Thomas P. Barber
How Judge Barber rules, drawn from 8 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Barber decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Procedural preferences
Grants motions to compel arbitration to the extent the defendants may enforce the agreements, and stays the case pending completion of arbitration rather than dismissing.
“(1) The motions to compel arbitration (Docs. 84; 85; 87; 88; 89) are GRANTED to the extent the Court finds that Defendants may enforce the arbitration agreements in this case. (2) The motions are DENIED to the extent that Plaintiffs' claims are not subject to dismissal at this time. (3) This case is STAYED pending the completion of arbitration ...”
He treats Eleventh Amendment immunity as a threshold jurisdictional bar for claims against a state university in federal court, even where the state may have waived immunity for a different statutory claim. Claims that remain viable in state court may still be dismissed from the federal action without leave to amend there.
“just because the state may waive immunity for one type of claim (such as the Rehabilitation Act) does not mean that it waives immunity for all possible claims”
For ADA accommodation claims, he distinguishes trained service animals from emotional-support animals and will dismiss a Title II theory based solely on an emotional-support animal as legally unavailable.
“It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s cat is not a service animal. Consequently, any ADA claim fails as a matter of law.”
In ERISA benefits cases, he applies the administrator-review framework rather than ordinary fact-trial summary judgment: a discretionary decision supported by reasonable medical and vocational evidence survives even if the court might have decided the claim differently, and a structural conflict needs case-specific evidence of influence.
“Under that deferential standard, the Court must affirm the administrator’s decision if it was reasonable based on the available evidence, even if the Court would have reached a different decision in the first instance.”
He separates reasonable suspicion from probable cause on the facts presented: an officer's inability to identify pills as contraband made possession and concealment insufficient for arrest, even though those facts could justify further investigation.
“The possession of unidentified pills – even when coupled with an attempt to conceal them – simply did not establish probable cause to believe Defendant was committing any criminal offense.”
A party invoking the EFAA to avoid an otherwise valid employment-arbitration agreement must allege at least a plausible or nonfrivolous sexual-harassment claim; conclusory use of harassment labels is insufficient, and he stays rather than dismisses once arbitration is compelled.
“the EFAA’s exclusion of sexual harassment claims from arbitration ‘applies only when the plaintiff states a plausible claim of sexual harassment’”
On promotion pretext, an employee's own view that she was better qualified does not suffice; the comparative disparity must be so weighty that no reasonable impartial decisionmaker could have selected the other candidate.
“To meet the burden of showing pretext, it is insufficient for Plaintiff to point to evidence that she was, in fact, the better candidate.”
In Murphy, he dismissed an amended complaint that incorporated 158 general paragraphs into every count, while allowing another amendment directed to separate claims and their supporting facts.
“This type of over-incorporation constitutes an impermissible shotgun pleading.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“(1) The motions to compel arbitration (Docs. 84; 85; 87; 88; 89) are GRANTED to the extent the Court finds that Defendants may enforce the arbitration agreements in this case. (2) The motions are DENIED to the extent that Plaintiffs' claims are not subject to dismissal at this time. (3) This case is STAYED pending the completion of arbitration ...”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 16) is hereby GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 114) is hereby DENIED.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Undisputed Material Fact, and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 115) is hereby GRANTED.”
“Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, as set forth herein.”
“The motion is GRANTED to the extent the Court finds that Defendants may enforce the arbitration agreement in this case.”
“The motion is DENIED as to the request to dismiss the case.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law (Doc. 39) is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs’ ‘Verified Time-Sensitive Motion for Sanctions and to Enjoin Retaliation’ (Doc. 42) is hereby DENIED.”
“‘Defendant, Constance Bamberg’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint’ (Doc. 25) is GRANTED as set forth herein.”
“‘Defendant, Noah’s Ark of Central Florida, Inc., d/b/a ROAR Florida’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint’ (Doc. 26) is GRANTED as set forth herein.”
“‘Defendant, Villages at Noah’s Landing, LTD.’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint’ (Doc. 27) is GRANTED as set forth herein.”
“‘Defendant Royal American Management, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Action Complaint’ (Doc. 29) is GRANTED as set forth herein.”
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