William C. Sherrill, Jr.
Judge Sherrill no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Sherrill decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He reads the Prison Litigation Reform Act's physical-injury bar (42 U.S.C. 1997e(e)) strictly: a prisoner cannot recover compensatory or punitive damages for purely mental or emotional injury, and he applies that limit even in a First Amendment case where the injury is almost always intangible -- so a damages-only religious-exercise claim is cut down to injunctive relief.
“Plaintiff cannot obtain compensatory or punitive damages for mental or emotional injury, standing alone. That restriction holds true even in a First Amendment case such as this where the injury will almost always be only mental or emotional.”
In Bivens and 1983 suits against supervisors he requires personal participation: respondeat superior is not a basis for liability, so a warden or agency director who merely received letters or signed a routine transfer order is entitled to summary judgment absent evidence of personal involvement in the violation.
“There is no evidence that Defendant Lappin was personally involved in Plaintiff's sexual abuse, the investigation into that abuse, and the decisions to place her into the SHU for her safety, to not use her as a witness in the investigation or prosecution, and to transfer her. Summary judgment should be granted in favor of Defendant Lappin.”
Procedural preferences
On federal habeas he enforces the threshold limits before reaching the merits: an out-of-time 2254 petition is dismissed as untimely under the AEDPA one-year clock (computed by the anniversary method with state-court tolling), and a 2241 petition is dismissed as moot once the petitioner obtains the relief sought (here, removal/release).
“Thus, the AEDPA one year period continued to run from October 28, 2010, without tolling, and ended on September 2, 2009. ... Therefore, the petition is untimely.”
On PLRA exhaustion he takes a functional view that favors reaching the merits: a grievance appeal denied because the matter is already under Inspector General investigation counts as exhausted (there is nothing further for the inmate to do), and a grievance need not name a legal cause of action or the official to be sued -- it need only alert officials to the problem.
“A response that denies a grievance appeal because the matter is already under investigation, as opposed to returning it without action or finding it to be in non-compliance, must be considered exhaustion of administrative remedies. At that point, there was nothing further for Plaintiff to do.”
Cautions
He screens pro se prisoner filings closely and will recommend dismissal where the litigant has accumulated three strikes or failed to honestly disclose prior cases -- treating dishonest non-disclosure as an abuse of the judicial process warranting a 'malicious' dismissal, not merely a correctable defect.
“It is also clear that Plaintiff has abused the judicial process by failing to honestly disclose all the prior cases he has filed. For both of those reasons, this case should be dismissed sua sponte and Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis be denied.”
But he does not dismiss out of skepticism: on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion he credits a pro se plaintiff's specific factual allegations as true, so a concrete account of an intentional act (an officer kicking the step box from under a fully shackled inmate) states an Eighth Amendment claim and survives, even while weaker equal-protection and Fourth Amendment theories are dismissed.
“Those factual allegations are sufficient to suggest Defendant's action was intentional and give Defendant notice of the basis for the claim. ... This states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's motion to dismiss, doc. 17, be GRANTED, that this petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Tobias Rolle pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ... be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as untimely filed and that a certificate of appealability be DENIED pursuant to § 2254 Rule 11(a).”
“it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss, doc. 15, be GRANTED, and the § 2241 petition filed by Luckner Pierre be DISMISSED as moot.”
“it is RECOMMENDED that the motion for summary judgment, doc. 80, filed by Defendants Williams, Rivera, Horton, and Lappin be GRANTED, ... and this case be REMANDED for further proceedings on the surviving claims against Defendants Knight, Dixon, and Spence.”
“that the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff, doc. 89, be DENIED”
“it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment, doc. 30, be GRANTED in part, and summary judgment be granted in their favor as to all claims for monetary relief, that in all other respects, the motion be DENIED, and the case be REMANDED for further proceedings before a trial is set.”
“it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's motion to dismiss, doc. 38, be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's equal protection and Fourth Amendment claims should be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the claim against Defendant in his official capacity should be DISMISSED due to the Eleventh Amendment, but otherwise, the motion should be DENIED.”
“it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint, doc. 1, be DISMISSED as an abuse of the judicial process and Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, doc. 2, be DENIED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the order adopting this report and recommendation direct the Clerk of Court to note on the docket that this cause was dismissed as malicious pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).”
Sherrill recommended sua sponte summary dismissal of a misdelivered, handwritten habeas-type pleading by a civilly committed petitioner who already had a counseled Section 2254 proceeding pending in the Middle District. He concluded that venue was improper and a petitioner may not challenge the same confinement through separate suits in different courts, and recommended denying a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Grounding quote in notes.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
His assigned civil docket of record is dominated, in his later years (2006-2012), by Social Security disability appeals (DIWC/DIWW and SSID, e.g. the Astrue / Sebelius cases) decided by consent, alongside prisoner 42 U.S.C. 1983 / prison-condition cases and a tail of diversity contract, insurance, personal-injury, FLSA, employment, and consumer-credit cases the parties consented to have a magistrate judge dispose of. His earlier docket (1989-1995) was heavily prisoner civil-rights plus Federal Employers' Liability, Miller Act, copyright, and diversity personal-injury matters. Filed-to-terminated durations on the 19-case 2006-2011 sample ran 232-1514 days (median 283); Social Security appeals clustered tightly (~232-280 days), while the long tail is the contested prisoner and civil-rights cases (Leland v. Edge, 1514 days).
A historical record
Judge Sherrill no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.