Anne C. Conway
How Judge Conway rules, drawn from 9 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Conway decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Applies the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to immunize pre-litigation conduct: trademark cease-and-desist / demand letters to a competitor's distributors are petitioning activity protected from tort liability unless the plaintiff proves the 'sham exception': both that the activity was objectively baseless (no reasonable litigant could expect success) and subjectively intended to interfere rather than seek redress.
“the doctrine extends not only to petitioning of the judicial branch (i.e., filing a lawsuit), but also to acts reasonably attendant to litigation, such as demand letters.”
Voluntary cessation by a public official will not moot a claim when the total circumstances provide a reasonable basis to expect recurrence. Conway looked beyond the official's promise to the timing of the change, whether the new policy was durable, who controlled it, and whether similar conduct appeared elsewhere.
“there is a reasonable basis to believe that Defendant will resume his viewpoint-based blocking of Plaintiff if this action is terminated.”
In an ERISA disability dispute, contemporaneous medical findings and the occupation's generally performed demands supported the administrator's decision. The claimant's evidence did not establish disability throughout the policy's elimination period.
“The evidence does not show that Murray was unable to perform the substantial and material duties of his job for a period of time sufficient to satisfy the Elimination Period in his Policy.”
Procedural preferences
Strict on Rule 56 mechanics and the Case Management Order: a summary-judgment non-movant must specifically controvert each of the movant's stated undisputed facts and give pinpoint record citations. A bulk affidavit without pinpoint citations does not create a genuine dispute: she will deem the movant's facts undisputed and decide without searching the record.
“Because SHR fails to properly address Ford's assertions of fact, the Court considers those facts undisputed.”
Will not relax court-ordered deadlines without a good-cause showing, even on a stipulation of counsel; deadlines set early in the case govern.
“To the extent the stipulation of counsel seeks relief from Court ordered deadlines it is denied. ... No good cause has been shown for an extension.”
Polices removal jurisdiction independently and requires evidence, not generalized assertions, when the complaint does not establish the amount in controversy. In a declaratory-judgment action, the removing party must value the dispute from the plaintiff's perspective.
“The Court will not engage in such speculative guesswork.”
Requires the removing party to substantiate the amount in controversy and resolves genuine uncertainty in favor of remand. In Fusco, generalized references to punitive and other damages did not carry the employer's burden when the plaintiff supplied concrete mitigation evidence.
“Resolving all uncertainties in favor of remand, the Court finds that VSS has not proven the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Cautions
Plead the correct cause of action against the correct governmental actor. Conway declined to rewrite a counseled complaint framed under Section 1983 when the defendant was a federal official acting under federal law, even though the underlying constitutional theory might have been pleaded differently.
“[s]ection 1983 does not apply to federal actors acting under color of federal law.”
Evidence from foreign regulatory systems may be excluded when presenting it would require distracting mini-trials about different legal standards. In the Seroquel litigation, Conway distinguished the regulators' actions from underlying safety information that might still be admissible for notice or knowledge.
“the fact remains that its probative value is greatly overmatched by the jury confusion, waste of time, and unfair prejudice that would result if the Court were to allow Plaintiffs to introduce this evidence during their main case.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“ORDER granting 33 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Silverhorse Racing, LLC Complaint (Doc. No. 2) is dismissed.”
“Ford's Motor Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. ... Ford is ORDERED to file a Proposed Order setting forth injunctive relief consistent with this Order”
“Silverhorse Racing, LLC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 54) is DENIED.”
Sua sponte jurisdictional remand, not a ruling on a party motion. The disposition states: "This case is hereby REMANDED for lack of jurisdiction to the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Osceola County, Florida."
“Plaintiff Amjad Masad’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“Plaintiff’s Request for Oral Argument (Doc. 47) is DENIED.”
“Weng and Medina’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Northland Insurance Company’s Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED.”
“The parties’ Joint Stipulation for Severance and Remand of Count III (Doc. No. 11), filed on July 5, 2011, is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiff Danielle R. Fusco’s Motion to Remand Counts I, II, IV, V, and VI (Doc. No. 15), filed on July 14, 2011, is GRANTED.”
“RLI Insurance Company’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 38), filed on January 18, 2011, is GRANTED.”
“AIG Premier Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37), filed on November 18, 2010, is DENIED.”
“Defendant Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company’s Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19), filed on January 9, 2009, is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs’ Appeal From, Objections To, and Motion to Vacate Magistrate Judge’s Order Excluding Evidence and Argument About Foreign Seroquel Labels and Foreign Regulatory Actions (Doc. No. 1288), filed on February 13, 2009, is OVERRULED AND DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider Order (Doc. No. 1287), filed on February 13, 2009, is MOOT.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 171 days (N = 20).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 111 days (N = 5).
- In the reviewed 2016 civil matters, many employment, benefits, and consumer cases settled at mediation within several months.
- Prisoner civil-rights and habeas matters often ended within days or weeks, while a smaller number of commercial disputes continued through contested relief, including a trademark case that reached a permanent injunction after roughly two years.
- The mix is descriptive rather than a complete caseload measure.
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