Selena E. Molina
How Judge Molina decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In forum-selection disputes between related but distinct agreements, she reads the more specific clause as controlling over a broader, more general one, harmonizing rather than voiding either provision.
“The specific-over-general rule of contract interpretation ... favors the Incentive Unit Agreement and provides another reason for this Court to dismiss in favor of the expressly chosen forum.”
On a Section 220 books-and-records demand, she will order production tailored strictly to whichever purpose the stockholder has actually proven, denying the broader investigation-purpose categories where the evidentiary showing of a credible basis to suspect wrongdoing falls short, even while granting the narrower valuation-purpose categories.
“I find the Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a credible basis to suspect a possibility of wrongdoing. Thus, ... I resolve that dispute by ordering production only of those documents necessary and essential to the Defendant's valuation purpose.”
She looks past a self-represented litigant's inartful pleading to the substance of what he actually seeks, giving pro se filings 'forgiving eyes,' while still holding them to genuine statutory prerequisites (like Section 220's form-and-manner demand requirements) that cannot be excused by liberality alone.
“The Plaintiff is self-represented and entitled to a review of his action with forgiving eyes.”
Procedural preferences
Facing a first-filed administrative or arbitral proceeding covering the same dispute, she applies the McWane presumption of dismissal rather than allow parallel litigation, regardless of whether the first-filed forum is a court, an arbitration panel, or an administrative board.
“This argument imposes a new geographical restriction not evident in McWane, Cryo-Maid, or their progeny. Those cases, rather, focus on whether there is a parallel action.”
She enforces Rule 15(aaa)'s strict consequences for a plaintiff who chooses to rest on the existing complaint through motion-to-dismiss briefing rather than timely amend, dismissing with prejudice absent good cause shown for the delay.
“The Plaintiffs made the tactical decision to rest on the Complaint and oppose the Motion to Dismiss through briefing. ... Such has consequences: dismissal with prejudice.”
On contractual prevailing-party fee-shifting clauses, she applies an all-or-nothing approach absent clear claim-by-claim language in the contract itself, declining invitations to proportionally apportion fees among a litigant's several claims.
“The Provision is a clear and unequivocal fee shifting provision, which shifts all fees and costs in favor of the prevailing party in litigation 'arising out of or relating to' the LLC agreement.”
In advancement disputes, she reads broad 'relating to or arising out of' contractual language expansively and is skeptical of a company's attempt to amend around an advancement obligation by lightly editing a complaint's wording rather than its underlying substance.
“Delaware courts recognize the phrases 'relating to' and 'arising out of' as 'paradigmatically broad terms.'”
Cautions
She will not draw an inference of wrongdoing or confidential-information misuse from the bare fact that former employees started a competing business; she requires the pleading to actually connect a named customer or a specific misused document to the defendant's conduct.
“Merely averring that the Defendants solicited unnamed customers through their operation of a competitive business is conclusory and non-specific.”
Her recommendations are not immune from reversal: in the highest-profile matter of her tenure, a Vice Chancellor's de novo review on exceptions found she had applied too demanding a standard in weighing extensive contemporaneous press reporting toward a stockholder's credible-basis showing.
“The stockholder established a proper purpose by proving a credible basis to suspect corporate wrongdoing.”
In partition actions, she holds the party resisting the statutory preference for an in-kind division to a real evidentiary burden -- unrebutted expert valuation testimony that a split preserves aggregate value will defeat a bare assertion that division would be detrimental.
“Goldstein has failed to present affirmative evidence supporting a finding that the aggregate value of the Property subdivided is less than the value as a single unit. Such was Goldstein's burden and he failed to adduce evidence to meet it.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“I find the partition in kind is not detrimental to the parties' interests and CTC's proposed partition is fair and equitable. Thus, I recommend judgment be entered in favor of CTC, and the Property partitioned as proposed by CTC.”
“I recommend that the plaintiffs' claims for breach of the alleged oral agreements, breach of the implied covenant, and promissory estoppel be dismissed with prejudice. That leaves the plaintiffs' claims for breach of the written agreement, fraudulent inducement, equitable fraud, and negligent misrepresentation, which I find should survive the pleadings and proceed to discovery.”
“I find the motions to dismiss should be granted and this action should be dismissed in full. I further find that the plaintiff's Motions fail to support maintenance of this litigation and should be denied.”
“I find the Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a credible basis to suspect a possibility of wrongdoing. Thus, where there remains a dispute regarding the scope of production, I resolve that dispute by ordering production only of those documents necessary and essential to the Defendant's valuation purpose.”
“The Exceptant's request for an extension should be DENIED, the Executor's request to dismiss should be GRANTED, and the Exceptions should be DISMISSED as untimely.”
“I find this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against Poore. Those claims should be dismissed, with leave to transfer to the Family Court. Further proceedings are needed to address subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims.”
“I find that Atlantic's motion to dismiss should be granted, as explained below, rendering Sussex County's motion moot. ... this action should be dismissed for forum non conveniens without prejudice and in favor of the first-filed Administrative Proceedings.”
“Through this report, I recommend that the administrator of late ward's estate begin taking concrete steps to close the estate. I find, based on the record developed at the evidentiary hearing, there is nothing left for probate, and it is in the best interest of the estate and its beneficiaries for the neutral administrator to file a final accounting, distribute the estate, and close this matter for good.”
“I find the Plaintiff has proven her claim for equitable fraud and, to remedy that fraud, I recommend equitable recission of the transfer of the Original Title to the Defendant. Title to the Coupe should revert to the Plaintiff.”
“The Rule is hereby made ABSOLUTE, and the Motion is, therefore, GRANTED.”
“I find the Complaint and the Tenant's claims and requests for relief therein, are not so narrow. ... I find the Complaint should survive and the Motion should be denied.”
“The Motion is GRANTED and the Motion to Compel is DENIED. ... I find (1) and (3) should be dismissed on the merits and the remainder of this action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, with leave to transfer to a court with jurisdiction.”
Put Judge Molina's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Molina actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Molina's own signed orders and cites them.