03-23
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“SunTrust's motions for summary judgment [ECF 42; ECF 43] are GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of SunTrust and close the case.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 94 days (N = 8).

Mix from search_dockets case-level rows (filed June 2023) plus the reasoning-layer cases; most carry no nature_of_suit string and no FJC IDB row (recent filings, FJC lag). General civil docket with consumer FCRA, FLSA, prisoner, and 1983 police-misconduct matters prominent.