Elizabeth A. Jenkins

How Judge Jenkins rules, drawn from 19 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Jenkins no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Position
magistrate
Status
Retired 2016
Education
Vanderbilt University, B.A., 1971; University of Florida Levin College of Law, J.D., 1976
Signed orders read
19

How Judge Jenkins decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

Ties discovery relief to what was actually pleaded: refuses the motion as framed while expressly allowing the narrower inspection the complaint supports, rather than granting or denying wholesale.

“Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Entry on Land and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 18) is DENIED as to Plaintiffs motion to compel, except that Plaintiffs may enter Defendant’s land to conduct an inspection that is limited to the specific barriers to access enumerated in Plaintiffs’ complaint.”

Resolves a discovery motion issue by issue and says so in the disposition, leaving the reasoning in the body to explain which half went which way.

“That plaintiffs Motion to Exclude Exhibits of Defendant Schaub and Compel (Dkt. 113) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated in the body of the order.”

Where the parties consented to have her decide the case outright, resolves summary judgment claim by claim rather than as a single up-or-down ruling.

“Defendant Florida Department of Corrections’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Sexual Harassment Claim (Dkt.20) is DENIED as to plaintiffs claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, but GRANTED as to plaintiffs claim for punitive damages.”

Procedural preferences

Clears a motion that has been overtaken by the court's own ruling by denying it as moot rather than reaching its merits.

“that Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order or Alternatively Motion for Direction of Procedure by the Court (Dkt.23) is DENIED as moot.”

Denies a procedural motion without prejudice where the defect is one the movant could cure, leaving the door open rather than ending the request.

“The Motion of Sheridan Transportation Company for Joinder as Co-Party Cross-claimant (Dkt. Ill) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”

Grants an ex parte subpoena application only to the extent of directing the clerk to issue the subpoena, and denies the balance of the relief sought.

“Defendant’s Second Ex Parte Motion For Issuance Of Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dkt. 65) is GRANTED to the extent that the Clerk of Court shall issue a subpoena duces tecum”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Fernandez v. Kash N' Karry Food Stores, Inc.
90-492-CIV-T-10C · 1991-04-30
Motion for subpoena (plaintiff) Denied

“that Plaintiff’s Request for Order Directing Service of Subpeona’s [sic] (Edward Litton) (Dkt.27) is DENIED;”

Motion for subpoena (plaintiff) Denied

“that Plaintiff’s Request for Order Directing Service of Subpeona’s [sic] (Randy Pendland) (Dkt.28) is DENIED;”

Motion for protective order (defendant) Moot / procedural

“that Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order or Alternatively Motion for Direction of Procedure by the Court (Dkt.23) is DENIED as moot.”

Smalley Transportation Co. v. Prime Computer, Inc.
89-872-CIV-T-13C · 1991-05-13
Motion for protective order (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“that plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 31) is DENIED as moot.”

Motion to disqualify counsel Denied

“that the Motion to Disqualify Counsel (Dkt. 31) is DENIED.”

Richardson v. Florida
89-1068-CIV-T-10C · 1991-06-12
Motions to compel (plaintiff) Granted in part

“That plaintiffs Motion to Exclude Exhibits of Defendant Schaub and Compel (Dkt. 113) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as stated in the body of the order.”

Reedy v. Lull Engineering Co.
90-1383-CIV-T-15C · 1991-06-17
Motions to compel (defendant) Granted in part

“that Defendant’s Motion To Compel Discovery (Dkt.8) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part;”

United States v. Edwards
89-264-CR-T-22C · 1992-01-21
Motion for subpoena Granted in part

“Defendant’s Second Ex Parte Motion For Issuance Of Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dkt. 65) is GRANTED to the extent that the Clerk of Court shall issue a subpoena duces tecum”

Farina v. City of Tampa
94-445-CIV-T-24A · 1994-12-13
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Procedural Due Process Claims Against Defendants Niteh and Myrick (doc. 43) is GRANTED.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Nitch’s Motion for Summary Judgment in Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (doc. 55) is DENIED.”

City of Tampa v. Fourth Tug/Barge Corp.
92-1785-CIV-T-24C · 1995-07-27
Motion for joinder Denied

“The Motion of Sheridan Transportation Company for Joinder as Co-Party Cross-claimant (Dkt. Ill) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”

Tampa Port Authority v. M/V Duchess
94-1727-CIV-T-23C · 1997-12-08
Motion to alter or amend judgment Granted

“Westchester Fire Insurance Company’s Motion To Alter or Amend Judgment (Dkt.173) is GRANTED.”

Tampa Port Authority v. M/V DUCHESS
94-1727-CIV-T23C · 1998-01-29
Motion for new trial Denied

“Tampa Port Authority’s Motion for New Trial (Dkt.174) is DENIED.”

Winters v. Florida, Department of Corrections
8:00-cv-01567 · 2001-09-13
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“Defendant Florida Department of Corrections’ Motion for Final Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Sexual Harassment Claim (Dkt.20) is DENIED as to plaintiffs claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment, but GRANTED as to plaintiffs claim for punitive damages.”

Macort v. Goodwill Industries-Manasota, Inc.
8:03-CV-1324-T-30EAJ · 2003-12-19
Motion for protective order Granted

“Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order on Inspections (Dkt. 16), is GRANTED”

Motions to compel Granted in part

“Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Entry on Land and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Dkt. 18) is DENIED as to Plaintiffs motion to compel, except that Plaintiffs may enter Defendant’s land to conduct an inspection that is limited to the specific barriers to access enumerated in Plaintiffs’ complaint.”

Rosser-Monahan v. Avon Products, Inc.
8:04-CV-45-T-24EAJ · 2004-11-18
Motion for protective order Denied

“Defendant’s Motion for Expedited Protective Order is DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

  • Sampled assignments run from 1989 to 2022 and show a docket that changes character completely across the tenure.
  • The earliest cohort, filed 1989 through 1992, is a general civil docket she held on the parties' consent: marine personal injury, employment discrimination, insurance and contract disputes, copyright and trademark, a bankruptcy withdrawal, student-loan recovery for the government, and the torts-to-land case that produced one of the published opinions here.
  • By the 1998-2002 window, Social Security appeals have become the single largest block, sitting alongside employment discrimination, disability-access claims, ERISA and ordinary diversity contract work, and she is also drawing criminal-duty matters.
  • The 2005-2010 window is dominated by Social Security appeals almost to the exclusion of everything else, with occasional diversity personal-injury and insurance cases, and the 2014-2015 rows are Social Security appeals nearly across the board.
  • The last sampled assignment is a criminal-duty matter from February 2022, six years after her retirement, consistent with recall service.
  • One caveat about these samples: the case-level subject codes in the public docket metadata are demonstrably unreliable for this court, several cases captioned against the Commissioner of Social Security carry prisoner-petition, motor-vehicle or civil-rights codes, so this description follows the case captions rather than the coded categories.

A historical record

Judge Jenkins no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.