William Henry Stafford Jr.
Judge Stafford no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Stafford decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On objections to a magistrate judge's recommendation he reviews the record de novo and will reject the recommendation where the summary-judgment record leaves a genuine factual dispute -- here declining to grant either side summary judgment on a religious grooming-rule claim because the evidence on whether the rule served a compelling interest by the least restrictive means was contested.
“As to Plaintiff's beard-length claim, however, the undersigned is unable to agree that, on this record, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment. Defendant has submitted sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment as to whether the prison's beard-length rule furthers a compelling government interest and is a least restrictive means to advance that interest.”
In excessive-force cases he weighs the available video evidence and denies summary judgment where it leaves open whether the force was justified, declining to resolve the factual question on the papers.
“Having viewed the hand held and fixed wing videos of the relevant events and otherwise considered the record ... the court finds that there is a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the force twice used on Askew was needed to restore order.”
Procedural preferences
He holds litigants to the arguments they presented to the magistrate judge: a ground for dismissal raised for the first time in objections to the recommendation is treated as waived rather than considered anew.
“Because the Secretary did not present this argument to the magistrate judge, the undersigned considers the argument waived.”
He will defer ruling on a dispositive question rather than guess at unsettled law, pausing a count whose outcome turns on an exhaustion issue already pending and argued before the court of appeals.
“Because the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Sims is likely to have a controlling effect on a decision regarding administrative exhaustion in this case, the undersigned will defer ruling on the magistrate judge's recommendation as to Count I pending a decision by the Eleventh Circuit in Sims.”
As a senior judge handling an overflow civil/prisoner docket, he resolves most matters by adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation; he reviews objected-to portions but will adopt even over a pro se litigant's objections when the record supports the recommendation. File specific, record-grounded objections — generalized objections rarely move him off the R&R.
“Having reviewed the record in light of Plaintiff's objections, the court finds that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation should be adopted.”
Cautions
Prisoner and habeas filings on his senior-era docket are frequently resolved on threshold grounds rather than the merits: state habeas petitions filed outside the one-year limitations period are dismissed as time-barred with the certificate of appealability denied, and detention-habeas petitions are dismissed as moot once the petitioner is released.
“The petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred. ... A certificate of appealability is DENIED.”
In prisoner civil-rights cases he enforces the PLRA's administrative-exhaustion requirement (42 U.S.C. § 1997e) strictly, dismissing unexhausted claims on summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings (typically without prejudice). Exhaust every grievance step before filing.
“All claims against Dr. Ladele are accordingly DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The United States of America's motion for summary judgment (doc. 20) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Kriss's motion for summary judgment (doc. 68) is GRANTED.”
“The respondent's motion to dismiss (doc. 15) is GRANTED. ... The petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus (doc. 1) is DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred. ... A certificate of appealability is DENIED.”
“Respondents' motion to dismiss (doc. 10) is GRANTED. ... Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED as moot based on Petitioner's release from detention.”
“Defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment (doc. 68) is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's strip-search claim only. ... Defendant's motion for summary judgment (doc. 68) is DENIED as to Plaintiff's beard-length claim.”
“Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (doc. 42) is DENIED.”
“Ernest Gorham's motion for summary judgment (doc. 62) is GRANTED, and Ernest Gorham is hereby DISMISSED from this action with prejudice.”
“Defendant Austin's motion for summary judgment (doc. 218) is DENIED.”
“The amended motion for summary judgment (doc. 217) filed by Defendants Crosby, Malphurs, and Segree is GRANTED as to Defendant Segree but DENIED as to Defendants Crosby and Malphurs.”
“Counts II and III of Plaintiff's amended complaint are DISMISSED. [The magistrate judge had recommended] that the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 54) filed by JPay, LLC ('JPay'), be granted.”
“the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 52) filed by Ricky D. Dixon (the 'Secretary') be granted as to Counts II and III of Plaintiff's amended complaint but denied as to Count I ... A ruling on the magistrate judge's report and recommendation as it relates to Count I is deferred pending a decision by the Eleventh Circuit in Sims.”
In a Prison Litigation Reform Act screening disposition, the court adopted the magistrate judge's unobjected recommendations and dismissed the prisoner complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim. In the same order, it denied the plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss and recover his filing fee. Quote: 'Plaintiff's complaint and this action are hereby DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim'; 'Plaintiff's "Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss the Case and Motion to Receive a Refund Court Lien/Fees" is DENIED.'
“The defendant's motion for sanctions (doc. 57)—to strike the plaintiff's complaint and to preclude the plaintiff from introducing any testimonial or documentary evidence at trial—is DENIED.”
“The plaintiff's motions (docs. 52 & 54) for extension of time to file Rule 26 disclosures are GRANTED. The plaintiff's Rule 26 disclosures shall be deemed timely.”
“The defendant's motion (ECF No. 25) to dismiss the plaintiff's first amended complaint is GRANTED. ... The clerk shall enter judgment stating: "All claims are dismissed with prejudice."”
“Plaintiff's "Emergency Motion to Re-Urge TRO-Injunctive Relief" (ECF No. 60) ... [is] denied without prejudice.”
“"Motion for Emergency Hearing for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction" (ECF No. 67) [is] denied without prejudice.”
“Plaintiff's "Motion for Permission to File More Than 25 Pages in Complaint" (ECF No. 60) is DENIED as moot.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
His docket was strongly bimodal. In his active and early-senior years (from his 1975 commission) it was dominated by institutional civil-rights litigation that ran for years or decades under continuing court supervision -- school-desegregation and voting-rights cases (such as a Gadsden County school-board case open from 1973 to 2004), Title VII employment-discrimination suits against state agencies (including a United States enforcement action against the Florida Highway Patrol open from 1979 to 2005), prisoner civil-rights cases, a medical-malpractice diversity case, and bankruptcy-withdrawal and federal-loan-recovery matters. In his late-senior years he carried a high-volume Tallahassee-Division screening docket of pro se prisoner civil-rights, prison-condition, and state habeas filings that were referred to magistrate judges and terminated quickly. Because these two modes are so different, no single case-duration figure is representative; the durations below describe only the recent screening cohort.
A historical record
Judge Stafford no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.