John Antoon II

How Judge Antoon rules, drawn from 18 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Position
District judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
William J. Clinton (Democratic)
Commissioned
May 31, 2000
Education
Florida Southern College, B.A., 1968; Florida State University College of Law, J.D., 1971; Florida Institute of Technology, M.S., 1993; University of Virginia School of Law, LL.M., 2001
Signed orders read
18

About Judge Antoon

John Antoon, II is a judge of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Antoon received a commission on May 31, 2000. Judge Antoon assumed senior status on June 3, 2013.

Judge Antoon's practices and standing orders

Rules for cases before Judge Antoon, as published on the court's website (checked October 8, 2026). Judges revise these often, so confirm the current version on the court's site before you file.

Key rules

Filing

Provide no separate courtesy copy for motions filed with the clerk, but give the judge a copy of a motion filed in open court.

“When filing motions with the clerk, it is not necessary to provide separate courtesy copies for the judge, but if a party files a motion in open court, a copy should be provided to the judge for his review.”

Motions

Combine requests to limit evidence into one motion in limine, limited to 25 pages without leave; responses are limited to 20 pages.

“All requests to limit evidence must be included in a single motion not exceeding 25 pages without leave of court. Responses are limited to 20 pages unless the court gives leave to exceed the limit.”

Conferences

Complete mediation in most cases at least five months before the trial term.

“Mediation is required in most cases and should be completed at least five months prior to the trial term.”

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 10, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Antoon decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In Ramdeen v. Prudential Insurance, he rejected the claimant's ERISA benefit challenge and granted the defendants summary judgment after reviewing the disability decision on the administrative record.

“Mr. Ramdeen's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.”

In Aquent v. Stapleton, he let CFAA claims under Sections 1030(a)(2)(C) and (a)(4) proceed, but dismissed a Section 1030(a)(5)(C) claim because Aquent conceded the employee had authorization to access the system.

“Aquent sufficiently stated a cause of action under, and the motion to dismiss must be denied as to, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) and (a)(4). Because § 1030(a)(5)(C) requires the conduct to have been done without authorization and Aquent concedes that Stapleton had authorization, Aquent fails to state a claim under § 1030(a)(5)(C).”

In Suntree Technologies v. EcoSense, Antoon granted summary judgment against a false advertising claim. Suntree supplied no survey or expert evidence of consumer deception, and one lay witness’s impression of the presentation did not establish that consumers were deceived.

“Suntree has provided no survey evidence or expert testimony regarding customer deception.”

Procedural preferences

In Echeverria v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, he dismissed the RICO and emotional-distress counts with prejudice and granted summary judgment against the remaining RESPA and misrepresentation claims.

“Plaintiffs' RICO claim is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.... Count Four is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.”

In Burks v. Beary, Antoon denied the deputies’ summary judgment motion on qualified immunity because the plaintiff’s eyewitness account supported a materially different version of the shooting. At that stage he construed the disputed facts in the plaintiff’s favor.

“The Court must construe the facts as to what occurred at the scene in Plaintiffs favor at this stage of the case; under Jack’s version of the facts, qualified immunity cannot be granted.”

Cautions

In a correctional officer’s discrimination suit, he granted the county summary judgment after finding no evidence that an officer who engaged in similar misconduct received less severe discipline.

“Plaintiff is unable to identify any Orange County correctional officer who engaged in misconduct similar to hers, yet received a discipline less severe than termination.”

In Morales v. CoAdvantage, he considered the complaint and its attachments on the Rule 12(b)(6) motions but declined to consider exhibits attached only to the defendants' motions.

“Following the general rule on a motion to dismiss, the Court considers the complaint and the exhibits attached to the complaint but does not consider the exhibits attached to the CoAdvantage Defendants' motion to dismiss.”

Treats timely reporting as part of coverage under a claims-made-and-reported policy, not merely a cooperation condition requiring prejudice. A claimant seeking to enforce a consent judgment must plead facts establishing that coverage attached.

“If the claim is reported to the insurer during the policy period, then the carrier is legally obligated to pay; if the claim is not reported during the policy period, no liability attaches.”

Does not transform an employer's overtime-classification decision into an ERISA fiduciary act merely because the decision affects benefit calculations. The plan administrator may follow plan terms based on compensation actually paid.

“The business decision whether to classify employees as ‘exempt’ or ‘nonexempt’ for FLSA overtime purposes may have an impact on an ERISA plan, but that does not render the claims based on that classification decision ERISA claims.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Florida
6:04-cv-00035 · 2005-06-30
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment must be granted as to all of Plaintiffs claims.”

