Thomas Hoyt Davis
Judge Davis no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Davis decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Davis generally applied statutory language according to its ordinary meaning unless the text clearly required something different.
“A word will be given its usual and ordinary meaning unless a contrary meaning is clearly intended.”
He treated racially discriminatory exclusion from a federal primary as a direct deprivation of federally protected voting rights.
“acting as the duly constituted authorities of the Democratic Party, in refusing to permit plaintiff to vote in the Primary of July 4, 1944, solely on account of his race and color, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured to him by the Constitution and laws of the United States”
Procedural preferences
Davis strictly construed substituted-service statutes and declined to extend them beyond their text.
“This Court, in the absence of State court decisions to the contrary, will not broaden the terms of this unambiguous statute.”
He placed the burden on the removing party to establish federal jurisdiction affirmatively.
“United States District Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction”; thus, the presumption is against jurisdiction, and ‘jurisdiction must always affirmatively appear.”
Cautions
Davis required taxpayers to prove the amount of any claimed refund rather than leaving the court to estimate it.
“The burden is on the taxpayer to prove the amount of the refund to which he is entitled.”
He sought to match income and related expenses to the same accounting period to avoid distorted results.
“To hold otherwise ‘would produce an unfair distortion of the taxpayer’s actual profits in each of the years’.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged that the complaint be, and it is hereby, dismissed.”
“Plaintiffs have overcome the statutory presumptions and have carried their burden by a preponderance of the evidence, and are entitled to recover in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law herein.”
“The plaintiff is entitled to a refund of all amounts of taxes paid by it, pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, for the period July 1, 1943, through December 31, 1943, inclusive, with interest thereon according to law.”
“Thus, these gifts are not gifts of present interests, so as to entitle the donor to the exclusion claimed.”
“The action of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in assessing a deficiency in estate taxes and the action of the defendant in collecting $15,171.62, plus interest of $1,321.91 thereon from plaintiff was contrary to law, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover said amounts with interest from November 6, 1945.”
“The motion to dismiss is sustained and the complaint dismissed.”
“The Plaintiff is entitled to recover in accordance with the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions and may present a judgment in accordance therewith.”
“Whereupon, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $22,681.04 principal, together with interest at 6% from May 6, 1941 on said principal sum, and costs of this proceeding.”
“It Is Considered, Ordered And Adjudged that plaintiff, Trust Company of Georgia, do have and recover from defendant, Marion H. Allen, Collector of Internal Revenue, the principal sum of $36,967.-95 as overpayment of income taxes for the year 1940, and the principal sum of $7,-538.62 as overpayment of declared value excess profit taxes for the year 1940, with interest upon each of said sums as provided by law.”
“The Commissioner was incorrect in his determination and the Plaintiff is entitled to recover.”
“Whereupon, it is considered, ordered and adjudged that the plaintiff do have and recover of the defendants the sum of $100, as stipulated by the parties, together with future interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum, and the costs of this proceeding to be taxed by the clerk.”
“It is hereby, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that these actions be, and the same are hereby, dismissed.”
A historical record
Judge Davis no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.