Gary R. Jones
How Judge Jones decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On prisoner Eighth-Amendment medical claims he applies the Estelle deliberate-indifference standard strictly: a prisoner who received diagnosis and continuous (even if conservative or delayed) care cannot create a fact issue merely by wanting different/faster treatment. Decision-grade for plaintiff's counsel: a deliberate-indifference claim needs evidence the providers subjectively knew of and disregarded a serious risk (or that delay itself worsened the condition), not just a disagreement with medical judgment.
“Generally, an inmate who receives a medical diagnosis and care, but desires a different diagnosis or treatment, can't show deliberate indifference. ... At its essence, this case is one in which Plaintiff wanted a different, less conservative, treatment than that which the medical staff provided. These are plainly matters of medical judgment that are not an appropriate basis for liability under the Eighth Amendment.”
Distinguishes preclusion doctrines precisely and will deny a defense that misapplies them: unreviewed state administrative-agency findings have NO preclusive effect on a federal ADA (or Title VII) claim under the Elliott exception (the ADA incorporates Title VII's enforcement scheme), and Rooker-Feldman bars only review of state-COURT judgments, not state-agency decisions. Decision-grade: do not move to dismiss an ADA claim on the strength of an adverse FCHR/DOAH outcome that no state court reviewed.
“The exception carved out in Elliott, however, extends to ADA claims because 'the ADA explicitly incorporates all of the enforcement powers, remedies, and procedures of Title VII.' ... The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to state court decisions, not to state administrative decisions.”
Reviews agency (Touhy) decisions under the APA's narrow arbitrary-and-capricious standard and confines review to the administrative record actually presented to the agency; he will uphold a multi-ground agency denial if any independent ground (here, relevance/cumulativeness AND privilege) holds, and faults a movant who fails to address every ground. He also updates his own recommendation when the record changes ('this more copious explanation by the Department makes all the difference').
“Defendants, however, rely on 'facts [they] never presented' to the Department, and, thus, are not part of the administrative record. This is unavailing on APA review ... a reviewing court will uphold an agency action resting on several independent grounds if any of those grounds validly supports the result.”
Procedural preferences
Enforces the PLRA exhaustion requirement rigorously via the Turner v. Burnside two-step: a grievance 'returned without action' for failing to follow proper procedure does not exhaust, and exhaustion completed AFTER the complaint was filed is a fatal procedural default. Get every FDOC grievance step (informal, formal, appeal to the Secretary) done correctly and BEFORE suing.
“the grievance process for grievance number 15-6-29219 was not completed until months after suit was filed, the grievance is insufficient to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies before suit was filed. Plaintiff's complaint, therefore, must be dismissed for failure to properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit.”
Liberally construes pro se habeas petitioners to avoid harsh AEDPA bars: a second 2254/2255 petition filed before the first is adjudicated should be construed as a motion to amend the pending petition (Ching/Gonzalez), not dismissed as successive. Pro se prisoners get the benefit of procedural liberal construction.
“Given the unusual procedural posture of this case, and affording pro se Petitioner the benefit of liberal construction, the instant Petition may be construed as seeking relief under Rule 60(b) ...”
Cautions
Strict on prisoner candor: failure to disclose prior lawsuits (especially related ones) on the civil-rights complaint form is sanctioned by dismissal for abuse of the judicial process, counting as a 28 U.S.C. 1915(g) strike -- pro se status does not excuse it. Disclose all prior litigation truthfully on the form.
“dismissal of this case without prejudice for abuse of the judicial process is an appropriate sanction for Plaintiff's lack of candor. The dismissal of this case for abuse of the judicial process should operate as a 'strike' pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”
Improperly-formatted or premature filings get stricken, not indulged: a summary-judgment motion filed instead of a required response, or motions 'improper in form and substance,' are struck. File the right paper in the right form at the right time.
“Both of these motions are improper in form and substance and will be stricken. ... it is ORDERED that the motions, ECF Nos. 27 and 28, are STRICKEN.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 3 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Social security appeal N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to compel N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that KCN's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 136, should be GRANTED.”
“Defendants Corizon, LLC, Linda Cain, Guilda Epps and Sandra Streetman's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 58, should be GRANTED.”
“Defendant, Dr. Juan Almeyda-Gomez's Motion for Final Summary Judgment, ECF No. 80, should be GRANTED”
“Defendant, Juan Almeyda-Gomez's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint, ECF No. 63, should be DENIED as MOOT.”
“In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Verified Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12, should be DENIED. Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with her ADA claim.”
“it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendants Dr. Moses Izuegbu, M.D., Matthew McGuffin and Expedito Salvador's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 62, should be GRANTED and the case should be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”
“It is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion To Remand (Doc. 21) be GRANTED, and that this action be REVERSED and REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner.”
“For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner should be AFFIRMED.”
“Accordingly, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Compel the Deposition of LTC Martin Robinette, ECF No. 1457, should be DENIED.”
Prisoner 42:1983 case. ORDER + R&R. (1) ORDER part: the plaintiff's improperly-filed summary-judgment motion (ECF 27) and a motion to locate a bank account (ECF 28) were STRICKEN as improper in form and substance -- procedural, not a merits ruling: 'it is ORDERED that the motions, ECF Nos. 27 and 28, are STRICKEN.' (2) R&R part (the disposition): RECOMMENDED the case be DISMISSED for abuse of the judicial process because the prisoner failed to disclose prior litigation on the complaint form -- 'dismissal of this case without prejudice for abuse of the judicial process is an appropriate sanction for Plaintiff's lack of candor' and 'The dismissal of this case for abuse of the judicial process should operate as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).' Prejudice: WITHOUT PREJUDICE; counts as a 1915(g) strike. No merits party-motion ruling -> excluded_from_stats; counts as an order read. Decision-grade pattern: he enforces prisoner candor-on-disclosure strictly.
28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas. Procedural R&R, no merits ruling -> excluded_from_stats; counts as an order read. The respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as successive was WITHDRAWN; the respondent instead moved to transfer/consolidate. Applying Ching v. United States and Gonzalez v. Crosby, Jones recommended construing the prematurely-filed second petition as a Rule 60(b) motion / motion to amend the still-pending first petition rather than dismissing it as successive, and consolidating: 'it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that this case be consolidated with Addison v. Secretary, Case No. 5:10-cv-39-MCR-EMT, for all further proceedings.' Pattern: liberal construction of a pro se petitioner's premature successive petition to avoid an AEDPA bar.
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 343 days (N = 13).
His CONSENT/decision docket (assigned_judge='Gary R. Jones', oldest-first, 21 cases filed 2008-2011, all terminated) is dominated by Social Security disability appeals (DIWC/DIWW/SSID -- a large block filed mid-2011: WALKER, LARRY, RUSHING, TILLMAN, SICKLER, LEWIS, STRICKLAND, KLINE-PARRIS, STRAWDER, HARROLD), prisoner 42:1983 civil-rights (FREDERICK, PARKER, HARRELL, REILLY), FLSA wage cases (CORONADO, OFFENBACHER), ADA (CUSSON), and diversity contract/insurance (B-K CYPRESS insurance, SWIFT contract, WELLS FARGO foreclosure). This reflects an N.D. Fla. magistrate's referred + consent civil mix; criminal duties (first appearances, R&Rs on 2255 motions, COA recommendations) are not enumerated here but appear in his GovInfo signature record.