Echeverria v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
6:11-cv-01314 · 2012-10-22
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Plaintiffs' RICO claim is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.... Count Four is therefore DISMISSED with prejudice.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Counts One (RESPA) and Two (Fraudulent Misrepresentation) do not survive Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.”

Jones v. Federal Express Corp.
6:12-cv-01406 · 2013-11-14
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“Mr. Jones's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 89) as to FedEx's counterclaim must be granted, and Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 41) must be granted in part and denied in part.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part
Ramdeen v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
6:15-cv-00139 · 2016-02-19
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Mr. Ramdeen's Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Granted
Aquent LLC v. Stapleton
6:13-cv-01581 · 2014-11-05
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Aquent sufficiently stated a cause of action under, and the motion to dismiss must be denied as to, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) and (a)(4). Because § 1030(a)(5)(C) requires the conduct to have been done without authorization and Aquent concedes that Stapleton had authorization, Aquent fails to state a claim under § 1030(a)(5)(C).”

Harrington v. Roundpoint Mortg. Servicing Corp.
2:15-cv-00322 · 2017-11-30
Judgment on partial findings (defendant) Granted

“The Court granted the motion and announced that the findings of fact and conclusions of law required by Rule 52 would be issued in writing.... Defendants are entitled to judgment on the federal claim because Harrington gave prior express consent to receive calls on his cell phone about the loan at issue, and RoundPoint prevails on the state law claim because Harrington did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that RoundPoint's calls were harassing or abusive.”

Morales v. CoAdvantage Corporation
6:24-cv-00117-JA-DCI · 2024-04-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendants' motions (Docs. 14 & 18) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“The counts against CoAdvantage Corp. and the breach-of-fiduciary-duty counts against CoAdvantage Resources and Unum are DISMISSED without prejudice. The motions are otherwise denied.”

Jennings Construction Services Corp. v. ACE American Insurance Company
6:10-cv-01671 · 2011-05-10
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“ACE’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is hereby GRANTED and the Complaint (Doc. 2) is DISMISSED without prejudice. If Jennings is able to remedy the pleading deficiencies, it may file an Amended Complaint within fifteen days of the date of this Order.”

Suntree Technologies, Inc. v. Ecosense International, Inc.
6:09-cv-01945 · 2011-07-20
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Suntree’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 73) and Suntree’s Motion to Strike Defendants’ Summary Judgment Filings for Exceeding the Page Limit (Doc. 104) are DENIED;”

Motions to strike (plaintiff) Denied
Summary judgment (defendant EcoSense) Granted

“EcoSense’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75) and Dussich’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 76) are GRANTED;”

Summary judgment (defendant Dussich) Granted
Motion for extension of time to seek attorneys fees (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiffs Partially Unopposed Motion to Extend the Time to Seek Attorneys’ Fees (Doc. 92) is GRANTED”

Motions to strike (defendants) Moot / procedural

“Defendants’ Motion to Strike Paragraphs Three, Four, and Five of John Robertson’s Declaration (Doc. 93), Defendants’ Motion in Limine (Doc. 121), and Suntree’s Motion in Limine (Doc. 122) are DENIED as moot;”

Motion in limine (defendants) Moot / procedural
Motion in limine (plaintiff) Moot / procedural
Burks v. Beary
6:08-cv-01568 · 2010-04-29
Summary judgment (defendant sheriff) Granted in part

“The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) filed by Defendant Kevin Beary is GRANTED in part and DENIED without prejudice in part.”

Summary judgment (defendant deputies) Denied

“The Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 38) filed by Defendants Chester Parker and Brian Figueroa is DENIED.”

Zipp v. World Mortgage Company
6:08-cv-01638 · 2009-06-26
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Granted

“Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Walker’s ERISA Claims (Counts II and III) (Doc. 25) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Walker’s Counts II and III are hereby dismissed with prejudice.”

M.S. ex rel. Soltys v. Seminole County School Board
6:07-cv-01481 · 2009-07-10
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant Garrett's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 57) is hereby DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The reviewed 2015 Orlando matters provide illustrative caseload context rather than weighted counts or a complete census. No authoritative caseload baseline was available.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years0
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 202600
Sep 202500
Mar 202500
Sep 202400
Mar 202400
Sep 202300
Mar 202300
Sep 202200
Mar 202201
Sep 202100
Mar 202100
Sep 202000

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, not for Judge Antoon: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed6,8965.5 months
Closed with no court action493.5 months
Closed before pretrial6,4925.2 months
Closed during or after pretrial31914.7 months
Closed during trial3624.2 months
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 20256,8965.5 months
Sep 20247,1155.6 months
Sep 20236,7775.5 months
Sep 20226,7816.7 months
Sep 20216,7496.2 months
Sep 20206,3926.2 months
Sep 20196,8305.7 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

Draft for Judge Antoon with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Antoon, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

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