Selena E. Molina
How Judge Molina rules, drawn from 29 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Molina no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Molina
Selena E. Molina served as a Magistrate in Chancery on the Delaware Court of Chancery from 2019 until her departure in February 2026. She became Senior Magistrate in Chancery in 2025. She earned her undergraduate and law degrees at Widener University.
How Judge Molina decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Vortex Infrastructure v. Kane, she read two related agreements together and applied the incentive-unit agreement's more specific Texas forum clause, dismissing the Delaware suit without prejudice.
“The specific-over-general rule of contract interpretation ... favors the Incentive Unit Agreement and provides another reason for this Court to dismiss in favor of the expressly chosen forum.”
In Zinnah Investments v. Xyleco, she ordered Section 220 production limited to documents needed for valuation because the shareholder had not shown a credible basis to investigate wrongdoing.
“I find the Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a credible basis to suspect a possibility of wrongdoing. Thus, ... I resolve that dispute by ordering production only of those documents necessary and essential to the Defendant's valuation purpose.”
In Fedder v. Aspen/Brennan, she read a self-represented plaintiff’s pleading with “forgiving eyes” but dismissed the Section 220 claim for failing the statute’s form and manner requirements.
“The Plaintiff is self-represented and entitled to a review of his action with forgiving eyes.”
Procedural preferences
In Karpoff v. Atlantic Concrete, she dismissed the Chancery case without prejudice in favor of an earlier county-board administrative appeal covering the same zoning issue, applying the McWane first-filed principle.
“This argument imposes a new geographical restriction not evident in McWane, Cryo-Maid, or their progeny. Those cases, rather, focus on whether there is a parallel action.”
In Messina v. Killmon, she denied a late amendment request under Chancery Rule 15(aaa) after the plaintiffs chose to brief the dismissal motion on their existing complaint, and dismissed some claims with prejudice.
“The Plaintiffs made the tactical decision to rest on the Complaint and oppose the Motion to Dismiss through briefing. ... Such has consequences: dismissal with prejudice.”
In Leistner v. Red Mud Enterprises, she held that the operating agreement's broad prevailing-party fee clause covered the whole action, rejected claim-by-claim apportionment, and ordered reasonable fees shifted subject to billing review.
“The Provision is a clear and unequivocal fee shifting provision, which shifts all fees and costs in favor of the prevailing party in litigation 'arising out of or relating to' the LLC agreement.”
In Barr, she held that the company’s amended complaint did not extinguish a former officer and director’s advancement right under the LLC agreement.
“the amended complaint did not extinguish advancement”
Cautions
In Kalkomey, Molina found a solicitation allegation too conclusory because the complaint named no customers allegedly solicited through the defendants’ competing business.
“Merely averring that the Defendants solicited unnamed customers ... through their operation of a competitive business is conclusory and non-specific.”
In CTC East, Molina recommended partition in kind after finding that Goldstein had offered no affirmative evidence that subdivision would reduce the property’s total value.
“Goldstein has not presented affirmative evidence supporting a finding that the aggregate value of the Property subdivided is less than the value as a single unit.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“I find the partition in kind is not detrimental to the parties' interests and CTC's proposed partition is fair and equitable. Thus, I recommend judgment be entered in favor of CTC, and the Property partitioned as proposed by CTC.”
“For the above reasons, I find the Motion to Dismiss should be granted in part and denied in part.”
“For the above reasons, I find that the Motions to Dismiss should be granted, and the Plaintiff’s Motions denied.”
“I find the Plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that there is a credible basis to suspect a possibility of wrongdoing. Thus, where there remains a dispute regarding the scope of production, I resolve that dispute by ordering production only of those documents necessary and essential to the Defendant's valuation purpose.”
“The Exceptant's request for an extension should be DENIED, the Executor's request to dismiss should be GRANTED, and the Exceptions should be DISMISSED as untimely.”
“I find this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against Poore. Those claims should be dismissed, with leave to transfer to the Family Court. Further proceedings are needed to address subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims.”
“I find that Atlantic's motion to dismiss should be granted, as explained below, rendering Sussex County's motion moot. ... this action should be dismissed for forum non conveniens without prejudice and in favor of the first-filed Administrative Proceedings.”
“Through this report, I recommend that the administrator of late ward's estate begin taking concrete steps to close the estate. I find, based on the record developed at the evidentiary hearing, there is nothing left for probate, and it is in the best interest of the estate and its beneficiaries for the neutral administrator to file a final accounting, distribute the estate, and close this matter for good.”
“I find the Plaintiff has proven her claim for equitable fraud and, to remedy that fraud, I recommend equitable recission of the transfer of the Original Title to the Defendant. Title to the Coupe should revert to the Plaintiff.”
“The Rule is hereby made ABSOLUTE, and the Motion is, therefore, GRANTED.”
“For these reasons, I find the Motion should be denied.”
“The Motion is GRANTED and the Motion to Compel is DENIED. ... I find (1) and (3) should be dismissed on the merits and the remainder of this action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, with leave to transfer to a court with jurisdiction.”
A historical record
Judge Molina no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.