Kelly Lee Ellerbe
How Judge Ellerbe decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a duty-to-disclose/fraud-by-omission theory against a vendor with sensitive system access, she treats whether the circumstances gave rise to a duty to disclose risky practices as a fact question for the jury, not one resolvable on a motion to dismiss -- letting most of a fraud claim past the pleading stage even while trimming its outer edges.
“The Court finds these allegations require factual inquiry and are not susceptible to disposition on the pleadings... whether the particular circumstances of a case give rise to an obligation to disclose will generally be a jury question.”
In approving a fiduciary's proposed settlement, she gives significant weight to whether the beneficiaries or claimants most familiar with the dispute have raised any objection, treating a lack of opposition as a real factor supporting approval even in a complicated multi-forum dispute.
“The fact that those most closely familiar with the underlying businesses and circumstances have posed no objection to the Settlement Agreement is a key factor supporting the Court's decision to approve the Settlement Agreement.”
On a motion for leave to amend a complaint late in a case, she follows Georgia's liberal amendment standard and focuses on whether the opposing side would truly be prejudiced by the new theory and whether a trial date has already been set, rather than treating a late amendment as presumptively improper.
“any potential prejudice is minimized as this matter has yet to receive trial setting. Finally, the Court finds permitting this amendment is consistent with the directive of O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-15(a) that provides leave to file pleading amendments after the entry of a pre-trial order 'shall be freely given'”
Procedural preferences
She construes Georgia's discovery rules liberally against a party who answers interrogatories by vague reference to business records; a defendant must actually specify which records answer which interrogatory, not merely gesture at a document production.
“GMV Defendants failed to 'specify the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained' in making such reference as required under the Civil Practice Act.”
A protective order requesting shelter from discovery -- including into a party's own finances -- requires the movant to clearly demonstrate good cause in the factual record; conclusory assertions are not enough, even where the requesting party already faces a default-judgment sanction.
“Good cause which needs to be shown for a protective order must be clearly demonstrated in the factual record and 'is not established by stereotyped or conclusional statements, bereft of facts.'”
She treats exclusion of expert testimony as an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly, working through the admissibility factors issue-by-issue rather than excluding or admitting an entire expert report wholesale.
“the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used only sparingly.”
When a party raises several overlapping legal bases for the same sanction request, she picks the single most applicable statute rather than granting sanctions under multiple theories at once, and she requires a finding of actual intentional misconduct before escalating a discovery dispute to contempt.
“The Court finds that the conduct at issue is more directly and completely addressed under O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-37(b). Accordingly, the Court denies Ehlert's requests to issue sanctions under O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-56(g), Section 8.D of the First Amended Case Management Order, or O.C.G.A. Section 9-15-14.”
Cautions
In reviewing a proposed derivative-lawsuit settlement, she independently scrutinizes the good faith and reasonableness of the APPROVAL PROCESS itself, not merely whether a settlement agreement is a valid contract or looks fair on its face -- a settling party's failure to give the derivative plaintiff a meaningful chance to be heard by the approving body is treated as strong evidence the process was not independent or reasonable, and can result in a hard denial with no further chances to re-file.
“This Court has misgivings about the outsized role this small percentage of Rainforest shareholders played in the approval process... the failure to provide the Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to present his claim to the body charged with evaluating the Settlement Agreement suggests the investigation was not independently or reasonably conducted.”
She has denied requests to retroactively excuse missed discovery deadlines, holding that a court's discretion to enlarge time under O.C.G.A. 9-11-6(b) is judicial, not unrestrained, and that unauthenticated informal correspondence does not substitute for a proper factual showing.
“[W]hile O.C.G.A. Section 9-11-6(b) gives the trial court wide discretionary authority to enlarge the time within which an act may be done, the discretion to be exercised is a judicial discretion, not an unrestrained one.”
When awarding attorney's fees against a party, she recalculates the requested amount line-by-line rather than accepting counsel's total, cutting time not clearly tied to the sanctionable conduct -- a party facing a fee award here should expect a discounted, itemized number rather than the figure requested.
“The Court arrived at the award figure by, in part, a line-by-line review of Plaintiffs' fee invoices with the Court deducting any fees incurred during the summary judgment phase which were arguably attributable to the time spent on dispositive motions on other claims.”
A party trying to claw back an inadvertently-produced document cannot rely on an attorney's letter alone -- she requires the factual basis of the privilege claim to be substantiated by affidavit before she will order the document returned or unread.
“affidavit verifying the factual assertions it makes in its letter brief.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“MORRIS HARDWICK SCHNEIDER, LLC ORDER STRIKING DEFENDANT DIVOT HOLDINGS, LLC'S ANSWER (order's own title, naming the disposition)”
“Nancy Johnson et al., ORDER DENYING MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL (order's own title, naming the disposition)”
“Having considered the entire record and given all of the above, Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is DENIED. Defendants are ORDERED to respond to Interrogatory No. 3 as narrowed above and otherwise shall respond fully to Plaintiffs' RPDs and Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, all within ten (10) days of this order.”
“Given all of the above, the Court finds it lacks jurisdiction to consider the Motion or to grant the relief requested therein. Accordingly, the Motion is hereby DENIED.”
“it is hereby ordered and adjudged that the Motion is DENIED.”
“J.P. Carey Enterprises ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CUENTAS'S MOTION TO STRIKE (order's own title, naming the disposition)”
“GREENLIFE ENERGY SOLUTIONS ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE PATTERSON'S THIRD AFFIDAVIT (order's own title, naming the disposition)”
“GREENLIFE ENERGY SOLUTIONS ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT... (order's own title, naming the disposition)”
“...AND ORDER FINDING MOOT DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS (order's own title, naming the disposition)”
“[Motion for Abatement, Dismissal of Complaint and Restructuring of Pending Claims] is GRANTED, IN PART as follows: a. The Ehlert Action is DISMISSED as to Galaxy.”
“GMV Defendants are ORDERED to, within 14 days from this order, respond fully to Interrogatories No. 11, 14-16, 19-21, 25-27, 31...”
“In light of the foregoing, Petitioner's Motion is GRANTED IN PART. It is hereby ORDERED that the Successor Trustee, is authorized to enter into and execute the Settlement Agreement... It is further ORDERED that the remainder of the Successor Trustee's Motion seeking court approval for her resignation and release from liability for all her acts as Successor Trustee be DEFERRED.”
“In light of all the foregoing, the Defendants' Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement is DENIED. The Court specially sets the trial of this matter for September 16, 2024... the Court will not consider any additional motions seeking Court approval to settle Plaintiff's derivative claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. 14-2-745.”
Put Judge Ellerbe's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Ellerbe actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Ellerbe's own signed orders and cites them.