Wilbur Dawson Owens Jr.
Judge Owens no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Owens decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Owens followed the evident purpose of later legislation even when Congress used the word 'should' rather than 'shall.'
“whether Congress instructs that the Secretary ‘should’ implement section 957 or ‘shall’ implement section 957, the clear import is that section 957 is to be implemented.”
He gave little weight to isolated trial-level orders that did not explain their factual or legal basis.
“These cases are not only not binding on this court but are not even persuasive authority.”
Procedural preferences
Owens required a party seeking disqualification to identify the allegedly related subjects and issues with specificity.
“Only when the moving party delineates with specificity the subject matters, issues, and causes of action presented in former representation can the district court determine if the substantial relationship test has been met.”
He held removing defendants to a demanding proof burden when the complaint limited the amount sought below the jurisdictional threshold.
“The Defendants have failed to prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.”
Cautions
A prevailing party did not obtain fees merely by winning when the opposing government's position had been reasonably grounded.
“Simply because a jury found in plaintiffs favor on an issue of disputed fact does not render defendant’s position lacking in substantial justification.”
Owens distinguished general supervisory responsibility from an affirmative act that created or increased an injury risk.
“This immunity would not, however, extend to the supervisor when he commits an affirmative act causing or increasing the risk of injury to another employee.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and this case is dismissed.”
“Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is GRANTED against Defendant Middle-brook”
“the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in full.”
“Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs’ motions to remand are HEREBY GRANTED.”
“For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs’ motion to reverse the Discovery Special Master’s order of July 21, 1999, is hereby DENIED.”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III of the antitrust tying violations will be DENIED at this time.”
“Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the evidence is HEREBY DENIED.”
“Accordingly, Michael Thornhill’s motion to suppress [Tab #’s 85, 103], Everrett McCrary’s motion to suppress [Tab #’s 86, 104], and LaMonica Thornhill’s motion to suppress [Tab # 95] are hereby DENIED.”
“For the above reasons, defendant Melvin Patrick’s motion to dismiss all remaining claims against him is hereby GRANTED.”
“The court fails to see how the two matters are related based on the information currently before it, and therefore the motion is DENIED subject to Williams’ right to refile same and provide a more detailed showing of the specific issues that the two matters have in common.”
After liability had been resolved, Owens directed the plaintiffs to submit an itemized damages, costs, and fee presentation before class notice and final relief could be determined. The order did not decide a pending party motion.
“Accordingly, there is no basis for the court to grant Mr. Bazemore’s § 2255 motion; it is, therefore, summarily DENIED and DISMISSED.”
A historical record
Judge Owens no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.