Charles Ashley Royal
How Judge Royal decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a warrant challenge, the judge drew a sharp line between a warrant that specifies the crime under investigation with temporal or subject-matter limits (upheld) and one that authorizes an open-ended search of an entire social-media account (unconstitutionally overbroad) -- and held the good-faith exception does not rescue the latter.
“the Court finds the Instagram Warrant is unconstitutionally overbroad, and the good faith exception inapplicable under the circumstances here”
Applying res judicata against a serial pro se litigant, the judge looked past the plaintiff's attempt to plead new legal theories and asked only whether the new suit arose from the same underlying facts as a previously dismissed suit -- if so, it is barred even for claims that could have been, but were not, raised the first time.
“Res judicata bars all the claims against these Defendants, even those that were not asserted in Ashford I, because Plaintiff could have asserted them in Ashford I.”
In a municipal-liability case, the judge required more than a superficial similarity between prior incidents and the plaintiff's own -- a pattern of police 'use of force' complaints did not establish the city was on notice of a need to train officers on handcuffing and detaining juveniles, a different alleged deficiency.
“That the previous incidents and this case involve police encounters is not sufficient to transfer the need for training in one specific area—use of force—to the need for training in another—handcuffing and detaining a teenager”
Procedural preferences
The judge treats reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy confined to three narrow grounds (intervening change in law, new evidence, or clear error/manifest injustice) and has denied every reconsideration or Rule 60(b) motion seen in this record on that basis, including from pro se litigants who resubmit the same materials or point to general conditions evidence unrelated to their own case.
“the Court should only grant these motions in three limited circumstances: (1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence has been discovered which was not previously available to the parties in the exercise of due diligence; or (3) reconsideration is needed to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice”
Faced with a genuine service-of-process defect (the wrong corporate name on the summons), the judge focused the analysis on whether the defendant had actual, complete knowledge of the claims against it and suffered real prejudice, rather than dismissing on the technical naming error alone -- and denied dismissal because the defendant plainly knew it had been sued.
“Because it is undisputed that Bostick had complete and total knowledge of Plaintiff's claims against it, Bostick suffered no actual prejudice from the misnomer in the summons.”
Cautions
The judge distinguishes an individual officer's excessive-force liability from a supervisor's liability for that same conduct: a supervisor who investigated and disciplined the officer after the fact is not liable even where the officer himself loses qualified immunity, so counsel should not assume a finding against the line officer automatically extends up the chain of command.
“the supervisors did investigate and act when Ferrer's use of force was determined to be a violation of BCSO policies... the sanctions imposed here were real”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Bostick's Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process [Doc. 45].”
“Plaintiff's construed Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint is DENIED.”
Directed a pro se plaintiff to respond to a pending motion to dismiss within 14 days and warned that the case could be dismissed if he did not. Rules on no party motion itself; the underlying motion to dismiss was later granted on the merits.
“Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 26] without prejudice to Defendants' right to move to dismiss again after Plaintiff files her Amended Complaint.”
“Defendant Sheriff Joe Chapman's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 27] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Chapman are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.”
“Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. 33 & 37] are GRANTED.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 37] and hereby ORDERS the pending Indictment in Case No. 3:20-CR-61(CAR) against Defendant Gerrick Cooper to be DISMISSED.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion to Dismiss Indictment [Doc. 528] and hereby ORDERS the pending Indictment against Rickshun Willingham to be DISMISSED.”
“Mercery's Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to the Geolocation Warrant [Doc. 46] is DENIED.”
“the Court finds the good faith exception inapplicable under the circumstances here, and Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to the Instagram Warrant is GRANTED.”
“Accordingly, Movant's motion for the issuance of a writ of audita querela (Doc. 88) is GRANTED. The Court's January 2016 judgment is VACATED and REIMPOSED with the modification that Movant may serve his twenty-eight month sentence on supervised release.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 18] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Maddox's First Amendment retaliation claims against Manager Williams and Mayor Girtz are DISMISSED. Maddox's First Amendment retaliation claim and GWA claim against ACC will go forward.”
“Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 3]. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 12] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED.”
“The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Time [Doc. 15] and finds his Motions to Withdraw as Counsel and for Extension of Time [Doc. 16] are MOOT.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 313.5 days (N = 12).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 211 days (N = 5).
The sampled dockets span prisoner civil-rights suits, Section 2254/2241 habeas petitions, Social Security disability appeals, employment and civil-rights claims (including two suits against the same county board of commissioners), consumer-debt-collection and Truth in Lending disputes, personal-injury and premises-liability claims, a RICO suit, contract and insurance disputes, an immigration-mandamus suit, and an arbitration-confirmation petition -- a broad general civil and criminal docket typical of a long-serving district judge.
Put Judge Royal's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Royal actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Royal's own signed orders and cites them.