Charlene Edwards Honeywell
How Judge Honeywell decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Procedural preferences
Will not make credibility determinations at summary judgment. In Miller v. Ginny's, where a plaintiff's sworn affidavit of oral TCPA-consent revocation conflicted with a creditor's call logs containing no revocation notation, she denied summary judgment and sent the dispute to the jury. Practice signal: do not move for summary judgment on a record that requires the court to credit one declarant over another.
“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences form the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.”
Four-corners discipline on Rule 12(b)(6) in Medical & Chiropractic v. Oppenheim: struck extrinsic exhibits appended to a reply and declined to convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment, telling defendants to raise the materials on a proper Rule 56 motion instead.
“In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central to the plaintiffs claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.”
Cautions
Sharp on attorney duty of candor. In Byrnes v. Small she admonished plaintiff's counsel under ABA Model Rule 3.3 for misrepresenting service/denial dates. Decision-grade: get your dates and record citations exactly right before this judge.
“The Court will not tolerate any further misrepresentations such as this one, which evinces, at best, a reckless disregard of the duty of candor to the Court.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to certify collective action N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to strike N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 44) is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs' Motion to Conditionally Certify an FLSA Collective Action and Authorize Notice to Putative Opt-In Plaintiffs and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 108) is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and the First-Filed Action Doctrine or, in the Alternative, to Stay (Doc. 31) is DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs Motion to Strike all References to Materials Outside of the Complaint in Defendants' Reply (Doc. 61) is GRANTED. Exhibits A-C of Defendants Reply (Doc. 59) is STRICKEN.”
“Plaintiffs Motion to Remand (Doc. 21) is DENIED.”
“Plaintiff Marguerite Miller's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 24) is DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
From an assigned_judge='Charlene Edwards Honeywell' enumeration (window filed 2020-2022). Her Tampa civil docket in this window is QUI-TAM-HEAVY (False Claims Act) alongside a substantial criminal load -- the classic flmd-Tampa composition (cf. flmd/byron, flmd/jung). Qui tam dockets sit under seal for years and then settle, get voluntarily dismissed after the US declines to intervene, or get stayed pending parallel criminal cases -- so they rarely reach a contested dispositive ruling. Her richest contested-merits civil work (employment, insurance, consumer, products) is the older reasoning-layer docket. Descriptive caseload mix, not a base rate.