Robert Lewis Hinkle
How Judge Hinkle rules, drawn from 24 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Hinkle
Robert Lewis Hinkle is a judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Hinkle received a commission on August 1, 1996. Judge Hinkle assumed senior status on November 7, 2016.
Judge Hinkle's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Hinkle's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Hinkle decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Dekker v. Weida, he held after trial that Florida could not categorically exclude Medicaid coverage for puberty blockers and hormones used to treat gender dysphoria; diagnostic difficulty called for caution, not a blanket exclusion.
“The difficulty diagnosing a patient calls for caution. It does not call for a one-size-fits-all refusal to cover widely accepted medical treatment.”
In the NetChoice remand, he treated a platform's mix of human editorial standards and algorithmic ranking as protected expressive activity, while leaving room for regulation that can survive the appropriate First Amendment scrutiny.
“The unmistakable upshot is this: the First Amendment applies to mixed curation.”
In Rare Breed Triggers v. Big Daddy Enterprises, he granted a patent preliminary injunction after construing the claim and finding that a nonessential addition to the accused product did not avoid infringement.
“When a claim reads on a product, an infringer cannot manufacture the product in a manner that requires an otherwise-nonessential addition and assert this somehow makes the product noninfringing.”
In Brenner, Hinkle granted preliminary relief against Florida’s same-sex marriage ban after holding marriage a fundamental right and finding the state’s procreation and moral-disapproval arguments insufficient.
“The undeniable truth is that the Florida ban on same-sex marriage stems entirely, or almost entirely, from moral disapproval of the practice. ... the Supreme Court has made clear that moral disapproval, standing alone, cannot sustain a provision of this kind.”
In Engle v. Warden Eichenlaub, he applied Marks to the fractured Santos decision, limited its controlling rationale to illegal-gambling proceeds, and rejected a habeas claim involving drug proceeds.
“when there is a split decision, the controlling view is the narrowest that supports the result. ... The narrowest view that supports the Santos result is that the ‘proceeds’ of an illegal lottery—that is, an illegal gambling operation—are its profits. This helps Mr. Engle not at all.”
In Mendoza v. Inch, he applied res judicata to claims already resolved by a prior class judgment, explaining that the judgment rather than the filing order controlled preclusion.
“What matters now is not which case was filed first, but which case resulted in a judgment first. ‘Res judicata arises from a judgment.’”
In Dicks, Hinkle rejected the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 3626 categorically bars punitive damages in prisoner conditions suits, while leaving the claimant’s entitlement on the facts for later decision.
“The court did not say the statute categorically prohibited punitive damages. This was necessarily a holding that punitive damages can sometimes meet the statutory requirements.”
Procedural preferences
In Scarborough v. Cohen, he dismissed a prisoner civil-rights claim for failure to exhaust because a request for permission to marry was not an informal grievance under the prison's process.
“Plaintiff's failure to exhaust, however, was a matter not of semantics but of substance. Plaintiff's original request for permission to marry was not a grievance in any sense of the word.”
In Morton v. United States, he denied summary judgment on one FTCA claim without prejudice because the government had not submitted a proper Local Rule 56.1(B) statement of facts.
“Any renewed summary-judgment motion must include a ‘statement of facts generally in the form that would be appropriate in an appellate brief.’ N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 56.1(B).”
In Rossi v. Uhtmeier, he dismissed a self-represented relator’s qui tam complaint at screening because a nonlawyer could not litigate on behalf of the United States; he directed any challenge to earlier district court dismissals to the court of appeals.
“There can be no pro se qui tam action.”
Cautions
In one order, Hinkle described a plaintiff’s objections as contumacious and said that belittling the magistrate judge and others involved in the case must stop.
“The objections are contumacious in tone. The plaintiff has a right to litigate his claims fully and fairly, but he has no right to belittle the magistrate judge or others involved in the judicial process. The practice must stop.”
In Stallworth v. Tyson, he denied a requested sanction under Florida's prisoner-litigation statute, explaining that the state legislature could not direct a federal court's sanctions decision and declining fees in the circumstances.
“a state legislature plainly cannot properly do so. ... a federal court has ample authority to impose appropriate sanctions on a party ... [but] as a matter of discretion, and considering all the circumstances, I decline to assess attorney's fees or impose other sanctions.”
In Stroud, Hinkle granted prison officials qualified immunity because no clearly established rule required more than they did after an inmate reported a threat. He left the separate constitutional-violation question unresolved.
“But no decision or clearly applicable principle establishes that in the circumstances known to the defendants here, more was required than what they did. They did not knowingly violate the law. They have qualified immunity.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction, ECF Nos. 2, 11, and 42 in Case No. 4:14cvl07, are granted against the remaining defendants.”
