Mary Stenson Scriven
How Judge Scriven rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Scriven
Mary Stenson Scriven is a judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Scriven received a commission on September 30, 2008.
Judge Scriven's practices and standing orders
Rules for cases before Judge Scriven, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 10, 2026).
How Judge Scriven decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a false-advertising suit concerning promotion of the film War Dogs, she found that the amended complaint plausibly alleged commercial speech and denied the motion to dismiss.
“Applying the Bolger factors here, the Amended Complaint plausibly alleges that the challenged communications are ‘commercial speech.’”
At the pleading stage, accepts well-pleaded facts, declines to decide their truth, and leaves factual challenges for a developed summary-judgment record.
“The Court does not opine as to the truth of the statements in consideration of this motion. Instead, by law, the Court must accept the pleaded facts as true and construe them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff in ruling on these motions to dismiss.”
Distinguishes a third-party claimant's direct coverage rights from a derivative bad-faith claim. A declaratory judgment does not bind a claimant whose rights arose before the action and who was not joined, while derivative claims remain limited by judgments binding the insured.
“Because it chose not to join Helt, the Court concludes that in regard to her direct claim, she is not bound by the state court’s determination that the Policy was void.”
A challenge to an arbitration panel's legal reading of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act did not establish that the panel exceeded its powers. Scriven declined to revisit the underlying legal merits when denying vacatur in Birla.
“Plaintiff’s contention that the arbitrators disregarded the law is not a basis for vacatur.”
Procedural preferences
In Lebron v. Wilkins, Scriven granted the plaintiff summary judgment and permanently enjoined Florida’s suspicionless drug testing of applicants for cash assistance. The state had not shown a substantial special need for the searches, and its evidence did not establish the pervasive drug problem it asserted.
“there simply is no competent evidence offered on this record of the sort of pervasive drug problem the State envisioned in the promulgation of this statute.”
A litigation hold must be implemented and monitored; merely circulating a preservation demand while routine deletion continues is insufficient. In Swofford, that failure supported adverse inferences, presumptions, and a fee award.
“Counsel must take affirmative steps to monitor compliance so that all sources of discoverable information are identified and searched [and in this case, preserved.]”
In Bellezza v. Liberty Mutual, she dismissed without prejudice so the plaintiff could file and serve a new case against the proper corporate defendant, rather than substitute that defendant in the existing action.
“the Court deems the appropriate course of action is to dismiss this action without prejudice so that Plaintiff can file a new complaint that asserts her causes of action against the proper defendant and serve that defendant”
Scriven corrected a judgment that had swept in school-board claims never resolved by the court. In Yuengling, the correction left those claims pending while a separate reconsideration request succeeded only for the sheriff defendants.
“This was a clerical error. The claims against PCSB were not finally litigated or disposed of.”
In Jordan, Scriven treated denial of a religious property-tax exemption as part of tax assessment and dismissed the federal challenge without prejudice under the Tax Injunction Act, with comity and pleading defects as further grounds.
“The determination of whether an exemption applies is a part of the assessment process.”
Cautions
In Kaiser v. DePuy Spine, she dismissed the amended medical-device product-liability claims with prejudice after finding them preempted by the Medical Device Amendments.
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is GRANTED; 2. Plaintiffs' Claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; 3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this Case.”
In fraud claims arising from written loan transactions, oral representations that contradict the executed documents do not support reasonable reliance. Rule 9(b) also requires the speaker, time, place, content, and resulting benefit to be pleaded with particularity.
“Plaintiffs purported reliance on Defendant SunTrust’s alleged oral misrepresentations, which contradict the express terms of the loan documents, is unreasonable as a matter of law.”
In Scott, Scriven granted summary judgment after finding the plaintiff lacked a disclosed medical expert to establish causation of injuries that were not readily observable. She did not decide which driver caused the collision.
“Because Plaintiff has failed to submit medical expert evidence opining on the issue of causation, she cannot prove causation—an essential element of her claim.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 78) is GRANTED.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 79) is DENIED.”
“the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction against the enforcement of Section 414.0652 against him until this matter is fully adjudicated by the Court.”
“On stipulation of the State that it will not seek to enforce the statute against others similarly situated to Plaintiff until the matter is fully resolved, the Court DENIES the Plaintiffs Motion for Class Certification (Dkt. 16) without prejudice.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ... Pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 16) is GRANTED. ... Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. 14) is DISMISSED. ... CLOSE this case.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 34) is DENIED. ... allowing the EEOC's proposed Second Amended Complaint would be futile.”
“Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 89) is DENIED.”
“Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint is GRANTED; 2. Plaintiffs' Claims are DISMISSED with prejudice; 3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to CLOSE this Case.”
“Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, (Dkts. 17, 21), are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART: a. The Motions are GRANTED to the extent that Counts I – III may proceed against Defendants solely in their individual capacity. b. The Motions are GRANTED to the extent that Count III is DISMISSED as to Defendant Taylor. Count III survives against Defendant Eby. c. The Motions are otherwise DENIED.”
“Defendant’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, (Dkt. 10), is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Defendant is awarded $4,304.50 in attorney’s fees.”
“Defendant Mentor Worldwide LLC's Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. 11), is GRANTED .”
“Plaintiff's ‘Request to Grant Leave to Add Other Parties and Amend the Complaint,’ (Dkt. 24), is GRANTED”
“Plaintiff's ‘Request for Permission to Relocate,’ (Dkt. 17), which the Court construes as a Motion to Transfer Venue is DENIED .”
“Defendant Liberty Mutual General Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 22) is GRANTED. This .action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE”
“Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 31) is DENIED as moot.”
The court allowed a third-party claimant's direct coverage theory to continue because she was not joined in the earlier declaratory action, but dismissed a derivative bad-faith count with prejudice because the insured was bound by the no-coverage judgment. The disposition arose from show-cause review rather than a party motion and is excluded from motion counts.
“the Court hereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 70), as described herein.”
“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Spoliation Sanctions (Doc. No. 44) is GRANTED;”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 849 days (N = 1).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 24 days (N = 27).
The reviewed 2026 matters include prisoner habeas and civil-rights suits as well as Fair Labor Standards Act wage claims, confirming that she remains active and continues to receive new civil cases. This recent group provides descriptive context rather than a complete caseload measure.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, not for Judge Scriven: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 6,896 | 5.5 months |
| Closed with no court action | 49 | 3.5 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 6,492 | 5.2 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 319 | 14.7 months |
| Closed during trial | 36 | 24.2 months |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 6,896 | 5.5 months |
| Sep 2024 | 7,115 | 5.6 months |
| Sep 2023 | 6,777 | 5.5 months |
| Sep 2022 | 6,781 | 6.7 months |
| Sep 2021 | 6,749 | 6.2 months |
| Sep 2020 | 6,392 | 6.2 months |
| Sep 2019 | 6,830 | 5.7 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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