Robert Lewis Hinkle
How Judge Hinkle decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a fundamental-rights challenge, defines the right at the correct level of generality and applies strict scrutiny: the right to marry is fundamental regardless of whom one marries, so a state ban must be narrowly tailored to a compelling interest -- and 'moral disapproval, standing alone' is not one. He treats a procreation-based defense of a marriage restriction as pretext. Decision-grade for civil-rights litigators before him: lead with the fundamental-right framing and force the state onto strict scrutiny; expect bare moral-tradition or procreation arguments to fail.
“The undeniable truth is that the Florida ban on same-sex marriage stems entirely, or almost entirely, from moral disapproval of the practice. ... the Supreme Court has made clear that moral disapproval, standing alone, cannot sustain a provision of this kind.”
Reads fractured Supreme Court decisions through Marks: the binding rule of a splintered opinion is the narrowest rationale that commands a majority of the result, not the plurality's broadest statement. A litigant relying on plurality language outside that narrowest holding will lose. Decision-grade: frame a Santos/plurality argument within the controlling narrow rationale or it fails.
“when there is a split decision, the controlling view is the narrowest that supports the result. ... The narrowest view that supports the Santos result is that the “proceeds” of an illegal lottery—that is, an illegal gambling operation—are its profits. This helps Mr. Engle not at all.”
Enforces res judicata firmly: a prior dismissal for failure to state a claim is an adjudication on the merits, and the first action to reach judgment (not the first filed) controls preclusion. A plaintiff cannot relitigate by refiling a nearly identical complaint or by having filed first.
“What matters now is not which case was filed first, but which case resulted in a judgment first. “Res judicata arises from a judgment.””
Procedural preferences
Reviews magistrate-judge Reports & Recommendations de novo on objection and adopts unobjected R&Rs; the sampled dispositive dispositions overwhelmingly issue as R&R-adoption orders (prisoner 1983 / habeas / FTCA). He will write his own additional analysis or read a complaint differently from the R&R even while adopting its result. Strict on PLRA exhaustion: a prisoner must complete all three FDOC grievance steps before suing, and an 'informal request' is not an 'informal grievance.'
“Plaintiff's failure to exhaust, however, was a matter not of semantics but of substance. Plaintiff's original request for permission to marry was not a grievance in any sense of the word.”
Requires a proper Local Rule 56.1(B) statement of facts on summary judgment ('in the form that would be appropriate in an appellate brief'); he will deny an SJ motion on that procedural ground without reaching the merits and allow a renewed, properly-supported motion. Get the 56.1(B) statement right.
“Any renewed summary-judgment motion must include a “statement of facts generally in the form that would be appropriate in an appellate brief.” N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 56.1(B).”
Cautions
Polices litigant conduct and tone: he will warn a party that 'contumacious' objections belittling the magistrate judge 'must stop,' while still adjudicating the merits fairly. Keep briefing respectful and substantive.
“The objections are contumacious in tone. The plaintiff has a right to litigate his claims fully and fairly, but he has no right to belittle the magistrate judge or others involved in the judicial process. The practice must stop.”
Independent on sanctions and on the limits of a federal court's role: he declined a defendant's request to impose Fla. Stat. 944.279 prisoner-litigation sanctions, holding a state legislature cannot direct a federal court to make unnecessary findings or initiate state discipline; and he weighs ability to pay before awarding fees as a sanction. A sanctions motion grounded only in the state statute will not move him.
“a state legislature plainly cannot properly do so. ... a federal court has ample authority to impose appropriate sanctions on a party ... [but] as a matter of discretion, and considering all the circumstances, I decline to assess attorney's fees or impose other sanctions.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 6 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 5 |
Granted: 1Granted in part: 3Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for sanctions N = 2 |
Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The plaintiffs' motions for a preliminary injunction, ECF Nos. 2, 11, and 42 in Case No. 4:14cv107, are granted against the remaining defendants. ... Florida's same-sex marriage provisions violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.”
“The state defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF No. 50 in Case No. 4:14cv107, is granted in part and denied in part. All claims against the defendant Governor and Attorney General are dismissed without prejudice as redundant. ... In all other respects the motion to dismiss is denied.”
“The defendant Clerk of Court's motion to dismiss, ECF No. 49 in Case No. 4:14cv107, is denied.”
“The Secretary's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 156 and 157, are granted. All remaining claims against the Secretary are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Keefe's summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 136, is granted in part and denied in part. All claims against Keefe other than the FDUTPA claim are dismissed with prejudice.”
“The motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, ECF No. 29, is granted in part. The first, second, third, and fourth claims are dismissed. Summary judgment on the fifth claim is denied without prejudice.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss (document 10) is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are dismissed with prejudice. ... The motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim of racially discriminatory failure to hire, and related “unequal treatment,” is denied.”
“The summary-judgment motions, ECF Nos. 94 and 95, are GRANTED IN PART. ... Judgment on the merits on the federal claims is entered in favor of the defendant Larry Campbell in his official and individual capacities and in favor of the defendants Carl Bennett, Tim Ruth, and Andrew Dawson in their individual capacities. Those claims are dismissed with prejudice. The state-law claims ... are dismissed based on the discretionary decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
“The defendant's summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 47, is GRANTED. ... The clerk must enter a judgment stating, “All the plaintiff Victor Dontavious Stallworth's claims against all defendants are dismissed with prejudice.””
“The defendant's motion for sanctions, ECF No. 49, is DENIED.”
No party motion -> excluded from motion stats; counts as an order read. Sua sponte dismissal via adopted R&R: plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee or move for IFP, filed only a summary-judgment motion rather than a complaint, and failed to cure; alternatively barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quote: 'even if the summary-judgment motion was treated as a complaint and the other deficiencies were ignored, dismissal would be proper based on the Eleventh Amendment, because the plaintiff has named as a defendant only the Florida Legislature, which for Eleventh Amendment purposes is equivalent to the state itself.'
No party motion -> excluded from motion stats; counts as an order read. Sua sponte dismissal via adopted R&R on res judicata: the amended complaint closely tracked a 2013 case dismissed for failure to state a claim. Quote: 'That case was dismissed for failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Such a dismissal is an adjudication on the merits. The plaintiff did not appeal, so the adjudication was and is final.' Independently fails to state a claim; supplemental jurisdiction declined over any state claim.
“The petitioner's motion summary judgment (document 49) is DENIED. This matter is remanded to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss (document 12), as deemed a motion for summary judgment (document 27), is GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment stating, “The complaint is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.””
“Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (document 17) is DENIED.”
“The respondent's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (document 11) is GRANTED. The clerk must enter judgment stating, “The petition is denied with prejudice.””
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 220.0 days (N = 20).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 24 days (N = 5).
2021 filing-window cohort (20 terminated civil cases) shows a broad N.D. Fla. district docket: heavy prisoner / detainee civil-rights (42:1983) and FDOC ADA cases (446 Civil Rights: ADA -- a batch of four FDOC ADA suits filed 2021-02-02, ROOKS/LITTLES/MARTIN/JENKINS, all terminated 2021-06-16), employment discrimination (442 Civil Rights: Jobs -- Title VII sex-discrimination, ADA-employment), insurance, diversity product liability (C.R. Bard), and mortgage/foreclosure. Referral magistrates surfaced (all already in registry): Martin A. Fitzpatrick, Michael J. Frank, Gary R. Jones.