“The state defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF No. 50 in Case No. 4:14cvl07, is granted in part and denied in part.”
“The defendant Clerk of Court’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 49 in Case No. 4:14cvl07, is denied.”
“The Secretary's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, ECF Nos. 156 and 157, are granted. All remaining claims against the Secretary are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Keefe's summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 136, is granted in part and denied in part. All claims against Keefe other than the FDUTPA claim are dismissed with prejudice.”
“The motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, ECF No. 29, is granted in part. The first, second, third, and fourth claims are dismissed. Summary judgment on the fifth claim is denied without prejudice.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss (document 10) is GRANTED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are dismissed with prejudice. ... The motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim of racially discriminatory failure to hire, and related ‘unequal treatment,’ is denied.”
“The summary-judgment motions, ECF Nos. 94 and 95, are GRANTED IN PART. ... Judgment on the merits on the federal claims is entered in favor of the defendant Larry Campbell in his official and individual capacities and in favor of the defendants Carl Bennett, Tim Ruth, and Andrew Dawson in their individual capacities. Those claims are dismissed with prejudice. The state-law claims ... are dismissed based on the discretionary decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.”
“The defendant's summary-judgment motion, ECF No. 47, is GRANTED. ... The clerk must enter a judgment stating, ‘All the plaintiff Victor Dontavious Stallworth's claims against all defendants are dismissed with prejudice.’”
“The defendant's motion for sanctions, ECF No. 49, is DENIED.”
Sua sponte dismissal through an adopted report and recommendation: the plaintiff failed to pay the filing fee or move to proceed in forma pauperis, filed only a summary-judgment motion rather than a complaint, and failed to cure the defects; dismissal was also proper under Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quote: 'even if the summary-judgment motion was treated as a complaint and the other deficiencies were ignored, dismissal would be proper based on the Eleventh Amendment, because the plaintiff has named as a defendant only the Florida Legislature, which for Eleventh Amendment purposes is equivalent to the state itself.'
Sua sponte dismissal through an adopted report and recommendation on res judicata grounds: the amended complaint closely tracked a 2013 case dismissed for failure to state a claim. Quote: 'That case was dismissed for failing to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Such a dismissal is an adjudication on the merits. The plaintiff did not appeal, so the adjudication was and is final.' The complaint also independently failed to state a claim, and the court declined supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claim.
“The petitioner's motion summary judgment (document 49) is DENIED. This matter is remanded to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.”
“Defendant's motion to dismiss (document 12), as deemed a motion for summary judgment (document 27), is GRANTED. The clerk shall enter judgment stating, ‘The complaint is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.’”
“Plaintiff's motion for sanctions (document 17) is DENIED.”
“The respondent's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment (document 11) is GRANTED. The clerk must enter judgment stating, ‘The petition is denied with prejudice.’”
“The Secretary's motion to dismiss or abstain, ECF No. 97, is denied.”
“The plaintiffs' preliminary-injunction motion, ECF No. 108, is granted in part. A preliminary injunction is entered in favor of the individual plaintiffs as set out below against all defendants other than the Governor and Supervisor of Orange County.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 220.0 days (N = 20).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 24 days (N = 5).
- A 2021 filing-window cohort (20 terminated civil cases) shows a broad N.D.
- Fla. district docket: heavy prisoner / detainee civil-rights (42:1983) and FDOC ADA cases (446 Civil Rights: ADA, a batch of four FDOC ADA suits filed 2021-02-02, ROOKS/LITTLES/MARTIN/JENKINS, all terminated 2021-06-16), employment discrimination (442 Civil Rights: Jobs, Title VII sex-discrimination, ADA-employment), insurance, diversity product liability (C.R.
- Bard), and mortgage/foreclosure.
- Cases are referred to the division's magistrate judges for reports and recommendations.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 2 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 2 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, not for Judge Hinkle: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 148,428 | 47.7 months |
| Closed with no court action | 30 | 3 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 148,385 | 47.7 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 4 | not reported |
| Closed during trial | 9 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 148,428 | 47.7 months |
| Sep 2024 | 140,479 | 43.4 months |
| Sep 2023 | 36,307 | 27.8 months |
| Sep 2022 | 57,845 | 21.8 months |
| Sep 2021 | 14,972 | 5.3 months |
| Sep 2020 | 6,038 | 6.7 months |
| Sep 2019 | 1,148 | 7.5 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Hinkle with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Hinkle, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
Opens in Ezel Pro.
- Grounded in Judge Hinkle's own signed orders
- Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
- Chat, drafting and research in one workspace