Steven Daniel Grimberg

How Judge Grimberg rules, drawn from 15 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia (Atlanta Division)
Appointed by
Donald Trump (Republican)
Commissioned
2019-09-13
Education
University of Florida, B.A. (with honors); Emory University School of Law, J.D. (with distinction)
Signed orders read
15

How Judge Grimberg decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

For Fair Credit Reporting Act accuracy claims, he evaluates the challenged credit entry as a whole rather than isolating one field; in Terry, a historical scheduled-payment amount was not misleading where the report repeatedly showed the account was closed with no balance or past-due amount.

“Viewing the relevant entry in its entirety, it is clear that there is no ongoing obligation for payment; the inclusion of a payment amount under ‘scheduled payment amount’ objectively does not cause confusion or create an inaccuracy.”

Strong stated preference for resolving disputes on the merits over procedural technicalities; construes renewal/saving statutes and Rule 15 leave-to-amend liberally toward that end, and reads excusable-neglect (Pioneer) elastically to excuse short, good-faith filing delays.

“Given the strong public policy in both Tennessee and Georgia favoring disposition of a case on its merits, the Court finds it is appropriate to apply Tennessee's renewal statute and allow Plaintiffs leave to amend their Renewal Complaint.”

Prioritizes resolving qualified- and sovereign-immunity questions at the earliest possible stage, and will reopen a defaulted posture to let immunity defenses be heard.

“Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”

Procedural preferences

Enforces civil-procedure mechanics strictly even against pro se parties: a default judgment requires the Clerk's Rule 55(a) entry of default first; and his Standing Order bars piecemeal/successive summary-judgment motions and denies premature Rule 56 motions filed before discovery under Rule 56(d).

“Richardson has not complied with step one of Rule 55(a) by filing a motion for the Clerk's entry of default. This is not a mere persnickety technicality; the law is clear that the clerk's entry of default must precede an application for default judgment.”

Cautions

Substantial medical conditions do not by themselves establish compassionate-release grounds when treatment is manageable in custody and the conditions do not substantially impair self-care.

“while her current medical problems are numerous and substantial, they are no longer extraordinary and compelling; they will not substantially diminish her ability to provide self-care within a custodial setting.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Lucas v. City of Duluth, Georgia
1:24-cv-05064-SDG · 2025-09-30
Judgment on pleadings (defendant) Denied

“The partial motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendants City of Duluth, Vegter, and Bustamente [ECF 17] is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Lucas's first motion for partial summary judgment [ECF 21] is DENIED as premature. Lucas is GRANTED LEAVE to file a renewed motion for summary judgment within 30 days of this Order.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“The Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Hunter, Rodriguez, and Lee-Foon [ECF 29] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendants Hunter and Rodriguez are DISMISSED as defendants in this case.”

Richardson v. David
1:23-cv-05963-SDG · 2025-03-28
Motion to set aside default (defendant) Granted

“Defendant City of Atlanta Police Department's motion to set aside default [ECF 9] is GRANTED as amended. Defendant Rontarin David's motion to set aside default [ECF 11] is GRANTED as amended.”

Default judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Since Richardson did not file a motion for entry of default by the Clerk, his motion for default judgment is at best premature, and therefore DENIED.”

Motion for contempt (plaintiff) Denied

“APD is a governmental entity, and this case is based on federal question jurisdiction, so APD is not required to file a disclosure statement. Accordingly, Richardson's motion for contempt is DENIED.”

Sanders v. Elmington Property Management, LLC
1:22-cv-03985-SDG · 2023-08-21
Motion to amend (plaintiff) Granted

“the Motion to Amend [ECF 26] is GRANTED, and the Motion to Dismiss [ECF 29] is DENIED.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Moot / procedural

“Because the Court grants the Motion to Amend, the Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot. Even if Defendants' motion were not moot, it would still be denied.”

Byrd v. The Gwinnett County School District
1:22-cv-01457-SDG · 2024-03-31
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“The District's motion for summary judgment [ECF 49] is DENIED as to Byrd's Title VII retaliation claim, and GRANTED as to his remaining claims.”

