Sheri Polster Chappell
How Judge Chappell rules, drawn from 42 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Chappell
Sheri Polster Chappell is a judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Chappell received a commission on May 22, 2013.
Judge Chappell's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Chappell, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Key rules
Filing
Provide courtesy copies only for summary judgment motions, responses, or replies exceeding 25 pages with attachments.
“Parties need only provide courtesy copies of motions for summary judgment, responses, and replies that exceed 25 pages (including exhibits and attachments).”
Motions
A party may file only one summary judgment motion without leave of court.
“Only one motion for summary judgment may be filed by a party (or multiple parties represented by the same counsel) absent leave of court.”
Motions
A summary judgment movant may reply without leave within 14 days after the response, limited to seven pages; other replies require permission.
“A party must get the court's permission before filing a reply—except for summary judgment motions. A party moving for summary judgment may file a reply not to exceed 7 pages within 14 days after service of the response without the court's permission.”
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 10, 2026).
How Judge Chappell decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Wright v. Dyck-O’Neal, Chappell granted judgment on the pleadings for the debt collector. She held that Florida’s notice-of-assignment statute did not make notice a condition precedent to collection and that the pleaded failure to give notice therefore did not establish the federal claim.
“In short, Section 559.715 has no language making notice of assignment a condition precedent. DONI thus did not violate the FDCPA.”
A surety seeking specific performance of a clear collateral-security clause can establish irreparable harm from the loss of collateralization itself while claims remain pending; delay in seeking relief is relevant but not necessarily fatal when the other Rule 65 factors strongly favor enforcement.
“the nature of the injury in collateral security provision cases is the lack of collateralization while claims are pending, and nothing can remedy that injury after the fact.”
A constitutional tort theory must connect the challenged speech to the individual defendant's own knowledge and actions; motive cannot be imputed from other officials without record evidence of that connection.
“There must exist ‘a factual connection between [Plaintiff’s] speech and each individual official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions[.]’”
In Longo, the court treated Congress's express exclusion of Indian tribes from Title VII's employer definition as dispositive of the former casino employee's federal claim.
“Congress chose to expressly exempt Indian tribes from Title VII’s definition of ‘employer.’”
In Turtle, the court distinguished the tribe's retained right to sell alligator eggs from the government's authority to enforce nondiscriminatory conservation measures protecting the species.
“In short, although Congress has not exercised its authority to abrogate Turtle's right to sell eggs, those rights are not unlimited.”
In Peoples Gas, the court declined to create a statutory indemnity remedy where the underground-facility statute supplied no express or implied right to recover a third-party settlement.
“A plain reading of the statute supports no claim for indemnification.”
In Garrison Systems, Chappell treated state claims based on copying and displaying copyrighted photographs as preempted, while recognizing that a contract claim rests on a distinct source of duty. She nevertheless dismissed the browsewrap contract count without prejudice because the pleaded website notice was inadequate.
“Count VI, however, is not preempted. This is because the cause of action”
In a franchise dispute, detailed allegations of a former franchisee’s use of proprietary information, equipment, and trade dress supported an unfair competition claim at the pleading stage.
“Plaintiff has adequately pled a claim for common law unfair competition under Pennsylvania law.”
In Najera Sevilla, Chappell granted habeas relief after finding a detention began before issuance of a warrant or notice to appear and the government did not claim an exception for warrantless arrest.
“The government violated Najera Sevilla’s right to due process by arresting and detaining him without a warrant and before he was in removal proceedings.”
In Beraun Rojas, Chappell granted habeas relief after finding the record lacked evidence that continued detention served appearance or public-safety purposes.
“The record is devoid of any evidence suggesting Beraun Rojas is a flight risk or a danger to the community.”
Procedural preferences
In Douse, Chappell dismissed Counts V through XI of the product-liability complaint while allowing the remaining counts to proceed.
“The Motion is GRANTED as to Counts V-XI ... The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
In Kazak and Kazak Real Estate v. Truist, Chappell declined to consider account agreements attached to the bank's dismissal motion because the plaintiffs disputed their authenticity. She denied the motion to dismiss on the pleaded claims.
“So the Court will not consider the agreements at this stage.”
In Tassinari v. RiverSource Life Insurance, Chappell dismissed an unjust enrichment count with prejudice because both sides agreed a valid insurance policy governed the premium dispute. She dismissed a separate statutory count without prejudice so the plaintiff could plead the missing conditions precedent.
“Since the parties agree a valid contract exists, Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim must be excluded—he cannot recover the same damages twice.”
In Medina, the court assessed disability accommodation by meaningful access to the program as a whole rather than by whether the public entity supplied the claimant's preferred or optimal accommodation.
“But equal access is not the standard under the law, and Defendant has provided the Court with enough evidence to illustrate that there is no genuine issue whether it has reasonably accommodated A.M. by providing her meaningful access.”
