Charles Ashley Royal

How Judge Royal rules, drawn from 29 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
Position
District judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
George W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
December 21, 2001
Education
University of Georgia (A.B., 1971); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1974); University of Georgia (M.S., 1976)
Signed orders read
29

About Judge Royal

C. Ashley Royal is a judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Royal received a commission on December 21, 2001. Judge Royal assumed senior status on September 1, 2016.

Judge Royal's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Royal's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Royal decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On a warrant challenge, the judge drew a sharp line between a warrant that specifies the crime under investigation with temporal or subject-matter limits (upheld) and one that authorizes an open-ended search of an entire social-media account (unconstitutionally overbroad), and held the good-faith exception does not rescue the latter.

“the Court finds the Instagram Warrant is unconstitutionally overbroad, and the good faith exception inapplicable under the circumstances here”

Applying res judicata against a serial pro se litigant, the judge looked past the plaintiff's attempt to plead new legal theories and asked only whether the new suit arose from the same underlying facts as a previously dismissed suit: if so, it is barred even for claims that could have been, but were not, raised the first time.

“Res judicata bars all the claims against these Defendants, even those that were not asserted in Ashford I, because Plaintiff could have asserted them in Ashford I.”

In a municipal-liability case, the judge required more than a superficial similarity between prior incidents and the plaintiff's own: a pattern of police 'use of force' complaints did not establish the city was on notice of a need to train officers on handcuffing and detaining juveniles, a different alleged deficiency.

“That the previous incidents and this case involve police encounters is not sufficient to transfer the need for training in one specific area—use of force—to the need for training in another—handcuffing and detaining a teenager”

Procedural preferences

The judge treats reconsideration as an extraordinary remedy confined to three narrow grounds (intervening change in law, new evidence, or clear error/manifest injustice) and has denied every reconsideration or Rule 60(b) motion seen in this record on that basis, including from pro se litigants who resubmit the same materials or point to general conditions evidence unrelated to their own case.

“the Court should only grant these motions in three limited circumstances: (1) there has been an intervening change in controlling law; (2) new evidence has been discovered which was not previously available to the parties in the exercise of due diligence; or (3) reconsideration is needed to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice”

Faced with a genuine service-of-process defect (the wrong corporate name on the summons), the judge focused the analysis on whether the defendant had actual, complete knowledge of the claims against it and suffered real prejudice, rather than dismissing on the technical naming error alone, and denied dismissal because the defendant plainly knew it had been sued.

“Because it is undisputed that Bostick had complete and total knowledge of Plaintiff's claims against it, Bostick suffered no actual prejudice from the misnomer in the summons.”

Cautions

The judge distinguishes an individual officer's excessive-force liability from a supervisor's liability for that same conduct: a supervisor who investigated and disciplined the officer after the fact is not liable even where the officer himself loses qualified immunity, so counsel should not assume a finding against the line officer automatically extends up the chain of command.

“the supervisors did investigate and act when Ferrer's use of force was determined to be a violation of BCSO policies... the sanctions imposed here were real”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Obiagwu v. Baldwin Memorial Crematory, et al.
5:24-cv-00198-CAR · 2025-10-31
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Bostick's Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient Service of Process [Doc. 45].”

Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff's construed Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended Complaint is DENIED.”

Blake v. Village Capital Investment, LLC
5:23-cv-00291-CAR · 2023-10-11

Directed a pro se plaintiff to respond to a pending motion to dismiss within 14 days and warned that the case could be dismissed if he did not. Rules on no party motion itself; the underlying motion to dismiss was later granted on the merits.

Williams v. Commissioner Timothy C. Ward, et al.
5:22-cv-00242-CAR · 2024-03-22
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Moot / procedural

“Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 26] without prejudice to Defendants' right to move to dismiss again after Plaintiff files her Amended Complaint.”

Franklin v. Dr. Nowlin, et al.
3:21-cv-00039-CAR-CHW · 2022-05-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Defendant Sheriff Joe Chapman's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 27] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Chapman are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim.”

Franklin v. Dr. Nowlin, et al.
3:21-cv-00039-CAR-CHW · 2022-12-21
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment [Docs. 33 & 37] are GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted
United States v. Gerrick Lanier Cooper
3:20-cr-00061-CAR-CHW · 2022-05-24
Motion to dismiss indictment (government) Granted

“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 37] and hereby ORDERS the pending Indictment in Case No. 3:20-CR-61(CAR) against Defendant Gerrick Cooper to be DISMISSED.”

United States v. Rickshun Willingham
3:20-cr-00008-CAR-CHW · 2022-04-04
Motion to dismiss indictment (government) Granted

“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion to Dismiss Indictment [Doc. 528] and hereby ORDERS the pending Indictment against Rickshun Willingham to be DISMISSED.”

United States v. Ceddrick Mercery
3:21-cr-00009-CAR-CHW · 2022-02-25
Motion to suppress (defendant) Denied

“Mercery's Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to the Geolocation Warrant [Doc. 46] is DENIED.”

Motion to suppress (defendant) Granted

“the Court finds the good faith exception inapplicable under the circumstances here, and Defendant's Motion to Suppress evidence seized pursuant to the Instagram Warrant is GRANTED.”

United States v. Erickson Meko Campbell
3:14-cr-00046-CAR-CHW-1 · 2023-04-26
Motion for writ of audita querela (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, Movant's motion for the issuance of a writ of audita querela (Doc. 88) is GRANTED. The Court's January 2016 judgment is VACATED and REIMPOSED with the modification that Movant may serve his twenty-eight month sentence on supervised release.”

Maddox v. Girtz, et al.
3:21-cv-00124-CAR · 2023-03-30
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 18] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Maddox's First Amendment retaliation claims against Manager Williams and Mayor Girtz are DISMISSED. Maddox's First Amendment retaliation claim and GWA claim against ACC will go forward.”

Lewis v. City of Monroe, et al.
3:22-cv-00109-CAR · 2023-08-09
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Thus, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 3]. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Defendants are hereby DISMISSED.”

Oliver v. Georgia Department of Corrections and Commissioner Tyrone Oliver
5:24-cv-00374-CAR · 2025-04-16
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 12] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint [Doc. 1] is DISMISSED.”

Motion to extend time (plaintiff) Denied

“The Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Extend Time [Doc. 15] and finds his Motions to Withdraw as Counsel and for Extension of Time [Doc. 16] are MOOT.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 313.5 days (N = 12).

Median motion-to-ruling time: 211 days (N = 5).

The sampled dockets span prisoner civil-rights suits, Section 2254/2241 habeas petitions, Social Security disability appeals, employment and civil-rights claims (including two suits against the same county board of commissioners), consumer-debt-collection and Truth in Lending disputes, personal-injury and premises-liability claims, a RICO suit, contract and insurance disputes, an immigration-mandamus suit, and an arbitration-confirmation petition: a broad general civil and criminal docket typical of a long-serving district judge.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months1
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years1
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 202611
Sep 202502
Mar 202501
Sep 202402
Mar 202400
Sep 202300
Mar 202341
Sep 202210
Mar 202200
Sep 202100
Mar 202100
Sep 202000

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, not for Judge Royal: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed7376.4 months
Closed with no court action2816.3 months
Closed before pretrial4436.3 months
Closed during or after pretrial8not reported
Closed during trial5not reported
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 20257376.4 months
Sep 20246488 months
Sep 20236689 months
Sep 20227279 months
Sep 20217288.7 months
Sep 20206436.9 months
Sep 20197108.1 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

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