York v. Publix Super Markets, Inc.
1:21-cv-03515-SDG · 2024-03-30
Motion to exclude (defendant) Granted

“Publix's motion to exclude the Yorks' expert [ECF 37] is GRANTED, and its motion for summary judgment [ECF 38] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“its motion for summary judgment [ECF 38] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Yorks' negligence and loss of consortium claims shall proceed to trial.”

Nealy v. SunTrust Bank
1:19-cv-02885-SDG · 2021-03-23
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“SunTrust's motions for summary judgment [ECF 42; ECF 43] are GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of SunTrust and close the case.”

Allen v. Garrison Property and Casualty Company
1:24-cv-01552-SDG · 2026-01-13
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Because the third amended complaint is subject to dismissal for the same reasons as the second amended complaint, Garrison’s motion to dismiss [ECF 25] is GRANTED. Allen’s third amended complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Hart v. Georgia Department of Corrections
1:24-cv-04814-SDG · 2025-06-16
Motion to set aside dismissal (plaintiff) Denied

“Hart’s motion to set aside dismissal [ECF 18] is DENIED.”

Motion for extension of time (plaintiff) Granted

“Hart’s motion for extension of time to file objections [ECF 16] is GRANTED nunc pro tunc, and therefore undersigned deems Hart’s objections [ECF 17] timely filed.”

Motion for appointment of counsel (plaintiff) Denied

“Hart’s motion for appointment of counsel [ECF 22] is DENIED.”

Application to proceed ifp (plaintiff) Denied

“Hart’s application to appeal in forma pauperis [ECF 24] is DENIED.”

Motion for relief from prepayment of fees (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Hart’s motion for relief from prepayment of fees [ECF 25] is DENIED as moot.”

Norwood v. United States of America
1:20-cr-00488-SDG-JSA · 2025-04-08
Motion to vacate 2255 (petitioner) Denied

“The R&R [ECF 196] is ADOPTED as the order of the Court, and Norwood’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate [ECF 181] is DENIED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Motions to dismiss (government) Granted

“The Government’s motion to dismiss [ECF 186] is GRANTED.”

United States of America v. Williams
1:24-cr-00311-SDG-RGV · 2025-10-30
Motion to suppress (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence [ECF 22] is DENIED.”

Motion to suppress (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion to suppress statements [ECF 23] is DENIED.”

Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion to dismiss indictment on speedy trial grounds [ECF 28] is DENIED.”

Motion to dismiss indictment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant’s motion to dismiss indictment [ECF 29], as amended [ECF 30], is DENIED.”

Daker v. Oliver
1:24-cv-02687-SDG-JKL · 2025-12-01
Motion for temporary restraining order (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Daker’s motions for a temporary restraining order and to expedite proceedings are DENIED AS MOOT in light of this Court’s Orders of July 14, September 15, and September 22, 2025.”

Motion to expedite (plaintiff) Moot / procedural
Motion to correct docket (plaintiff) Granted

“Daker’s motion to correct dockets is GRANTED.”

Motion for extension of time (plaintiff) Granted

“Finally, Daker’s motion for a copy of the Magistrate Judge’s October 27, 2025 Report and Recommendation (the R&R) and to expand the time to file objections thereto [ECF 360] is GRANTED.”

Richardson v. David
1:23-cv-05963-SDG · 2026-03-30
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendants’ motions to dismiss [ECFs 35, 36] are GRANTED. Richardson’s complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Richardson may file, within 30 days of this Order, an amended complaint seeking to cure the deficiencies described herein.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 94 days (N = 8).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 167 days (N = 3).

Mix from case-level docket records (filed June 2023) plus the cases behind the published orders; most carry no nature-of-suit string and no administrative case-closure row (recent filings). General civil docket with consumer credit-reporting, wage-and-hour, prisoner, and civil-rights police-misconduct matters prominent.

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