Hope Thai Cannon
How Judge Cannon decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In prisoner Eighth-Amendment excessive-force cases she draws a sharp line on summary judgment by whether the record blatantly contradicts the plaintiff: where it is competing sworn accounts with no objective video, she DENIES the defendants' MSJ as a jury 'swearing match'; where body-camera footage refutes the plaintiff, she GRANTS it (and qualified immunity). Decision-grade for both sides: in a no-video force case, develop the factual dispute and you survive SJ; if there is dispositive bodycam/video, the case turns on what it actually shows.
“the two version of events presented by Defendants and Plaintiff present 'a classic swearing match, which is the stuff of which jury trials are made.' ... At the summary judgment stage, this Court cannot make credibility determinations”
Counterpoint to the swearing-match rule: dispositive video controls. Where bodycam footage blatantly contradicts the plaintiff's account of a search/seizure, she grants qualified immunity and summary judgment because no constitutional violation is shown.
“Based on the uncontroverted evidence set forth in the body camera footage, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that Defendants violated a constitutional right. As such, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.”
On qualified immunity at summary judgment in excessive-force/failure-to-intervene claims, she treats the QI question as folding into the same fact dispute: if a reasonable jury could find excessive force or a failure to intervene, QI does not shield the officer at the SJ stage. A defendant cannot win QI merely by asserting it where the force itself is genuinely disputed.
“because a reasonable jury could find Defendant Yost failed to intervene in the alleged use of excessive force, Defendant Yost is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.”
Disability-discrimination framing matters: the United States/its agencies are immune under ADA Title I, but she will liberally construe a pro se complaint to assert the Rehabilitation Act (the exclusive federal-employee disability remedy) rather than dismiss outright -- then decide the merits (here, joint-employer control) on the record.
“The fact that DeCA ... is immune from liability under Title I of the ADA, however, does not necessarily mean that summary judgment should be entered in favor of Defendant. This is so because the United States is not immune under the Rehabilitation Act, which provides the same relief as the ADA.”
On PLRA damages she applies 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e) but reads 'more than de minimis injury' generously at summary judgment: a concussion, migraines, and multiple contusions create a fact question that defeats a defense MSJ aimed at capping a prisoner to nominal damages.
“the undersigned finds that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff suffered a more than de minimis physical injury from Defendants' conduct.”
Procedural preferences
Failure to timely respond to Requests for Admissions is treated as a binding concession under Rule 36(a): the facts are deemed admitted and can carry a summary judgment. Answer RFAs on time -- silence becomes the record.
“Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's request for admissions within the allotted time frame. In fact, the Plaintiff failed to respond even after this Court specifically ordered him to do so. ... Thus, for purposes of this motion, the facts set forth in the requests are deemed admitted.”
Prisoner claims for injunctive relief are mooted by a transfer: once the inmate leaves the institution where the challenged conditions exist, she dismisses the injunctive claims as moot (the narrow capable-of-repetition exception rarely applies). Conditions-of-confinement injunctive relief must target the facility where the plaintiff is actually held.
“the undersigned agrees with the Secretary that Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are moot. Plaintiff's requested injunctive relief concerns conditions in a prison at which he is no longer incarcerated.”
Cautions
Strict on prisoner candor: failing to disclose prior lawsuits on the civil-rights complaint form (signed under penalty of perjury) is sanctioned by dismissal as 'malicious' for abuse of the judicial process under 28 U.S.C. 1915A/1915(e), and pro se status is no excuse. Disclose all prior litigation truthfully.
“An appropriate sanction for Plaintiff's abuse of the judicial process in not providing the Court with true factual statements or responses is to dismiss this case without prejudice.”
Dilatory or duplicative pro se tactics are not indulged: repeated motions aimed at the same issue, and refusing to participate in written discovery, draw firm management and admonitions -- she had already accommodated genuine concerns (deferring depositions during COVID) before denying a further stay.
“As the undersigned has directed Plaintiff on numerous occasions, he filed this action over a year ago and he must prosecute it. His failure to do so is prejudicial to the Defendant and his multiple filings directed at the same issue is bordering on an abuse of the judicial process.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 5 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to stay N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Habeas corpus 2241 N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED as to Plaintiff's claim for compensatory and punitive damages for violating his Eighth Amendment rights. ... Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's failure to intervene/protect claim against all Defendants, EXCEPT Marinin and Paul. ... Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims for retaliation (First Amendment claim), violation of his rights to equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment claim), and conspiracy to obstruct justice.”
“Defendant Yost's motion for summary judgment, ECF Doc. 59, be DENIED.”
“Defendants Walker, Brown, and Ely's motion for summary judgment, ECF Doc. 69, be DENIED.”
“Defendant Dixon's Motion to Dismiss (ECF Doc. 49) be GRANTED.”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF Doc. 17) be GRANTED and judgment be entered in favor of Defendants.”
“Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF Doc. 52) be GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff's motion to request a stay of time (ECF Doc. 57) is DENIED.”
“the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 be dismissed as moot and for failure to prosecute.”
Sua sponte R&R (no party motion) -> excluded_from_stats; counts as an order read. After the court and U.S. Marshals made repeated, documented attempts to serve an unlocatable correctional-officer defendant ('C. Smith'/'Cynthia Smith'), Cannon recommended dismissing her under Rule 4(m): 'That Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Smith be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).' Prejudice: WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Pattern: she affords an IFP prisoner the Richardson v. Johnson 'good cause' extension while reasonable USMS efforts continue, but will dismiss once those efforts are exhausted and the plaintiff cannot supply a service address.
Sua sponte R&R on screening (no party motion) -> excluded_from_stats; counts as an order read. Pro se employment-discrimination complaint dismissed for failure to prosecute: plaintiff did not submit summonses for service within the court's deadline and did not respond to a show-cause order. 'This case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with a Court order' (Rule 41(b)). Prejudice: WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Sua sponte 28 U.S.C. 1915A / 1915(e) screening R&R (no party motion) -> excluded_from_stats; counts as an order read. Pre-trial detainee's pro se 1983 complaint dismissed because he checked 'NO' under penalty of perjury when asked about prior suits but had filed four undisclosed federal actions. 'This case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as malicious for Plaintiff's abuse of the judicial process.' Prejudice: WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Decision-grade caution: like the related Jones/Gainesville magistrate practice, she enforces prisoner litigation-history disclosure strictly. (His separate 'Petition for Temporary Restraining Order' was terminated with the case.)
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 217.0 days (N = 14).
Her assigned_judge='Hope T. Cannon' docket (Pensacola/Gainesville/Tallahassee/Panama City divisions; suffix -HTC-) is dominated by (1) Social Security disability appeals decided on consent/referral -- defendants are the successive SSA Commissioners Berryhill/Saul/Kijakazi/O'Malley/Bisignano/Dudek/King (e.g. CORPUZ, ZORN, MELENDEZ, MALCOLM, IANUALE, MITCHELL, DURHAM, MONK, MATHEWS, DAY, TIPPER, DUARTE), and (2) criminal duty-magistrate matters (United States v. ... in -mj- dockets: complaints, search warrants, sealed/SERVISMED, HAMLETT, HERNANDEZ, SHOEMAKER). A handful of consent civil cases round it out: DEAN v. C.R. Bard (products), THE PALMS OF DESTIN CLUB v. Communications Processing Systems (contract/TCPA), FLORIDA COMMUNITY SERVICES CORP v. Skanska USA (property damage). This is the CONSENT/decision + duty subset, NOT her referral R&R caseload (prisoner 1983 / habeas / pro-se civil rights -- those appear in the reasoning layer, assigned to the district judge with Cannon as referred_judge).