In CHHJ Franchising, Chappell dismissed state tort counterclaims without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction after finding they arose from conduct around the litigation rather than the trademark facts. She denied the pending dismissal motion as moot.
“the facts alleged regarding these tort claims have nothing to do with trademark infringement.”
Cautions
In Mid-Continent Casualty v. Delacruz Drywall, Chappell dismissed the insurer’s declaratory action without prejudice because the underlying liability had not been resolved, leaving its duty-to-indemnify claim unripe. She denied the pending summary and default judgment motions.
“Consequently, Mid-Continent's duty to indemnify is not ripe, and its claims requesting a declaration on its duty to indemnify are dismissed without prejudice.”
In a due-process habeas challenge, she distinguishes an unreviewable request to second-guess discretionary immigration bond judgment from a reviewable claim that detention rests on acknowledged factual errors; persistence in a corrected mistake can be arbitrary.
“The government’s decision to double-down on its mistake, despite clear evidence and tacit acknowledgement that it was a mistake, is arbitrary.”
In NBR Shoppes, the court denied appellate attorney's fees despite affirming the bankruptcy order because the unsuccessful appeal relied on legal authority and was not frivolous.
“However, simply because NBR lost on appeal does not make the appeal frivolous.”
For a federal flood insurance claim, an earlier letter disallowing a request for additional payment started the filing period; continued claim review and later payments did not restart it.
“simply because an insurer provides additional payments or continues to review documents submitted that does not affect the running of the limitations period.”
In Doe, Chappell dismissed a battery claim against the employer because the amended complaint did not plausibly tie the alleged employee conduct to a work purpose, and she found further amendment of that claim futile.
“Doe does not allege that KW’s conduct served any work purpose of NJC.”
In Rivas-Fonseca, a postjudgment motion could not introduce a habeas claim absent from the original petition. The court directed the petitioner to use a new action for that claim.
“He cannot raise a new habeas claim in a post-judgment motion.”
In Rangel Clos, Chappell denied a second habeas petition challenging an immigration judge’s discretionary bond decision because the court lacked jurisdiction to review that decision.
“This Court does not have jurisdiction to review an immigration judge’s discretionary bond decision:”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs Federal Trade Commission and State of Florida's Motion to Reinstate the Freeze Over Assets Jointly Held by Robert and Olga Cupo and Assets Held by Dennis Cupo (Doc. 194) is DENIED.”
“Defendants' Renewed and Amended Motion to Unfreeze Individual Defendants' and Non-Party Assets and Credit (Doc. 203) is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants may refile, if needed, a motion consistent with this Opinion and Order after meeting and conferring with the Government in a good faith effort to resolve the matter.”
“Defendant Dyck-O'Neal, Inc.'s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. 87) is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly ... and close the file.”
“Consequently, Mid-Continent's duty to indemnify is not ripe, and its claims requesting a declaration on its duty to indemnify are dismissed without prejudice. ... Plaintiff Mid-Continent Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 64) and Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 78) are DENIED.”
“Defendant Fay Servicing, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) and Defendant McCalla, Raymer, Leibert, Pierce, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. a. Counts II and IV (FCCPA) are DISMISSED ... Counts I and III (FDCPA) survive at the motion to dismiss stage.”
“Defendant Fay Servicing, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7) and Defendant McCalla, Raymer, Leibert, Pierce, LLC's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. a. Counts II and IV (FCCPA) are DISMISSED ... Counts I and III (FDCPA) survive.”
“The Motion is GRANTED as to Counts V-XI ... The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
“Defendant’s Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint (Doc. 37) is DENIED.”
“To the extent Defendant incorporates a motion to strike Plaintiffs’ jury demand into its Motion to Dismiss, the motion to strike is denied without prejudice and may be refiled as its own motion.”
“Travelers’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 35) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 135) is GRANTED.”
“Counts II and V are DISMISSED with prejudice; Count III is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Jorge Eliecer Madera Reyes’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.# 24) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #42) is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 161 days (N = 7).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 105 days (N = 27).
Many reviewed False Claims Act matters spent long periods under seal while the government considered intervention, so their total durations are poor measures of motion-resolution time. The contested written decisions more often arose from consumer-protection, debt-collection, insurance, and product-liability disputes. This is descriptive context rather than a complete caseload measure.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, not for Judge Chappell: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 6,896 | 5.5 months |
| Closed with no court action | 49 | 3.5 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 6,492 | 5.2 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 319 | 14.7 months |
| Closed during trial | 36 | 24.2 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 6,896 | 5.5 months |
| Sep 2024 | 7,115 | 5.6 months |
| Sep 2023 | 6,777 | 5.5 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,781 | 6.7 months |
| Sep 2021 | 6,749 | 6.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 6,392 | 6.2 months |
| Sep 2019 | 6,830 | 5.7 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
Draft for Judge Chappell with the record in hand
Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Chappell, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.
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